Verify that KVM does, and does not, modify the allowed set of VMX's
secondary execution controls during KVM_SET_CPUID. Historically, KVM has
modified select bits in response to guest CPUID changes to try and force
a consistent CPU model. KVM's meddling causes problems if userspace
invokes KVM_SET_CPUID after explicitly setting the MSR, as KVM may end up
overriding a legal userspace config.
Newer, fixed KVM versions maintain the historical meddling for backwards
compatibility, but only if userspace has never set the MSR for the vCPU.
I.e. KVM transfers ownership to userspace on the first write.
Opportunistically fix some funky names in tools' definitions for a few
secondary execution controls.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/vmx.h | 4 +-
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_msrs_test.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
index e8ca0d8a6a7e..d01de81fc0ed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_cpu_feature {
#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 10)
#define X86_FEATURE_RTM KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 11)
#define X86_FEATURE_MPX KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 14)
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDSEED KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 18)
#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 20)
#define X86_FEATURE_PCOMMIT KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 22)
#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x7, 0, EBX, 23)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/vmx.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/vmx.h
index 71b290b6469d..56c1771ba6b8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/vmx.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/vmx.h
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS 0x00004000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING 0x00010000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000
-#define SECONDARY_EPT_VE 0x00040000
-#define SECONDARY_ENABLE_XSAV_RESTORE 0x00100000
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VE 0x00040000
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES 0x00100000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING 0x02000000
#define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK 0x00000001
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_msrs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_msrs_test.c
index 322d561b4260..dbd60a989b28 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_msrs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/vmx_msrs_test.c
@@ -12,6 +12,96 @@
#include "kvm_util.h"
#include "vmx.h"
+static void vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const char *name, uint64_t ctrl)
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT(vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2) & ctrl,
+ "Expected '%s' to be allowed in sec exec controls", name);
+}
+
+static void vmx_sec_exec_assert_denied(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const char *name, uint64_t ctrl)
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT(!(vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2) & ctrl),
+ "Expected '%s' to be denied in sec exec controls", name);
+}
+
+static void vmx_sec_exec_control_test(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const char *name,
+ struct kvm_x86_cpu_feature feature,
+ uint64_t ctrl, bool kvm_owned)
+{
+ /* Allowed-1 settings are in the upper 32 bits. */
+ ctrl <<= 32;
+
+ if (!this_cpu_has(feature))
+ return;
+
+ if (kvm_owned) {
+ vcpu_set_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_clear_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_denied(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ /* Make sure KVM is actually toggling the bit. */
+ vcpu_set_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+ } else {
+ vcpu_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+ vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2) | ctrl);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_set_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_clear_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_allowed(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+ vcpu_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2) & ~ctrl);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_denied(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_set_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_denied(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+
+ vcpu_clear_cpuid_feature(vcpu, feature);
+ vmx_sec_exec_assert_denied(vcpu, name, ctrl);
+ }
+}
+
+#define vmx_sec_exec_feature_test(vcpu, name, kvm_owned) \
+ vmx_sec_exec_control_test(vcpu, #name, X86_FEATURE_##name, \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_##name, kvm_owned)
+
+#define vmx_sec_exec_exiting_test(vcpu, name, kvm_owned) \
+ vmx_sec_exec_control_test(vcpu, #name, X86_FEATURE_##name, \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_##name##_EXITING, kvm_owned)
+
+static void vmx_sec_exec_controls_test(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+ vcpu_set_cpuid_feature(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
+
+ if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+ vcpu_clear_cpuid_feature(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that for features KVM has historically taken control of, KVM
+ * updates PROCBASED_CTLS2 during KVM_SET_CPUID if userspace has never
+ * set the MSR, but leaves it alone once userspace writes the MSR.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ vmx_sec_exec_feature_test(vcpu, XSAVES, !i);
+ vmx_sec_exec_feature_test(vcpu, RDTSCP, !i);
+ vmx_sec_exec_feature_test(vcpu, INVPCID, !i);
+ vmx_sec_exec_exiting_test(vcpu, RDRAND, !i);
+ vmx_sec_exec_exiting_test(vcpu, RDSEED, !i);
+ }
+}
+
static void vmx_fixed1_msr_test(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, uint32_t msr_index,
uint64_t mask)
{
@@ -78,6 +168,8 @@ int main(void)
/* No need to actually do KVM_RUN, thus no guest code. */
vm = vm_create_with_one_vcpu(&vcpu, NULL);
+ vmx_sec_exec_controls_test(vcpu);
+
vmx_save_restore_msrs_test(vcpu);
kvm_vm_free(vm);
--
2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog
