Re: [PATCH kernel v4] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES

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Ping? (I am told that pinging once a week is ok) Thanks,

On 14/3/23 20:43, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Ping? Thanks,


On 21/2/23 16:19, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Ping? Thanks,

On 3/2/23 16:14, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Prior to SEV-ES, KVM stored/loaded host debug registers upon switching
to/from a VM. Changing those registers inside a running SEV VM
triggered #VC exit to KVM.

SEV-ES added the encrypted state (ES) which uses an encrypted guest page
for the VM state (VMSA). The hardware saves/restores certain registers on
VMRUN/VMEXIT according to a swap type (A, B, C), see
"Table B-3. Swap Types" in the AMD Architecture Programmer’s Manual
volume 2.

AMD Milan (Fam 19h) introduces support for the debug registers swapping.
DR6 and DR7 are always swapped. DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK are swapped
a type B when SEV_FEATURES[5] ("DebugSwap") is set.

Enable DebugSwap in VMSA. But only do so if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0]
("NoNestedDataBp", "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints") is
supported by the SOC as otherwise a malicious SEV-ES guest can set up
data breakpoints on the #VC IDT entry/stack and cause an infinite loop.

Eliminate DR7 and #DB intercepts as:
- they are not needed when DebugSwap is supported;
- #VC for these intercepts is most likely not supported anyway and
kills the VM.
Keep DR7 intercepted unless DebugSwap enabled to prevent the infinite #DB
loop DoS.

While at this, move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c and move #DB intercept
next to DR7 intercept.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@xxxxxxx>
---
Changes:
v4:
* removed sev_es_is_debug_swap_enabled() helper
* made sev_es_debug_swap_enabled (module param) static
* set sev_feature early in sev_es_init_vmcb() and made intercepts
   dependend on it vs. module param
* move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c

v3:
* rewrote the commit log again
* rebased on tip/master to use recently defined X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP
* s/boot_cpu_has/cpu_feature_enabled/

v2:
* debug_swap moved from vcpu to module_param
* rewrote commit log

---
Tested with:
===
int x;
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
         x = 1;
         return 0;
}
===
gcc -g a.c
rsync a.out ruby-954vm:~/
ssh -t ruby-954vm 'gdb -ex "file a.out" -ex "watch x" -ex r'

where ruby-954vm is a VM.

With "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/debug_swap = 0", gdb does not stop
on the watchpoint, with "= 1" - gdb does.
---
  arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |  1 +
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h     | 42 -------------
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c     | 24 ++++++++
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c     | 65 +++++++++++++++++++-
  4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index cb1ee53ad3b1..665515c7edae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ enum avic_ipi_failure_cause {
  #define AVIC_HPA_MASK    ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
  #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK        0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
  struct vmcb_seg {
      u16 selector;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 4826e6cc611b..653fd09929df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -389,48 +389,6 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3
      return test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
  }
-static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
-{
-    struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
-
-    if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
-    }
-
-    vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
-    vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
-
-    recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
-static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
-{
-    struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
-
-    vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
-
-    /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */
-    if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
-        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
-    }
-
-    recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
  static inline void set_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 bit)
  {
      struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 86d6897f4806..af775410c5eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  #include <asm/pkru.h>
  #include <asm/trapnr.h>
  #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
  #include "mmu.h"
  #include "x86.h"
@@ -52,9 +53,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
  /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
  static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
  module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
+static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0644);
  #else
  #define sev_enabled false
  #define sev_es_enabled false
+#define sev_es_debug_swap false
  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
  static u8 sev_enc_bit;
@@ -2249,6 +2255,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
  out:
      sev_enabled = sev_supported;
      sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+    if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
+        sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
  #endif
  }
@@ -2940,6 +2948,7 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
  static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
  {
      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+    struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
      svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
      svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
@@ -2988,6 +2997,9 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
          if (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
              svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
      }
+
+    if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
+        save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
  }
  void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -3027,6 +3039,18 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)       /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
      hostsa->xss = host_xss;
+
+    /* The DebugSwap SEV feature does Type B swaps of DR[0-3] */
+    if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+        hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
+        hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
+        hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
+        hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
+        hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
+        hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
+        hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
+        hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
+    }
  }
  void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 60c7c880266b..f8e222bee22a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -671,6 +671,65 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
  }
+static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+    struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+    bool intercept;
+
+    if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
+    }
+
+    if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
+        struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
+
+        intercept = !(save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP);
+    } else {
+        intercept = true;
+    }
+
+    if (intercept) {
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+        set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+    }
+
+    recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+    struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+    struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
+
+    vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest unless DebugSwap +     * (depends on NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) is enabled as otherwise a VM writing to DR7
+     * from the #DB handler may trigger infinite loop of #DB's.
+     */
+    if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && (save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP)) {
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+    }
+
+    recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
  static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
  {
      u32 i;
@@ -1184,13 +1243,11 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
      if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
          svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
-    set_dr_intercepts(svm);
-
      set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
      set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
      set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
      set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
-    set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+
      /*
       * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
       * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
@@ -1308,6 +1365,8 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
      if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
          sev_init_vmcb(svm);
+    set_dr_intercepts(svm);
+
      svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
      init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);



--
Alexey



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