RE: [PATCH V2 mlx5-next 12/14] vfio/mlx5: Implement vfio_pci driver for mlx5 devices

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



> From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2021 11:19 PM
> 
> On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 08:42:12AM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> 
> > > This is also why I don't like it being so transparent as it is
> > > something userspace needs to care about - especially if the HW cannot
> > > support such a thing, if we intend to allow that.
> >
> > Userspace does need to care, but userspace's concern over this should
> > not be able to compromise the platform and therefore making VF
> > assignment more susceptible to fatal error conditions to comply with a
> > migration uAPI is troublesome for me.
> 
> It is an interesting scenario.
> 
> I think it points that we are not implementing this fully properly.
> 
> The !RUNNING state should be like your reset efforts.
> 
> All access to the MMIO memories from userspace should be revoked
> during !RUNNING

This assumes that vCPUs must be stopped before !RUNNING is entered 
in virtualization case. and it is true today.

But it may not hold when talking about guest SVA and I/O page fault [1].
The problem is that the pending requests may trigger I/O page faults
on guest page tables. W/o running vCPUs to handle those faults, the
quiesce command cannot complete draining the pending requests
if the device doesn't support preempt-on-fault (at least it's the case for
some Intel and Huawei devices, possibly true for most initial SVA
implementations). 

Of course migrating guest SVA requires more changes as discussed in [1]. 
Here just want to point out this forward-looking requirement so any 
definition change in this thread won't break that usage.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/06cb5bfd-f6f8-b61b-1a7e-60a9ae2f8fac@xxxxxxxxxx/T/
(p.s. 'stop device' in [1] means 'quiesce device' in this thread)

Thanks,
Kevin

> 
> All VMAs zap'd.
> 
> All IOMMU peer mappings invalidated.
> 
> The kernel should directly block userspace from causing a MMIO TLP
> before the device driver goes to !RUNNING.
> 
> Then the question of what the device does at this edge is not
> relevant as hostile userspace cannot trigger it.
> 
> The logical way to implement this is to key off running and
> block/unblock MMIO access when !RUNNING.
> 
> To me this strongly suggests that the extra bit is the correct way
> forward as the driver is much simpler to implement and understand if
> RUNNING directly controls the availability of MMIO instead of having
> an irregular case where !RUNNING still allows MMIO but only until a
> pending_bytes read.
> 
> Given the complexity of this can we move ahead with the current
> mlx5_vfio and Yishai&co can come with some followup proposal to split
> the freeze/queice and block MMIO?
> 
> Jason




[Index of Archives]     [KVM ARM]     [KVM ia64]     [KVM ppc]     [Virtualization Tools]     [Spice Development]     [Libvirt]     [Libvirt Users]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Questions]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]

  Powered by Linux