On 1/30/23 19:54, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 11/1/23 13:01, Kalra, Ashish wrote:On 1/10/2023 6:48 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:On 10/1/23 19:33, Kalra, Ashish wrote:On 1/9/2023 8:28 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:On 10/1/23 10:41, Kalra, Ashish wrote:On 1/8/2023 9:33 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification. The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with thedifference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed throughthe SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get both the report and certificate data at once. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> ---arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)if (ret) goto e_free; + mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock); ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false); } else { ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);@@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)*/static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp){ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {}; - void *context; + void *context, *certs_data; int rc;+ /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest request */+ certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!certs_data) + return NULL; + /* Allocate memory for context page */ context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!context) - return NULL; + goto e_free; data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);- if (rc) { - snp_free_firmware_page(context); - return NULL; - } + if (rc) + goto e_free; + + sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data; return context; + +e_free: + snp_free_firmware_page(context); + kfree(certs_data); + return NULL; } static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)@@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context); sev->snp_context = NULL; + kfree(sev->snp_certs_data); + return 0; }@@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT: case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES: case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC: + case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST: + case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST: break; default: reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;@@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return 1; } +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm, + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, + gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa) +{ + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev; + + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; ++ if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa, PAGE_SIZE))+ return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM; + + req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa)); + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn)) + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; + + resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa)); + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn)) + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; + + if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true)) + return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; + + data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context); + data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); + data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); + + return 0; +} ++static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)+{ + u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + int ret; + + ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn); + if (ret) + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; + + ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); + if (ret) + *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; +} ++static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)+{ + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0}; + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev; + unsigned long rc; + int err; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST; + goto e_fail; + } + + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock); + + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa); + if (rc) + goto unlock; + + rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...+ if (rc) + /* use the firmware error code */ + rc = err; + + snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc); + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock); + +e_fail: + svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc); +} ++static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)+{ + struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0}; + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + unsigned long data_npages; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev; + unsigned long rc, err; + u64 data_gpa; + + if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST; + goto e_fail; + } + + sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + + data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]; + data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) { + rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS; + goto e_fail; + } + + mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock); + + rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa); + if (rc) + goto unlock; ++ rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned long)sev->snp_certs_data,+ &data_npages, &err);but this one does not and jump straight to drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can these two be unified? sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks if fd is /dev/sev which is hardly useful."[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report" added this one.SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST additionally returns a certificate blob and that's why it goes through the CCP driver interface snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used to get both the report and certificate data/blob at the same time.True. I thought though that this calls for extending sev_issue_cmd() to take care of these extra parameters rather than just skipping the sev->fd.All the FW API calls on the KVM side go through sev_issue_cmd() and sev_issue_cmd_external_user() interfaces and that i believe uses sev->fd more of as a sanity check.Does not look like it: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c?h=v6.2-rc3#n1290 === int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, void *data, int *error) { if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops) return -EBADF; return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user); ===The only "more" is that it requires sev->fd to be a valid open fd, what is the value in that? I may easily miss the bigger picture here. Thanks,Have a look at following functions in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: sev_dev_init() and sev_misc_init(). static int sev_misc_init(struct sev_device *sev) { struct device *dev = sev->dev; int ret; /* * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but * the SEV FW commands must be issued on the master. During * probe, we do not know the master hence we create /dev/sev on * the first device probe. * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue * the command to the firmware. */It is still a single /dev/sev node and the userspace cannot get it wrong, it does not have to choose between (for instance) /dev/sev0 and /dev/sev1 on a 2 SOC system.... ...Hence, sev_issue_cmd_external_user() needs to ensure that the correct device (master device) is being operated upon and that's why there is the check for file operations matching sev_fops as below :int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, void *data, int *error) { if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops) return -EBADF; .. ..Essentially, sev->fd is the misc. device created for the master PSP device on which the SEV/SNP firmware commands are issued, hence,sev_issue_cmd() uses sev->fd.There is always just one fd which always uses psp_master, nothing from that fd is used.It also ensures that we can only issue commands (sev_issue_cmd) after SEV/SNP guest has launched.I can open /dev/sev and start sending commands to the firmware with no KVM running at all. Oh well, we discussed this offline :)We don't have a valid fd to use before the guest launch. The file descriptor is passed as part of the guest launch flow, for example, in snp_launch_start().More to the point, if sev->fd is still important, why is it ok to skip it for snp_handle_ext_guest_request()? Thanks,Then, we should do the same for snp_handle_ext_guest_request().Okay.This snp_handle_ext_guest_request() helper is for returning "Table 21. ATTESTATION_REPORT Structure" along with the certificate(s) used to sign the report: "This usage allows the attestation report and the certificates required to verify the report to be returned at the same time".I can see: 1) KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS ioctls on KVM VM and
This allows the VMM to (optionally) supply per-VM certificates that the guest can use to validate the attestation report, instead of the guest requesting separately.
2) SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG ioctls on /dev/sev
This allows the VMM to (optionally) supply certificates used for all VMs, i.e., there is no need for per-VM certificates.
Both store the passed blob and neither communicate it to the firmware. This makes me wonder - how does the attestation report (cooked by the firmware) get signed with those certificates passed on by the HV userspace?
These are for use by the guest to validate the attestation report. It allows the guest to obtain the certificate information without having to use another method to request the certificates.
By having this certificate store, the hypervisor can request the certificates from the KDS once, rather than every time a guest requests an attestation report.
Also, the cached blob in /dev/sev seems redundand - the attestation report is retuned for a specific guest so having a blob in the KVM VM makes sense and KVM unconditionally reserves memory for it anyway. And for the HV itself the blob is useless (?) so why bother with caching it in /dev/sev.
In general, the certificates are for the machine (VCEK, ASK, ARK), so they can be for all VMs on the machine. The per-VM blob allows a VMM to supply additional per-VM certficates, if it desires, but is not required.
And GET ioctls() return what SET passed on (not something the firware returned, for example), what is ever going to call SET? The userspace can
As stated above, the firmware already has the information needed to sign the attestation report. The SET IOCTL is used to supply the certficates to the guest for validation of the attestation report. This reduces the traffic and complexity of the guest requesting the certficates from the KDS.
as well cache what it passed and save a bit of the code/memory in the kernel.btw SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG are documented in Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst but implemented in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c (not sev-guest.c).What do I miss in the big picture here? :) Thanks,
The reason for the extended request is to make the attestation request appear atomic to the guest. If you had to make two calls to request the information, in the future, when live migration is possible, there is no guarantee that the guest couldn't have been migrated in between the calls to obtain the certificates and the call to obtain the attestation report and thus validation of the attestation report could fail.
Thanks, Tom
