On 11/16/22 11:55, Peter Gonda wrote:
The AMD Secure Processor (ASP) and an SNP guest use a series of
AES-GCM keys called VMPCKs to communicate securely with each other.
The IV to this scheme is a sequence number that both the ASP and the
guest track. Currently this sequence number in a guest request must
exactly match the sequence number tracked by the ASP. This means that
if the guest sees an error from the host during a request it can only
retry that exact request or disable the VMPCK to prevent an IV reuse.
AES-GCM cannot tolerate IV reuse see: "Authentication Failures in NIST
version of GCM" - Antoine Joux et al.
In order to address this make handle_guest_request() delete the VMPCK
on any non successful return. To allow userspace querying the cert_data
length make handle_guest_request() safe the number of pages required by
s/safe/save/
the host, then handle_guest_request() retry the request without
... then have handle_guest_request() ...
requesting the extended data, then return the number of pages required
back to userspace.
Fixes: fce96cf044308 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Just some nits on the commit message and comments below, otherwise
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@xxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index f422f9c58ba79..64b4234c14da8 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -67,8 +67,27 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
return true;
}
+/*
+ * If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there
+ * are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue
+ * using the VMPCK.
+ *
+ * This is because in the current encryption scheme GHCB v2 uses AES-GCM to
+ * encrypt the requests. The IV for this scheme is the sequence number. GCM
+ * cannot tolerate IV reuse.
+ *
+ * The ASP FW v1.51 only increments the sequence numbers on a successful
+ * guest<->ASP back and forth and only accepts messages at its exact sequence
+ * number.
+ *
+ * So if the sequence number were to be reused the encryption scheme is
+ * vulnerable. If the sequence number were incremented for a fresh IV the ASP
+ * will reject the request.
+ */
static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
+ dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id: %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
+ vmpck_id);
memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
}
@@ -321,34 +340,70 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
if (rc)
return rc;
- /* Call firmware to process the request */
+ /*
+ * Call firmware to process the request. In this function the encrypted
+ * message enters shared memory with the host. So after this call the
+ * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
+ * prevent reuse of the IV.
+ */
rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
+
+ /*
+ * If the extended guest request fails due to having too small of a
+ * certificate data buffer retry the same guest request without the
+ * extended data request in order to not have to reuse the IV.
... in order to increment the sequence number to avoid reuse of the IV.
+ */
+ if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST &&
+ err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN) {
+ const unsigned int certs_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
+
+ exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+ /*
+ * If this call to the firmware succeeds the sequence number can
+ * be incremented allowing for continued use of the VMPCK. If
+ * there is an error reflected in the return value, this value
+ * is checked further down and the result will be the deletion
+ * of the VMPCK and the error code being propagated back to the
+ * user as an IOCLT return code.
s/IOCLT/ioctl()/
Thanks,
Tom
+ */
+ rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
+
+ /*
+ * Override the error to inform callers the given extended
+ * request buffer size was too small and give the caller the
+ * required buffer size.
+ */
+ err = SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN;
+ snp_dev->input.data_npages = certs_npages;
+ }
+
if (fw_err)
*fw_err = err;
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
+ "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n",
+ rc, *fw_err);
+ goto disable_vmpck;
+ }
- /*
- * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is
- * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload.
- * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that
- * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure
- * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload.
- */
rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
if (rc) {
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
- "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n",
- vmpck_id);
- snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
- return rc;
+ "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n",
+ rc);
+ goto disable_vmpck;
}
/* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
return 0;
+
+disable_vmpck:
+ snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
+ return rc;
}
static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
