On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 3:44 PM Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 1:24 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 12:30:06AM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > > > > > HEAD commit: 933174ae28ba Merge tag 'spi-fix-v6.4-rc3' of git://git.ker.. > > > git tree: upstream > > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=138d4ae5280000 > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=f389ffdf4e9ba3f0 > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d0d442c22fa8db45ff0e > > > compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 > > > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. > > > > > > Downloadable assets: > > > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/21a81b8c2660/disk-933174ae.raw.xz > > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/b4951d89e238/vmlinux-933174ae.xz > > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/21eb405303cc/bzImage-933174ae.xz > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > Reported-by: syzbot+d0d442c22fa8db45ff0e@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] > > > CPU: 0 PID: 29845 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3-syzkaller-00032-g933174ae28ba #0 > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/16/2023 > > > RIP: 0010:vhost_work_queue drivers/vhost/vhost.c:259 [inline] > > > RIP: 0010:vhost_work_queue+0xfc/0x150 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:248 > > > Code: 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 da 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 56 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 1b 48 8d 7b 70 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 42 48 8b 7b 70 e8 95 9e ae f9 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000333faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > > > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc9000d84d000 > > > RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff841221d7 RDI: 0000000000000070 > > > RBP: ffff88804b6b95b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88804b6b00b0 > > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88804b6b95e0 R15: ffff88804b6b95c8 > > > FS: 00007f3b445ec700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > CR2: 0000001b2e423000 CR3: 000000005d734000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > DR3: 000000000000003b DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > Call Trace: > > > <TASK> > > > vhost_transport_send_pkt+0x268/0x520 drivers/vhost/vsock.c:288 > > > virtio_transport_send_pkt_info+0x54c/0x820 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:250 > > > virtio_transport_connect+0xb1/0xf0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:813 > > > vsock_connect+0x37f/0xcd0 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c:1414 > > > __sys_connect_file+0x153/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2003 > > > __sys_connect+0x165/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2020 > > > __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2030 [inline] > > > __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2027 [inline] > > > __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2027 > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > > > do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > > > RIP: 0033:0x7f3b4388c169 > > > Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > > > RSP: 002b:00007f3b445ec168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a > > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3b439ac050 RCX: 00007f3b4388c169 > > > RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004 > > > RBP: 00007f3b438e7ca1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 > > > R13: 00007f3b43acfb1f R14: 00007f3b445ec300 R15: 0000000000022000 > > > </TASK> > > > Modules linked in: > > > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > > > RIP: 0010:vhost_work_queue drivers/vhost/vhost.c:259 [inline] > > > RIP: 0010:vhost_work_queue+0xfc/0x150 drivers/vhost/vhost.c:248 > > > Code: 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 da 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 56 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 1b 48 8d 7b 70 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 42 48 8b 7b 70 e8 95 9e ae f9 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000333faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > > > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc9000d84d000 > > > RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff841221d7 RDI: 0000000000000070 > > > RBP: ffff88804b6b95b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88804b6b00b0 > > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88804b6b95e0 R15: ffff88804b6b95c8 > > > FS: 00007f3b445ec700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > CR2: 0000001b2e428000 CR3: 000000005d734000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > DR3: 000000000000003b DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > ---------------- > > > Code disassembly (best guess), 5 bytes skipped: > > > 0: 48 89 da mov %rbx,%rdx > > > 3: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx > > > 7: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) > > > b: 75 56 jne 0x63 > > > d: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax > > > 14: fc ff df > > > 17: 48 8b 1b mov (%rbx),%rbx > > > 1a: 48 8d 7b 70 lea 0x70(%rbx),%rdi > > > 1e: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx > > > 21: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx > > > * 25: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction > > > 29: 75 42 jne 0x6d > > > 2b: 48 8b 7b 70 mov 0x70(%rbx),%rdi > > > 2f: e8 95 9e ae f9 callq 0xf9ae9ec9 > > > 34: 5b pop %rbx > > > 35: 5d pop %rbp > > > 36: 41 5c pop %r12 > > > 38: 41 5d pop %r13 > > > 3a: e9 .byte 0xe9 > > > > > > Stefano, Stefan, take a look? > > I'll take a look. > > From a first glance, it looks like an issue when we call vhost_work_queue(). > @Mike, does that ring any bells since you recently looked at that code? I think it is partially related to commit 6e890c5d5021 ("vhost: use vhost_tasks for worker threads") and commit 1a5f8090c6de ("vhost: move worker thread fields to new struct"). Maybe that commits just highlighted the issue and it was already existing. In this case I think there is a race between vhost_worker_create() and vhost_transport_send_pkt(). vhost_transport_send_pkt() calls vhost_work_queue() without holding the vhost device mutex, so it can run while vhost_worker_create() set dev->worker, but has not yet set worker->vtsk. Before commit 1a5f8090c6de ("vhost: move worker thread fields to new struct"), dev->worker is set when everything was ready, but maybe it was just a case of the instructions not being re-ordered and the problem could still occur. This happens because VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID can be called before VHOST_SET_OWNER and then vhost_transport_send_pkt() finds the guest's CID and tries to send it a packet. But is it correct to handle VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID, before VHOST_SET_OWNER? QEMU always calls VHOST_SET_OWNER before anything, but I don't know about the other VMMs. So, could it be an acceptable solution to reject VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID before VHOST_SET_OWNER? I mean somethig like this: diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vsock.c b/drivers/vhost/vsock.c index 6578db78f0ae..33fc0805d189 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/vsock.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/vsock.c @@ -829,7 +829,12 @@ static long vhost_vsock_dev_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl, case VHOST_VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID: if (copy_from_user(&guest_cid, argp, sizeof(guest_cid))) return -EFAULT; - return vhost_vsock_set_cid(vsock, guest_cid); + mutex_lock(&vsock->dev.mutex); + r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&vsock->dev); + if (!r) + r = vhost_vsock_set_cid(vsock, guest_cid); + mutex_unlock(&vsock->dev.mutex); + return r; case VHOST_VSOCK_SET_RUNNING: if (copy_from_user(&start, argp, sizeof(start))) return -EFAULT; In the documentation, we say: /* Set current process as the (exclusive) owner of this file descriptor. This * must be called before any other vhost command. Further calls to * VHOST_OWNER_SET fail until VHOST_OWNER_RESET is called. */ This should prevents the issue, but could break a wrong userspace. Others idea that I have in mind are: - hold vsock->dev.mutex while calling vhost_work_queue() (performance degradation?) - use RCU to protect dev->worker WDYT? Thanks, Stefano
