On 9/1/21 11:18 AM, James Bottomley wrote:
On Wed, 2021-09-01 at 08:54 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
[...]
If you want to swap a page on TDX, you can't. Sorry, go directly to
jail, do not collect $200.
Actually, even on SEV-ES you can't either. You can read the encrypted
page and write it out if you want, but unless you swap it back to the
exact same physical memory location, the encryption key won't work.
Since we don't guarantee this for swap, I think swap won't actually
work for any confidential computing environment.
There are SEV/SEV-ES and SEV-SNP APIs to swap a page out and in. There is
also an API to copy (for SEV/SEV-ES) or move (for SEV-SNP) a page in
memory to help with balancing if needed.
These aren't currently implemented in the kernel, but can be. It requires
the changes going in for live migration to recognize that a page is
encrypted/private and invoke the APIs to transform the page before doing
the operation.
Thanks,
Tom
So I think there are literally zero code paths that currently call
try_to_unmap() that will actually work like that on TDX. If we run
out of memory on a TDX host, we can kill the guest completely and
reclaim all of its memory (which probably also involves killing QEMU
or whatever other user program is in charge), but that's really our
only option.
I think our only option for swap is guest co-operation. We're going to
have to inflate a balloon or something in the guest and have the guest
driver do some type of bounce of the page, where it becomes an
unencrypted page in the guest (so the host can read it without the
physical address keying of the encryption getting in the way) but
actually encrypted with a swap transfer key known only to the guest. I
assume we can use the page acceptance infrastructure currently being
discussed elsewhere to do swap back in as well ... the host provides
the guest with the encrypted swap page and the guest has to decrypt it
and place it in encrypted guest memory.
That way the swapped memory is securely encrypted, but can be swapped
back in.
James
