Sean, ping?
I wonder if this sev-es-not-singlestepping is a showstopper or it is
alright to repost this patchset without it? Thanks,
On 30/5/23 18:57, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 27/5/23 00:39, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Fri, May 26, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 24/5/23 01:44, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Tue, May 23, 2023, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Actually, can't disabling #DB interception for DebugSwap SEV-ES
guests be a
separate patch? KVM can still inject #DBs for SEV-ES guests, no?
Sorry for my ignorance but what is the point of injecting #DB if
there is no
way of changing the guest's DR7?
Well, _injecting_ the #DB is necessary for correctness from the
guest's perspective.
"What's the point of _intercepting_ #DB" is the real question. And
for SEV-ES guests
with DebugSwap, there is no point, which is why I agree that KVM
should disable
interception in that case. What I'm calling out is that disabling
#Db interception
isn't _necessary_ for correctness (unless I'm missing something),
which means that
it can and should go in a separate patch.
About this. Instead of sev_es_init_vmcb(), I can toggle the #DB
intercept
when toggling guest_debug, see below. This
kvm_x86_ops::update_exception_bitmap hook is called on vcpu reset and
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug (which skips this call if
guest_state_protected = true).
KVM also intercepts #DB when single-stepping over IRET to find an NMI
window, so
you'd also have to factor in nmi_singlestep, and update
svm_enable_nmi_window()
and disable_nmi_singlestep() to call svm_update_exception_bitmap().
Uff. New can of worms for me :-/
Is there any downside?
Complexity is the main one. The complexity is quite low, but the
benefit to the
guest is likely even lower. A #DB in the guest isn't likely to be
performance
sensitive. And on the flip side, opening an NMI window would be a
tiny bit more
expensive, though I doubt that would be meaningful either.
All in all, I think it makes sense to just keep intercepting #DB for
non-SEV-ES
guests.
Side topic, isn't there an existing bug regarding SEV-ES NMI windows?
KVM can't
actually single-step an SEV-ES guest, but tries to set RFLAGS.TF anyways.
Why is it a "bug" and what does the patch fix? Sound to me as it is
pointless and the guest won't do single stepping and instead will run
till it exits somehow, what do I miss?
Blech,
and suppressing EFER.SVME in efer_trap() is a bit gross,
Why suppressed? svm_set_efer() sets it eventually anyway.
but I suppose since the
GHCB doesn't allow for CLGI or STGI it's "fine".
GHCB does not mention this, instead these are always intercepted in
init_vmcb().
E.g. shouldn't KVM do this?
It sure can and I am happy to include this into the series, the commit
log is what I am struggling with :)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index ca32389f3c36..4e4a49031efe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3784,6 +3784,16 @@ static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct
kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
+ /*
+ * KVM can't single-step SEV-ES guests and instead assumes
that IRET
+ * in the guest will always succeed,
It relies on GHCB's NMI_COMPLETE (which SVM than handles is it was IRET):
case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
break;
i.e. clears NMI masking on the
+ * next VM-Exit. Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES
guests
+ * as the GHCB doesn't allow for CLGI or STGI (and KVM suppresses
+ * EFER.SVME for good measure, see efer_trap()).
SVM KVM seems to not enforce EFER.SVME, the guest does what it wants and
KVM is only told the new value via EFER_WRITE_TRAP. And "writes by
SEV-ES guests to EFER.SVME are always ignored by hardware" says the APM.
I must be missing the point here...
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
if (!gif_set(svm)) {
if (vgif)
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
--
Alexey
