On Wed, 23 Feb 2022 04:18:28 +0000,
Oliver Upton <oupton@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> DEN0022D.b 5.6.2 "Caller responsibilities" states that a PSCI
> implementation may return INVALID_ADDRESS for the CPU_ON call if the
> provided entry address is known to be invalid. There is an additional
> caveat to this rule. Prior to PSCI v1.0, the INVALID_PARAMETERS error
> is returned instead. Check the guest's PSCI version and return the
> appropriate error if the IPA is invalid.
>
> Reported-by: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
> index a0c10c11f40e..de1cf554929d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>
> #include <asm/cputype.h>
> #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
> +#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
>
> #include <kvm/arm_psci.h>
> #include <kvm/arm_hypercalls.h>
> @@ -70,12 +71,31 @@ static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_on(struct kvm_vcpu *source_vcpu)
> struct vcpu_reset_state *reset_state;
> struct kvm *kvm = source_vcpu->kvm;
> struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL;
> - unsigned long cpu_id;
> + unsigned long cpu_id, entry_addr;
>
> cpu_id = smccc_get_arg1(source_vcpu);
> if (!kvm_psci_valid_affinity(source_vcpu, cpu_id))
> return PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
>
> + /*
> + * Basic sanity check: ensure the requested entry address actually
> + * exists within the guest's address space.
> + */
> + entry_addr = smccc_get_arg2(source_vcpu);
> + if (!kvm_ipa_valid(kvm, entry_addr)) {
> +
> + /*
> + * Before PSCI v1.0, the INVALID_PARAMETERS error is returned
> + * instead of INVALID_ADDRESS.
> + *
> + * For more details, see ARM DEN0022D.b 5.6 "CPU_ON".
> + */
> + if (kvm_psci_version(source_vcpu) < KVM_ARM_PSCI_1_0)
> + return PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
> + else
> + return PSCI_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
> + }
> +
If you're concerned with this, should you also check for the PC
alignment, or the presence of a memslot covering the address you are
branching to? Le latter is particularly hard to implement reliably.
So far, my position has been that the guest is free to shoot itself in
the foot if that's what it wants to do, and that babysitting it was a
waste of useful bits! ;-)
Or have you identified something that makes it a requirement to handle
this case (and possibly others) in the hypervisor?
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
