On Mon, Oct 04, 2021 at 06:48:43PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Document the hypercalls user for the MMIO guard infrastructure.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/mmio-guard.rst | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/mmio-guard.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst
> index 78a9b670aafe..e77a0ee2e2d4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst
> @@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ ARM
> psci
> pvtime
> ptp_kvm
> + mmio-guard
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/mmio-guard.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/mmio-guard.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..8b3c852c5d92
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/mmio-guard.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +==============
> +KVM MMIO guard
> +==============
> +
> +KVM implements device emulation by handling translation faults to any
> +IPA range that is not contained in a memory slot. Such a translation
> +fault is in most cases passed on to userspace (or in rare cases to the
> +host kernel) with the address, size and possibly data of the access
> +for emulation.
> +
> +Should the guest exit with an address that is not one that corresponds
> +to an emulatable device, userspace may take measures that are not the
> +most graceful as far as the guest is concerned (such as terminating it
> +or delivering a fatal exception).
> +
> +There is also an element of trust: by forwarding the request to
> +userspace, the kernel assumes that the guest trusts userspace to do
> +the right thing.
> +
> +The KVM MMIO guard offers a way to mitigate this last point: a guest
> +can request that only certain regions of the IPA space are valid as
> +MMIO. Only these regions will be handled as an MMIO, and any other
> +will result in an exception being delivered to the guest.
> +
> +This relies on a set of hypercalls defined in the KVM-specific range,
> +using the HVC64 calling convention.
> +
> +* ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MMIO_GUARD_INFO
> +
> + ============== ======== ================================
> + Function ID: (uint32) 0xC6000002
> + Arguments: none
> + Return Values: (int64) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or
> + (uint64) Protection Granule (PG) size in
> + bytes (r0)
> + ============== ======== ================================
> +
> +* ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MMIO_GUARD_ENROLL
> +
> + ============== ======== ==============================
> + Function ID: (uint32) 0xC6000003
> + Arguments: none
> + Return Values: (int64) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or
> + RET_SUCCESS(0) (r0)
> + ============== ======== ==============================
> +
> +* ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MMIO_GUARD_MAP
> +
> + ============== ======== ====================================
> + Function ID: (uint32) 0xC6000004
> + Arguments: (uint64) The base of the PG-sized IPA range
> + that is allowed to be accessed as
> + MMIO. Must be aligned to the PG size
> + (r1)
> + (uint64) Index in the MAIR_EL1 register
> + providing the memory attribute that
> + is used by the guest (r2)
^^ some tabs got in here
> + Return Values: (int64) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or
> + RET_SUCCESS(0) (r0)
> + ============== ======== ====================================
> +
> +* ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_MMIO_GUARD_UNMAP
> +
> + ============== ======== ======================================
> + Function ID: (uint32) 0xC6000005
> + Arguments: (uint64) PG-sized IPA range aligned to the PG
> + size which has been previously mapped.
> + Must be aligned to the PG size and
> + have been previously mapped (r1)
> + Return Values: (int64) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or
> + RET_SUCCESS(0) (r0)
> + ============== ======== ======================================
> --
> 2.30.2
>
Otherwise,
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks,
drew
