On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 12:31:20PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 04:00:00PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 11:51:54AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 03:49:02PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 11:08:23AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 12:20:50PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 21, 2022 at 03:44:24PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 21, 2022 at 12:06:49PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote: > > > > > > > > The issue is where we account these pinned pages, where accounting is > > > > > > > > necessary such that a user cannot lock an arbitrary number of pages > > > > > > > > into RAM to generate a DoS attack. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is worth pointing out that preventing a DOS attack doesn't actually > > > > > > > work because a *task* limit is trivially bypassed by just spawning > > > > > > > more tasks. So, as a security feature, this is already very > > > > > > > questionable. > > > > > > > > > > > > The malicious party on host VM hosts is generally the QEMU process. > > > > > > QEMU is normally prevented from spawning more tasks, both by SELinux > > > > > > controls and be the seccomp sandbox blocking clone() (except for > > > > > > thread creation). We need to constrain what any individual QEMU can > > > > > > do to the host, and the per-task mem locking limits can do that. > > > > > > > > > > Even with syscall limits simple things like execve (enabled eg for > > > > > qemu self-upgrade) can corrupt the kernel task-based accounting to the > > > > > point that the limits don't work. > > > > > > > > Note, execve is currently blocked by default too by the default > > > > seccomp sandbox used with libvirt, as well as by the SELinux > > > > policy again. self-upgrade isn't a feature that exists (yet). > > > > > > That userspace has disabled half the kernel isn't an excuse for the > > > kernel to be insecure by design :( This needs to be fixed to enable > > > features we know are coming so.. > > > > > > What would libvirt land like to see given task based tracking cannot > > > be fixed in the kernel? > > > > There needs to be a mechanism to control individual VMs, whether by > > task or by cgroup. User based limits are not suited to what we need > > to achieve. > > The kernel has already standardized on user based limits here for > other subsystems - libvirt and qemu cannot ignore that it exists. It > is only a matter of time before qemu starts using these other > subsystem features (eg io_uring) and has problems. > > So, IMHO, the future must be that libvirt/etc sets an unlimited > rlimit, because the user approach is not going away in the kernel and > it sounds like libvirt cannot accommodate it at all. > > This means we need to provide a new mechanism for future libvirt to > use. Are you happy with cgroups? Yes, we use cgroups extensively already. With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
