Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that
enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP
but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections
enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious
software will provide no paging-based timing information.
Based on a linear-address organization, LASS partitions 64-bit linear
address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and
supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1).
LASS aims to prevent any attempt to probe supervisor-mode addresses by
user mode, and likewise stop any attempt to access (if SMAP enabled) or
execute user-mode addresses from supervisor mode.
When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature
to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and
allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction
executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check. But KVM
also needs to behave same as hardware to apply LASS to kinds of guest
memory accesses when emulating instructions by software.
KVM will take following LASS violations check on emulation path.
User-mode access to supervisor space address:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3)
Supervisor-mode access to user space address:
Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3)
Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 &&
CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)
This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel
enabling that can be found at
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS
enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As KVM
unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule, we use kernel module
and application test to emulate LASS violation instead. With KVM forced
emulation mechanism, we also verified the LASS functionality on some
emulation path with instruction fetch and data access to have same
behavior as hardware.
How to extend kselftest to support LASS is under investigation and
experiment.
[1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
v1->v2
1. refactor and optimize the interface of instruction emulation
by introducing new set of operation type definition prefixed with
"X86EMUL_F_" to distinguish access.
2. reorganize the patch to make each area of KVM better isolated.
3. refine LASS violation check design with consideration of wraparound
access across address space boundary.
v0->v1
1. Adapt to new __linearize() API
2. Function refactor of vmx_check_lass()
3. Refine commit message to be more precise
4. Drop LASS kvm cap detection depending
on hardware capability
Binbin Wu (4):
KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize()
KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch instructions
KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access
KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVTLB and pass it in em_invlpg()
Zeng Guang (4):
KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear
address
KVM: VMX: Implement and apply vmx_is_lass_violation() for LASS
protection
KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 9 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
11 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--
2.27.0
