Re: [PATCH v4] x86/speculation, KVM: remove IBPB on vCPU load

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 8:19 PM Jon Kohler <jon@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On May 12, 2022, at 11:06 PM, Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 5:50 PM Jon Kohler <jon@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> You mentioned if someone was concerned about performance, are you
> >> saying they also critically care about performance, such that they are
> >> willing to *not* use IBPB at all, and instead just use taskset and hope
> >> nothing ever gets scheduled on there, and then hope that the hypervisor
> >> does the job for them?
> >
> > I am saying that IBPB is not the only viable mitigation for
> > cross-process indirect branch steering. Proper scheduling can also
> > solve the problem, without the overhead of IBPB. Say that you have two
> > security domains: trusted and untrusted. If you have a two-socket
> > system, and you always run trusted workloads on socket#0 and untrusted
> > workloads on socket#1, IBPB is completely superfluous. However, if the
> > hypervisor chooses to schedule a vCPU thread from virtual socket#0
> > after a vCPU thread from virtual socket#1 on the same logical
> > processor, then it *must* execute an IBPB between those two vCPU
> > threads. Otherwise, it has introduced a non-architectural
> > vulnerability that the guest can't possibly be aware of.
> >
> > If you can't trust your OS to schedule tasks where you tell it to
> > schedule them, can you really trust it to provide you with any kind of
> > inter-process security?
>
> Fair enough, so going forward:
> Should this be mandatory in all cases? How this whole effort came
> was that a user could configure their KVM host with conditional
> IBPB, but this particular mitigation is now always on no matter what.
>
> In our previous patch review threads, Sean and I mostly settled on making
> this particular avenue active only when a user configures always_ibpb, such
> that for cases like the one you describe (and others like it that come up in
> the future) can be covered easily, but for cond_ibpb, we can document
> that it doesn’t cover this case.
>
> Would that be acceptable here?

That would make me unhappy. We use cond_ibpb, and I don't want to
switch to always_ibpb, yet I do want this barrier.

> >
> >> Would this be the expectation of just KVM? Or all hypervisors on the
> >> market?
> >
> > Any hypervisor that doesn't do this is broken, but that won't keep it
> > off the market. :-)
>
> Very true :)
>




[Index of Archives]     [KVM ARM]     [KVM ia64]     [KVM ppc]     [Virtualization Tools]     [Spice Development]     [Libvirt]     [Libvirt Users]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Questions]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]

  Powered by Linux