On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 5:36 AM Andrew Jones <ajones@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > ... > > > > > - csr_write(CSR_HCOUNTEREN, -1UL); > > > > > + /* VS should access only TM bit. Everything else should trap */ > > > > > + csr_write(CSR_HCOUNTEREN, 0x02); > > > > > > > > This looks like something that should be broken out into a separate patch > > > > with a description of what happens now when guests try to access the newly > > > > trapping counter registers. We should probably also create a TM define. > > > > > > > > > > Done. > > > > > > > As we allow cycles & instret for host user space now [1], should we do the same > > for guests as well ? I would prefer not to but same user space > > software will start to break > > they will run inside a guest. > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220928131807.30386-1-palmer@xxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > Yeah, it seems like we should either forbid access to unprivileged users > or ensure the numbers include some random noise. For guests, a privileged > KVM userspace should need to explicitly request access for them, ensuring > that the creation of privileged guests is done by conscious choice. > If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting we only enable TM bit in hcounteren ? We also need a mechanism to enable the hcounteren bits from KVM guest userspace. I can think of the following approaches. 1. The CYCLE, INSTRET enabling can also be via one reg interface. 2. We can enable it during first virtual instruction trap if these bits in guest scounteren are enabled. > Thanks, > drew -- Regards, Atish
