From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Add a documentation to Intel Trusted Docmain Extensions(TDX) support.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +-
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index aeeb071c7688..72341707d98f 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -1366,6 +1366,9 @@ It is recommended to use this API instead of the KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION ioctl.
The KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION does not allow fine grained control over memory
allocation and is deprecated.
+For TDX guest, deleting/moving memory region loses guest memory contents.
+Read only region isn't supported. Only as-id 0 is supported.
+
4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
---------------------
@@ -4489,7 +4492,7 @@ H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
:Capability: basic
:Architectures: x86
-:Type: vm
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
:Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
@@ -4501,6 +4504,10 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst.
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Trusted Domain Extensions
+(TDX) commands on Intel Processors. The TDX commands are defined in
+Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst.
+
4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
-----------------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2b4d6cd852d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX)
+===================================
+
+Overview
+========
+TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions which isolates VMs from
+the virtual-machine manager (VMM)/hypervisor and any other software on
+the platform. [1]
+For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
+available.
+
+
+API description
+===============
+
+KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+---------------------
+:Type: system ioctl, vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+
+For TDX operations, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is re-purposed to be generic
+ioctl with TDX specific sub ioctl command.
+
+::
+
+ /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ __u32 id; /* tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 metadata; /* sub comamnd specific */
+ __u64 data; /* sub command specific */
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+--------------------
+:Type: system ioctl
+
+subset of TDSYSINFO_STRCUCT retrieved by TDH.SYS.INFO TDX SEAM call will be
+returned. which describes about Intel TDX module.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_capabilities
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u32 sub_leaf;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ __u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+---------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Does additional VM initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.MNG.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_vm
+- reserved: must be 0
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u32 max_vcpus;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u64 cpuid; /* pointer to struct kvm_cpuid2 */
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+ __u64 reserved[43]; /* must be zero for future extensibility */
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+-----------------
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+
+Does additional VCPU initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.VP.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- metadata: must be 0
+- data: initial value of the guest TD VCPU RCX
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION
+-----------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Encrypt a memory continuous region which corresponding to TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD
+TDX SEAM call.
+If KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION flag is specified, it also extends measurement
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.EXTEND TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- metadata: flags
+ currently only KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION is defined
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+-------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Complete measurement of the initial TD contents and mark it ready to run
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.FINALIZE
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+- metadata: ignored
+- data: ignored
+
+
+KVM TDX creation flow
+=====================
+In addition to KVM normal flow, new TDX ioctls need to be called. The control flow
+looks like as follows.
+
+#. system wide capability check
+ * KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES: query if TDX is supported on the platform.
+ * KVM_CAP_xxx: check other KVM extensions same to normal KVM case.
+
+#. creating VM
+ * KVM_CREATE_VM
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM: pass TDX specific VM parameters.
+
+#. creating VCPU
+ * KVM_CREATE_VCPU
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU: pass TDX specific VCPU parameters.
+
+#. initializing guest memory
+ * allocate guest memory and initialize page same to normal KVM case
+ In TDX case, parse and load TDVF into guest memory in addition.
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION to add and measure guest pages.
+ If the pages has contents above, those pages need to be added.
+ Otherwise the contents will be lost and guest sees zero pages.
+ * KVM_TDX_FINALIAZE_VM: Finalize VM and measurement
+ This must be after KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
+
+#. run vcpu
+
+Design discussion
+=================
+
+Coexistence of normal(VMX) VM and TD VM
+---------------------------------------
+It's required to allow both legacy(normal VMX) VMs and new TD VMs to
+coexist. Otherwise the benefits of VM flexibility would be eliminated.
+The main issue for it is that the logic of kvm_x86_ops callbacks for
+TDX is different from VMX. On the other hand, the variable,
+kvm_x86_ops, is global single variable. Not per-VM, not per-vcpu.
+
+Several points to be considered.
+ . No or minimal overhead when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
+ . Avoid overhead of indirect call via function pointers.
+ . Contain the changes under arch/x86/kvm/vmx directory and share logic
+ with VMX for maintenance.
+ Even though the ways to operation on VM (VMX instruction vs TDX
+ SEAM call) is different, the basic idea remains same. So, many
+ logic can be shared.
+ . Future maintenance
+ The huge change of kvm_x86_ops in (near) future isn't expected.
+ a centralized file is acceptable.
+
+- Wrapping kvm x86_ops: The current choice
+ Introduce dedicated file for arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c (the name,
+ main.c, is just chosen to show main entry points for callbacks.) and
+ wrapper functions around all the callbacks with
+ "if (is-tdx) tdx-callback() else vmx-callback()".
+
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
+ contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
+ - When TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n), the overhead is
+ optimized out.
+ - Micro optimization by avoiding function pointer.
+ Cons:
+ - Many boiler plates in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c.
+
+Alternative:
+- Introduce another callback layer under arch/x86/kvm/vmx.
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
+ contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
+ - clear separation on callbacks.
+ Cons:
+ - overhead in VMX even when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
+
+- Allow per-VM kvm_x86_ops callbacks instead of global kvm_x86_ops
+ Pros:
+ - clear separation on callbacks.
+ Cons:
+ - Big change in common x86 code.
+ - overhead in common code even when TDX is
+ disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
+
+- Introduce new directory arch/x86/kvm/tdx
+ Pros:
+ - It clarifies that TDX is different from VMX.
+ Cons:
+ - Given the level of code sharing, it complicates code sharing.
+
+KVM MMU Changes
+---------------
+KVM MMU needs to be enhanced to handle Secure/Shared-EPT. The
+high-level execution flow is mostly same to normal EPT case.
+EPT violation/misconfiguration -> invoke TDP fault handler ->
+resolve TDP fault -> resume execution. (or emulate MMIO)
+The difference is, that S-EPT is operated(read/write) via TDX SEAM
+call which is expensive instead of direct read/write EPT entry.
+One bit of GPA (51 or 47 bit) is repurposed so that it means shared
+with host(if set to 1) or private to TD(if cleared to 0).
+
+- The current implementation
+ . Reuse the existing MMU code with minimal update. Because the
+ execution flow is mostly same. But additional operation, TDX call
+ for S-EPT, is needed. So add hooks for it to kvm_x86_ops.
+ . For performance, minimize TDX SEAM call to operate on S-EPT. When
+ getting corresponding S-EPT pages/entry from faulting GPA, don't
+ use TDX SEAM call to read S-EPT entry. Instead create shadow copy
+ in host memory.
+ Repurpose the existing kvm_mmu_page as shadow copy of S-EPT and
+ associate S-EPT to it.
+ . Treats share bit as attributes. mask/unmask the bit where
+ necessary to keep the existing traversing code works.
+ Introduce kvm.arch.gfn_shared_mask and use "if (gfn_share_mask)"
+ for special case.
+ = 0 : for non-TDX case
+ = 51 or 47 bit set for TDX case.
+
+ Pros:
+ - Large code reuse with minimal new hooks.
+ - Execution path is same.
+ Cons:
+ - Complicates the existing code.
+ - Repurpose kvm_mmu_page as shadow of Secure-EPT can be confusing.
+
+Alternative:
+- Replace direct read/write on EPT entry with TDX-SEAM call by
+ introducing callbacks on EPT entry.
+ Pros:
+ - Straightforward.
+ Cons:
+ - Too many touching point.
+ - Too slow due to TDX-SEAM call.
+ - Overhead even when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
+
+- Sprinkle "if (is-tdx)" for TDX special case
+ Pros:
+ - Straightforward.
+ Cons:
+ - The result is non-generic and ugly.
+ - Put TDX specific logic into common KVM MMU code.
+
+New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
+-------------------------------------------------
+Additional KVM API are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
+VMs are specific to TDX.
+
+- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+ Although not all operation isn't memory encryption, repupose to get
+ TDX specific ioctls.
+ Pros:
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code.
+ Cons:
+ - The operations aren't actually memory encryption, but operations
+ on TD VMs.
+
+Alternative:
+- Introduce new ioctl for guest protection like
+ KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP and introduce subcommand for TDX.
+ Pros:
+ - Clean name.
+ Cons:
+ - One more new ioctl for guest protection.
+ - Confusion with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP with KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP.
+
+- Rename KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP and keep
+ KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP as same value for user API for compatibility.
+ "#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP KVM_GUEST_PROTECTION_OP" for uapi
+ compatibility.
+ Pros:
+ - No new ioctl with more suitable name.
+ Cons:
+ - May cause confusion to the existing user program.
+
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [1] TDX specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
+.. [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-final9-17.pdf
+.. [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
+.. [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 EAS
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-module-1eas.pdf
+.. [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
+.. [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
+.. [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.
+.. [8] intel public github
+ kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
+ TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
+.. [9] tdvf
+ https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
+.. [10] KVM forum 2020: Intel Virtualization Technology Extensions to
+ Enable Hardware Isolated VMs
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDzm/intel-virtualization-technology-extensions-to-enable-hardware-isolated-vms-sean-christopherson-intel
+.. [11] Linux Security Summit EU 2020:
+ Architectural Extensions for Hardware Virtual Machine Isolation
+ to Advance Confidential Computing in Public Clouds - Ravi Sahita
+ & Jun Nakajima, Intel Corporation
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDOx/architectural-extensions-for-hardware-virtual-machine-isolation-to-advance-confidential-computing-in-public-clouds-ravi-sahita-jun-nakajima-intel-corporation
+.. [12] [RFCv2,00/16] KVM protected memory extension
+ https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/10/20/66
--
2.25.1
