On Fri, 10 Mar 2023 15:47:19 +0000
Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 06/03/2023 18:20, Zhi Wang wrote:
> > On Fri, 27 Jan 2023 11:29:21 +0000
> > Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> At runtime if the realm guest accesses memory which hasn't yet been
> >> mapped then KVM needs to either populate the region or fault the guest.
> >>
> >> For memory in the lower (protected) region of IPA a fresh page is
> >> provided to the RMM which will zero the contents. For memory in the
> >> upper (shared) region of IPA, the memory from the memslot is mapped
> >> into the realm VM non secure.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@xxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 10 +++++
> >> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h | 12 ++++++
> >> arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> >> arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >> 4 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> >> index 285e62914ca4..3a71b3d2e10a 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> >> @@ -502,6 +502,16 @@ static inline enum realm_state kvm_realm_state(struct kvm *kvm)
> >> return READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.realm.state);
> >> }
> >>
> >> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(struct kvm *kvm)
> >> +{
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm)) {
> >> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> >> +
> >> + return BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
> >> + }
> >> + return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >
> > "stolen" seems a little bit vague. Maybe "shared" bit would be better as
> > SEV-SNP has C bit and TDX has shared bit. It would be nice to align with
> > the common knowledge.
>
> The Arm CCA term is the "protected" bit[1] - although the bit is
> backwards as it's cleared to indicate protected... so not ideal naming! ;)
>
> But it's termed 'stolen' here as it's effectively removed from the set
> of value address bits. And this function is returning a mask of the bits
> that are not available as address bits. The naming was meant to be
> generic that this could encompass other features that need to reserve
> IPA bits.
>
> But it's possible this is too generic and perhaps we should just deal
> with a single bit rather than potential masks. Alternatively we could
> invert this and return a set of valid bits:
>
> static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_valid_bits(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> if (kvm_is_realm(kvm)) {
> struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
>
> return ~BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
> }
> return ~(gpa_t)0;
> }
>
> That would at least match the current usage where the inverse is what we
> need.
>
> So SEV-SNP or TDX have a concept of a mask to apply to addresses from
> the guest? Can we steal any existing terms?
>
In a general level, they are using "shared"/"private". TDX is using a
function kvm_gfn_shared_mask() to get the mask and three other marcos to
apply the mask on GPA (IPA)[1]. SEV-SNP is re-using SME macros e.g.
__sme_clr() to apply the mask[2].
Guess we can take them as an reference: using an inline function to get
the protected_bit_mask, like kvm_ipa_protected_mask() with the spec text
you pasted in the comment of the function. The name echoes the spec
description.
Then another necessary functions like kvm_gpa_{is, to}_{shared, private}
, which applies the mask to a GPA(IPA), to echo the terms in the generic
KVM knowledge. (Guess we can refine that with realm_is_addr_protected()).
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg4718104.html
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230220183847.59159-25-michael.roth@xxxxxxx/
>
> [1] Technically the spec only states: "Software in a Realm should treat
> the most significant bit of an IPA as a protection attribute." I don't
> think the bit is directly referred to in the spec as anything other than
> "the most significant bit". Although that in itself is confusing as it
> is the most significant *active* bit (i.e the configured IPA size
> changes which bit is used).
>
> > Also, it would be nice to change the name of gpa_stolen_mask accordingly.
> >
> >> static inline bool vcpu_is_rec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >> {
> >> if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_rme_is_available))
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
> >> index 9d1583c44a99..303e4a5e5704 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
> >> @@ -50,6 +50,18 @@ void kvm_destroy_rec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> >> int kvm_rec_enter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> >> int handle_rme_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int rec_run_status);
> >>
> >> +void kvm_realm_unmap_range(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipa, u64 size);
> >> +int realm_map_protected(struct realm *realm,
> >> + unsigned long hva,
> >> + unsigned long base_ipa,
> >> + struct page *dst_page,
> >> + unsigned long map_size,
> >> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
> >> +int realm_map_non_secure(struct realm *realm,
> >> + unsigned long ipa,
> >> + struct page *page,
> >> + unsigned long map_size,
> >> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
> >> int realm_set_ipa_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >> unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
> >> unsigned long ripas);
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> index f29558c5dcbc..5417c273861b 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> >> @@ -235,8 +235,13 @@ static void __unmap_stage2_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64
> >>
> >> lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >> WARN_ON(size & ~PAGE_MASK);
> >> - WARN_ON(stage2_apply_range(kvm, start, end, kvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap,
> >> - may_block));
> >> +
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + kvm_realm_unmap_range(kvm, start, size);
> >> + else
> >> + WARN_ON(stage2_apply_range(kvm, start, end,
> >> + kvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap,
> >> + may_block));
> >> }
> >>
> >> static void unmap_stage2_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64 size)
> >> @@ -250,7 +255,11 @@ static void stage2_flush_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
> >> phys_addr_t addr = memslot->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> phys_addr_t end = addr + PAGE_SIZE * memslot->npages;
> >>
> >> - stage2_apply_range_resched(kvm, addr, end, kvm_pgtable_stage2_flush);
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + kvm_realm_unmap_range(kvm, addr, end - addr);
> >> + else
> >> + stage2_apply_range_resched(kvm, addr, end,
> >> + kvm_pgtable_stage2_flush);
> >> }
> >>
> >> /**
> >> @@ -818,6 +827,10 @@ void stage2_unmap_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> >> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> >> int idx, bkt;
> >>
> >> + /* For realms this is handled by the RMM so nothing to do here */
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + return;
> >> +
> >> idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> >> mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
> >> write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >> @@ -840,6 +853,7 @@ void kvm_free_stage2_pgd(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
> >> pgt = mmu->pgt;
> >> if (kvm_is_realm(kvm) &&
> >> kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_DYING) {
> >> + unmap_stage2_range(mmu, 0, (~0ULL) & PAGE_MASK);
> >> write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >> kvm_realm_destroy_rtts(&kvm->arch.realm, pgt->ia_bits,
> >> pgt->start_level);
> >> @@ -1190,6 +1204,24 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >> return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
> >> }
> >>
> >> +static int realm_map_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa, unsigned long hva,
> >> + kvm_pfn_t pfn, unsigned long map_size,
> >> + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
> >> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> >> +{
> >> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> >> + struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
> >> +
> >> + if (WARN_ON(!(prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W)))
> >> + return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> + if (!realm_is_addr_protected(realm, ipa))
> >> + return realm_map_non_secure(realm, ipa, page, map_size,
> >> + memcache);
> >> +
> >> + return realm_map_protected(realm, hva, ipa, page, map_size, memcache);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
> >> unsigned long fault_status)
> >> @@ -1210,9 +1242,15 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >> unsigned long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
> >> enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> >> struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
> >> + gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
> >>
> >> fault_granule = 1UL << ARM64_HW_PGTABLE_LEVEL_SHIFT(fault_level);
> >> write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
> >> +
> >> + /* Realms cannot map read-only */
> >
> > Out of curiosity, why? It would be nice to have more explanation in the
> > comment.
>
> The RMM specification doesn't support mapping protected memory read
> only. I don't believe there is any reason why it couldn't, but equally I
> don't think there any use cases for a guest needing read-only pages so
> this just isn't supported by the RMM. Since the page is necessarily
> taken away from the host it's fairly irrelevant (from the host's
> perspective) whether it is actually read only or not.
>
> However, this is technically wrong for the case of unprotected (shared)
> pages - it should be possible to map those read only. But I need to have
> a think about how to fix that up.
If the fault IPA carries the protected bit, can't we do like:
if (vcpu_is_rec(vcpu) && fault_ipa_is_protected)
write_fault = true
Are there still other gaps?
>
> >> + if (vcpu_is_rec(vcpu))
> >> + write_fault = true;
> >> +
> >> exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
> >> VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
> >>
> >> @@ -1272,7 +1310,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >> if (vma_pagesize == PMD_SIZE || vma_pagesize == PUD_SIZE)
> >> fault_ipa &= ~(vma_pagesize - 1);
> >>
> >> - gfn = fault_ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> + gfn = (fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
> >>
> >> /*
> >> @@ -1345,7 +1383,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >> * If we are not forced to use page mapping, check if we are
> >> * backed by a THP and thus use block mapping if possible.
> >> */
> >> - if (vma_pagesize == PAGE_SIZE && !(force_pte || device)) {
> >> + /* FIXME: We shouldn't need to disable this for realms */
> >> + if (vma_pagesize == PAGE_SIZE && !(force_pte || device || kvm_is_realm(kvm))) {
> >
> > Why do we have to disable this temporarily?
>
> The current uABI (not using memfd) has some serious issues regarding
> huge page support. KVM normally follows the user space mappings of the
> memslot - so if user space has a huge page (transparent or hugetlbs)
> then stage 2 for the guest also gets one.
>
> However realms sometimes require that the stage 2 differs. The main
> examples are:
>
> * RIPAS - if part of a huge page is RIPAS_RAM and part RIPAS_EMPTY then
> the huge page would have to be split.
>
> * Initially populated memory: basically the same as above - if the
> populated memory doesn't perfectly align with huge pages, then the
> head/tail pages would need to be broken up.
>
> Removing this hack allows the huge pages to be created in stage 2, but
> then causes overmapping of the initial contents, then later on when the
> VMM (or guest) attempts to change the properties of the misaligned tail
> it gets an error because the pages are already present in stage 2.
>
> The planned solution to all this is to stop following the user space
> page tables and create huge pages opportunistically from the memfd that
> backs the protected range. For now this hack exists to avoid things
> "randomly" failing when e.g. the initial kernel image isn't huge page
> aligned. In theory it should be possible to make this work with the
> current uABI, but it's not worth it when we know we're replacing it.
I see. Will dig it and see if there is any idea come to my mind.
>
> >> if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE)
> >> vma_pagesize = fault_granule;
> >> else
> >> @@ -1382,6 +1421,9 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >> */
> >> if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && vma_pagesize == fault_granule)
> >> ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms(pgt, fault_ipa, prot);
> >> + else if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + ret = realm_map_ipa(kvm, fault_ipa, hva, pfn, vma_pagesize,
> >> + prot, memcache);
> >> else
> >> ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_map(pgt, fault_ipa, vma_pagesize,
> >> __pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
> >> @@ -1437,6 +1479,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> >> unsigned long hva;
> >> bool is_iabt, write_fault, writable;
> >> + gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
> >> gfn_t gfn;
> >> int ret, idx;
> >>
> >> @@ -1491,7 +1534,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >>
> >> idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
> >>
> >> - gfn = fault_ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> + gfn = (fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
> >> hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(memslot, gfn, &writable);
> >> write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
> >> @@ -1536,6 +1579,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >> * of the page size.
> >> */
> >> fault_ipa |= kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu) & ((1 << 12) - 1);
> >> + fault_ipa &= ~gpa_stolen_mask;
> >> ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa);
> >> goto out_unlock;
> >> }
> >> @@ -1617,6 +1661,10 @@ bool kvm_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
> >> if (!kvm->arch.mmu.pgt)
> >> return false;
> >>
> >
> > Does the unprotected (shared) region of a realm support aging?
>
> In theory this should be possible to support by unmapping the NS entry
> and handling the fault. But the hardware access flag optimisation isn't
> available with the RMM, and the overhead of RMI calls to unmap/map could
> be significant.
>
> For now this isn't something we've looked at, but I guess it might be
> worth trying out when we have some real hardware to benchmark on.
>
> >> + /* We don't support aging for Realms */
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> WARN_ON(size != PAGE_SIZE && size != PMD_SIZE && size != PUD_SIZE);
> >>
> >> kpte = kvm_pgtable_stage2_mkold(kvm->arch.mmu.pgt,
> >> @@ -1630,6 +1678,10 @@ bool kvm_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
> >> if (!kvm->arch.mmu.pgt)
> >> return false;
> >>
> >> + /* We don't support aging for Realms */
> >> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> return kvm_pgtable_stage2_is_young(kvm->arch.mmu.pgt,
> >> range->start << PAGE_SHIFT);
> >> }
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c
> >> index 3405b43e1421..3d46191798e5 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c
> >> @@ -608,6 +608,54 @@ int realm_map_protected(struct realm *realm,
> >> return -ENXIO;
> >> }
> >>
> >> +int realm_map_non_secure(struct realm *realm,
> >> + unsigned long ipa,
> >> + struct page *page,
> >> + unsigned long map_size,
> >> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> >> +{
> >> + phys_addr_t rd = virt_to_phys(realm->rd);
> >> + int map_level;
> >> + int ret = 0;
> >> + unsigned long desc = page_to_phys(page) |
> >> + PTE_S2_MEMATTR(MT_S2_FWB_NORMAL) |
> >> + /* FIXME: Read+Write permissions for now */
> > Why can't we handle the prot from the realm_map_ipa()? Working in progress? :)
>
> Yes, work in progress - this comes from the "Realms cannot map
> read-only" in user_mem_abort() above. Since all faults are treated as
> write faults we need to upgrade to read/write here too.
>
> The prot in realm_map_ipa isn't actually useful currently because we
> simply WARN_ON and return if it doesn't have PROT_W. Again this needs to
> be fixed! It's on my todo list ;)
>
> Steve
>
> >> + (3 << 6) |
> >> + PTE_SHARED;
> >> +
> >> + if (WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(ipa, map_size)))
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> + switch (map_size) {
> >> + case PAGE_SIZE:
> >> + map_level = 3;
> >> + break;
> >> + case RME_L2_BLOCK_SIZE:
> >> + map_level = 2;
> >> + break;
> >> + default:
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + ret = rmi_rtt_map_unprotected(rd, ipa, map_level, desc);
> >> +
> >> + if (RMI_RETURN_STATUS(ret) == RMI_ERROR_RTT) {
> >> + /* Create missing RTTs and retry */
> >> + int level = RMI_RETURN_INDEX(ret);
> >> +
> >> + ret = realm_create_rtt_levels(realm, ipa, level, map_level,
> >> + memcache);
> >> + if (WARN_ON(ret))
> >> + return -ENXIO;
> >> +
> >> + ret = rmi_rtt_map_unprotected(rd, ipa, map_level, desc);
> >> + }
> >> + if (WARN_ON(ret))
> >> + return -ENXIO;
> >> +
> >> + return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> static int populate_par_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> >> phys_addr_t ipa_base,
> >> phys_addr_t ipa_end)
> >
>
