On Sun, Jan 01, 2023 at 01:08:07PM +0200, Maxim Levitsky wrote: > On Sun, 2023-01-01 at 16:37 +0900, Hyeonggon Yoo wrote: > > On Sun, Jan 01, 2023 at 03:50:28PM +0900, Hyeonggon Yoo wrote: > > > On Sat, Dec 31, 2022 at 11:26:25PM +0800, kernel test robot wrote: > > > > Greeting, > > > > > > > > FYI, we noticed kernel_BUG_at_include/linux/mm.h due to commit (built with gcc-11): > > > > > > > > commit: 0af8489b0216fa1dd83e264bef8063f2632633d7 ("mm, slub: remove percpu slabs with CONFIG_SLUB_TINY") > > > > https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master > > > > > > > > [test failed on linux-next/master c76083fac3bae1a87ae3d005b5cb1cbc761e31d5] > > > > > > > > in testcase: rcutorture > > > > version: > > > > with following parameters: > > > > > > > > runtime: 300s > > > > test: default > > > > torture_type: tasks-tracing > > > > > > > > test-description: rcutorture is rcutorture kernel module load/unload test. > > > > test-url: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/RCU/torture.txt > > > > > > > > > > > > on test machine: qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -cpu SandyBridge -smp 2 -m 16G > > > > > > > > caused below changes (please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace): > > > > > > > > > > > > If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag > > > > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx> > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202212312021.bc1efe86-oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx > > > > > > <snip> > > > > > > > > > > > To reproduce: > > > > > > > > # build kernel > > > > cd linux > > > > cp config-6.1.0-rc2-00014-g0af8489b0216 .config > > > > make HOSTCC=gcc-11 CC=gcc-11 ARCH=i386 olddefconfig prepare modules_prepare bzImage modules > > > > make HOSTCC=gcc-11 CC=gcc-11 ARCH=i386 INSTALL_MOD_PATH=<mod-install-dir> modules_install > > > > cd <mod-install-dir> > > > > find lib/ | cpio -o -H newc --quiet | gzip > modules.cgz > > > > > > > > > > > > git clone https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests.git > > > > cd lkp-tests > > > > bin/lkp qemu -k <bzImage> -m modules.cgz job-script # job-script is attached in this email > > > > > > > > # if come across any failure that blocks the test, > > > > # please remove ~/.lkp and /lkp dir to run from a clean state. > > > > > > I was unable to reproduce in the same way as described above > > > because some files referenced in job-script couldn't be downloaded from > > > download.01.org/0day :( > > > > > > So I just built rcutorture module as builtin > > > and I got weird spinlock bug on commit: 0af8489b0216 > > > ("mm, slub: remove percpu slabs with CONFIG_SLUB_TINY") > > > > (+Cc KVM/Paravirt experts) > > > > > full dmesg added as attachment > > > > > > [ 1387.564837][ T57] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: c108f5f4 > > > [ 1387.566649][ T57] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode > > > [ 1387.567965][ T57] #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation > > > [ 1387.569439][ T57] *pde = 010001e1 > > > [ 1387.570276][ T57] Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP > > > [ 1387.571149][ T57] CPU: 2 PID: 57 Comm: rcu_torture_rea Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc2-00010-g0af8489b0216 #2130 63d19ac2b985fca570c354d8750f489755de37ed > > > [ 1387.574673][ T57] EIP: kvm_kick_cpu+0x54/0x90 > > > [ 1387.575802][ T57] Code: 2f c5 01 8b 04 9d e0 d4 4e c4 83 15 14 7b 2f c5 00 83 05 08 6d 2f c5 01 0f b7 0c 30 b8 05 00 00 00 83 15 0c 6d 2f c5 00 31 db <0f> 01 c1 83 05 10 6d 2f c5 01 8b 5d f8 8b 75 fc 83 15 14 6d 2f c5 > > ^^^^^^ > Yes this is the unfamous hypercall patching bug.... > > > > > > So what is happening is that Intel and AMD has a *slightly* different instruction reserved for hypercalls > (paravirt calls from guest to host hypervisor). > > KVM developers made a mistake to be 'nice' to the guests and if the guest uses the wrong hypercall instruction > the KVM attempts to rewrite it with the right instruction. > > That can fail, because to avoid security issues, KVM uses the exact same security context as the instruction itself > (it is as if the instruction was defined such as it overwrote itself) > This means that is the guest memory is marked read-only in the guest paging, then the write will fail and #PF > will happen on the wrong hypercall instruction. > > Here we have the Intel's instruction (VMCALL, 0f 01 C1), and the host machine is likely AMD which uses VMMCALL instruction > which is (0F 01 D9) Oh, right. my host machine is AMD Ryzen and seems I built kernel that does not correctly support the machine. > Now any recent Linux guest is supposed to use a right instruction using the alternatives mechanism, but it can if > the hypervisor passes 'non native' vendor id, like GenunineIntel on AMD machine. [ 0.000000][ T0] KERNEL supported cpus: [ 0.000000][ T0] Intel GenuineIntel [ 0.000000][ T0] Vortex Vortex86 SoC [ 0.000000][ T0] CPU: vendor_id 'AuthenticAMD' unknown, using generic init. [ 0.000000][ T0] CPU: Your system may be unstable. > In my testing using named CPU models like you do '-cpu SandyBridge' still passes through host vendor ID (that is the guest > will see Intel's cpu but with vendor='AutheticAMD') but nobody confirmed me that this is a bug or a feature and I am not > sure if older qemu versions also did this. > > Assuming that your host machine is AMD, > your best bet to check if my theory is right is to boot the guest without triggering the bug, > and check in /proc/cpuinfo if the vendor string is 'GenuineIntel' Same here. the vendor string is AuthenticAMD no matter if I pass -cpu SandyBridge or -cpu host. I didn't even imagine this could happen when using configuration the bot passed without thinking and running it on CPU with different vendor :) Thank you for such a kind explanation! Phew, so this bug was totally unrelated the issue bot reported and I have no clue why the original bug happened. -- Regards, Hyeonggon