On 6/8/2023 2:06 PM, Dmytro Maluka wrote:
On 3/24/23 11:30, Keir Fraser wrote:
On Tue, Mar 14, 2023 at 07:21:18AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Tue, Mar 14, 2023, Jason Chen CJ wrote:
On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 09:33:41AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Mon, Mar 13, 2023, Jason Chen CJ wrote:
There are similar use cases on x86 platforms requesting protected
environment which is isolated from host OS for confidential computing.
What exactly are those use cases? The more details you can provide, the better.
E.g. restricting the isolated VMs to 64-bit mode a la TDX would likely simplify
the pKVM implementation.
Thanks Sean for your comments, I am very appreciated!
We are expected
Who is "we"? Unless Intel is making a rather large pivot, I doubt Intel is the
end customer of pKVM-on-x86. If you aren't at liberty to say due NDA/confidentiality,
then please work with whoever you need to in order to get permission to fully
disclose the use case. Because realistically, without knowing exactly what is
in scope and why, this is going nowhere.
This is being seriously evaluated by ChromeOS as an alternative to
their existing ManaTEE design. Compared with that (hypervisor == full
Linux) the pKVM design is pretty attractive: smaller TCB, host Linux
"VM" runs closer to native and without nested scheduling, demonstrated
better performance, and closer alignment with Android virtualisation
(that's my team, which of course is ARM focused, but we'd love to see
broader uptake of pKVM in the kernel).
Right, we (Google with the help of Semihalf and Intel) have been
evaluating pKVM for ChromeOS on Intel platforms (using this Intel's
pKVM-on-x86 PoC) as a platform for running secure workloads in VMs
protected from the untrusted ChromeOS host, and it looks quite promising
so far, in terms of both performance and design simplicity.
The primary use cases for those secure workloads on Chromebooks are for
protection of sensitive biometric data (e.g. fingerprints, face
authentication), which means that we expect pKVM to provide not just the
basic memory protection for secure VMs but also protection of secure
devices assigned to those VMs (e.g. fingerprint sensor, secure camera).
Very interesting usecases. I would be interested to know how you plan to
paravirt the clocks and regulators required for these devices on the
guest VM (Protected VM) on x86. On ARM, we have SCMI specification w/
virtio-scmi, it is possible to do the clock and regulators paravirt.
Camera may have need more h/w dependencies than clocks and regulators
like flash LEDs, gpios, IOMMUs, I2C on top of the camera driver pipeline
itself.
Do you have any proof-of-concept for above usecases to check and
reproduce on the chrome w/ x86?
Do we have the recording of the PUCK meeting?
---Trilok Soni
