Re: A few KVM security questions

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On Mon, Dec 07, 2009 at 06:33:35PM +0100, Joanna Rutkowska wrote:
> Avi Kivity wrote:
> > On 12/07/2009 07:15 PM, Joanna Rutkowska wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> But the difference is that in case of Xen one can *easily* move the
> >>>> backends to small unprivileged VMs. In that case it doesn't matter the
> >>>> code is in kernel mode, it's still only in an unprivileged domain.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>        
> >>> They're not really unprivileged, one can easily program the dma
> >>> controller of their assigned pci card to read and write arbitrary host
> >>> memory.
> >>>
> >>>      
> >> That's not true if you use VT-d.
> >>    
> > 
> > AFAIK VT-d is only supported in Xen for fully virtualized guests.  Maybe
> > it changed while I wasn't watching, though.
> > 
> 
> Negative. VT-d can be used to contain PV DomUs as well. We actually
> verified it.

Oh, I didn't know that. This is a bit OT, but could you paste or point
to a VT-d configuration with a PV guest?

-- Pasi

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