Thanks a lot for your explaination, Sean. Still many questions below. :) On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 12:35:21AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Tue, Aug 24, 2021, Yu Zhang wrote: > > On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 05:52:48PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > > Thanks a lot for sharing these ideas. Lots of questions are inlined below. :) > > > > > The goal of this RFC is to try and align KVM, mm, and anyone else with skin in the > > > game, on an acceptable direction for supporting guest private memory, e.g. for > > > Intel's TDX. The TDX architectural effectively allows KVM guests to crash the > > > host if guest private memory is accessible to host userspace, and thus does not > > > > What about incorrect/malicious accesses from host kernel? Should the direct mapping > > also be removed for guest private memory? > > I would say that's out of scope for this RFC as it should not require any > coordination between KVM and MM. So Linux MM still has choice to unmap the private memory in direct mapping, right? > > > > play nice with KVM's existing approach of pulling the pfn and mapping level from > > > the host page tables. > > > > > > This is by no means a complete patch; it's a rough sketch of the KVM changes that > > > would be needed. The kernel side of things is completely omitted from the patch; > > > the design concept is below. > > > > > > There's also fair bit of hand waving on implementation details that shouldn't > > > fundamentally change the overall ABI, e.g. how the backing store will ensure > > > there are no mappings when "converting" to guest private. > > > > > > Background > > > ========== > > > > > > This is a loose continuation of Kirill's RFC[*] to support TDX guest private > > > memory by tracking guest memory at the 'struct page' level. This proposal is the > > > result of several offline discussions that were prompted by Andy Lutomirksi's > > > concerns with tracking via 'struct page': > > > > > > 1. The kernel wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, > > > let alone a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping. > > > > May I ask why? Doesn't FOLL_GUEST in Kirill's earlier patch work? Or just > > because traversing the host PT to get a PFN(for a PageGuest(page)) is too > > heavy? > > To ensure a 1:1 page:guest, 'struct page' would need to track enough information > to uniquely identify which guest owns the page. With TDX, one can argue that the > kernel can rely on the TDX-Module to do that tracking (I argued this :-)), but > for SEV and pure software implementations there is no third party that's tracking > who owns what. In other words, without stashing an identifier in 'struct page', > the kernel would only know that _a_ guest owns the page, it couldn't identify which > guest owns the page. And allocating that much space in 'struct page' would be > painfully expensive. So it's to make sure a private page can only be assigned to one guest. I thought PAMT in TDX and RMP in SEV-SNP can do this, is this understanding correct? But for pure software implementations, it's a problem indeed. And why would using a specific fd can achieve this? I saw requirement to only bind the fd to one guest, but is this enough to guarantee the 1:1 page:guest binding? > > 1:1 pfn:gfn is even worse. E.g. if userspace maps the same file as MAP_GUEST at > multiple host virtual adddress, then configures KVM's memslots to have multiple > regions, one for each alias, the guest will end up with 1:N pfn:gfn mappings. > Preventing that would be nigh impossible without ending up with a plethora of > races. You mean different memslots(in one address space) may contain the same gfn? IIUC, gfn overlap is not allowed: kvm_set_memory_region() will just return -EEXIST. > > > > 2. Does not work for memory that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices > > > gain support for exposing encrypted memory regions to guests. > > > > Do you mean that a page not backed by 'struct page' might be mapped to other > > user space? I thought the VM_GUEST flags for the VMA could prevent that(though > > I may possiblely be wrong). Could you explain more? Thanks! > > It's about enabling, not preventing. If in the future there is some form of memory > that is not backed by 'struct page' (CXL memory?), that can also be mapped into > a protected KVM guest, relying on 'struct page' to ensure that only the owning KVM > guest has access to that memory would not work. Oh. Keeping the page owner info in 'struct page' is not a good choice. But still, my quesions are: 1> If TDX module/ SEV-SNP can do this, do we still need to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association in host kernel - if we are not so ambitious to also make this work as a pure software design? :-) 2> Besides, could you please explain how this design achieves the 1:1 association? > > > > 3. Does not help march toward page migration or swap support (though it doesn't > > > hurt either). > > > > > > [*] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > Concept > > > ======= > > > > > > Guest private memory must be backed by an "enlightened" file descriptor, where > > > "enlightened" means the implementing subsystem supports a one-way "conversion" to > > > guest private memory and provides bi-directional hooks to communicate directly > > > with KVM. Creating a private fd doesn't necessarily have to be a conversion, e.g. it > > > could also be a flag provided at file creation, a property of the file system itself, > > > etc... > > > > > > Before a private fd can be mapped into a KVM guest, it must be paired 1:1 with a > > > KVM guest, i.e. multiple guests cannot share a fd. At pairing, KVM and the fd's > > > subsystem exchange a set of function pointers to allow KVM to call into the subsystem, > > > e.g. to translate gfn->pfn, and vice versa to allow the subsystem to call into KVM, > > > e.g. to invalidate/move/swap a gfn range. > > > > So the gfn->pfn translation is done by the fd's subsystem? Again, could you > > please elaborate how? > > Rats, I meant to capture this in the "patch" and did not. The memslot would hold > the base offset into the file instead of a host virtual address. I.e. instead of > gfn -> hva -> pfn, it would roughly be gfn -> offset -> pfn. > And the offset just equals gfn? > > And each private memory region would need a seperate group of callbacks? > > Each private memslot would have its own pointer to a virtual function table, but > there would only be a single table per backing store implementation. > Hmm. So we can have various backing stores for different memslots? And Qemu would inform KVM about this for each memslot? > > > Mapping a private fd in host userspace is disallowed, i.e. there is never a host > > > virtual address associated with the fd and thus no userspace page tables pointing > > > at the private memory. > > > > > > Pinning _from KVM_ is not required. If the backing store supports page migration > > > and/or swap, it can query the KVM-provided function pointers to see if KVM supports > > > the operation. If the operation is not supported (this will be the case initially > > > in KVM), the backing store is responsible for ensuring correct functionality. > > > > > > Unmapping guest memory, e.g. to prevent use-after-free, is handled via a callback > > > from the backing store to KVM. KVM will employ techniques similar to those it uses > > > for mmu_notifiers to ensure the guest cannot access freed memory. > > > > > > A key point is that, unlike similar failed proposals of the past, e.g. /dev/mktme, > > > existing backing stores can be englightened, a from-scratch implementations is not > > > required (though would obviously be possible as well). > > > > > > One idea for extending existing backing stores, e.g. HugeTLBFS and tmpfs, is > > > to add F_SEAL_GUEST, which would convert the entire file to guest private memory > > > and either fail if the current size is non-zero or truncate the size to zero. > > > > Have you discussed memfd_secret(if host direct mapping is also to be removed)? > > No. From a userspace perspective, the two would be mutually exclusive > Sorry? By "mutually exclusive", do you mean we can NOT remove both userspace mappings and kernel direct mappings at the same time? > > And how does this F_SEAL_GUEST work? > > Are you asking about semantics or implementation? If it's implementation, that's > firmly in the handwaving part :-) Semantically, once F_SEAL_GUEST is set it can't > be removed, i.e. the file is forever "guest private". In a way it's destructive, > e.g. the host can't ever read out the memory, but that's really just a reflection > of the hardware, e.g. even with SEV, the host can read the memory but it can never > decrypt the memory. > Acctually, I am asking both. :-) E.g., what do we expect of this fd. For now, my understandings are: 1> It's a dedicated fd, and can not be shared between different processes. 2> mmap() shall fail on this fd. 3> With F_SEAL_GUEST, size of this file is set to 0, or need be truncated to 0. But when should this fd be created? What operations do we expect this fd to offer? And how does this fd function as a channel between MM and KVM? > > > > > > KVM > > > === > > > > > > Guest private memory is managed as a new address space, i.e. as a different set of > > > memslots, similar to how KVM has a separate memory view for when a guest vCPU is > > > executing in virtual SMM. SMM is mutually exclusive with guest private memory. > > > > > > The fd (the actual integer) is provided to KVM when a private memslot is added > > > via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. This is when the aforementioned pairing occurs. > > > > My understanding of KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION is that, this ioctl is to > > facilitate the binding of HVA and GPA ranges. But if there's no HVAs for > > a private region at all, why do we need a memslot for it? Besides to keep > > track of the private GFN ranges, and provide the callbacks, is there any > > other reason? > > The short answer is that something in KVM needs to translate gfn->pfn. Using just > the gfn isn't feasible because there's no anchor (see above regarding the base file > offset). And even if the offset weren't needed, KVM still needs a lot of the same > metadata, e.g. some day there may be read-only private memsots, dirty logging of > private memslots, etc... Implementing something else entirely would also require > an absurd amount of code churn as all of KVM revolves around gfn -> slot -> pfn. > Yes. Thanks! > > Another question is: why do we need a whole new address space, instead of > > one address space accommodating memslot types? > > Either way could be made to work, and there isn't thaaat much code difference. My > initial thoughts were to use a flag, but there are some niceties that a separate > address space provides (more below). > > > > By default, KVM memslot lookups will be "shared", only specific touchpoints will > > > be modified to work with private memslots, e.g. guest page faults. All host > > > accesses to guest memory, e.g. for emulation, will thus look for shared memory > > > and naturally fail without attempting copy_to/from_user() if the guest attempts > > > > Becasue gfn_to_hva() will fail first? > > Yes. More precisely, gfn_to_hva() will fail because there is no memslot for the > current address space (shared). This is one advantage over a flag, e.g. there's no > need to check a flag after getting a memslot. It's somewhat superficial as it > wouldn't be too difficult to add low level helpers to default to "shared", but there > are multiple instances of those types of patterns, so I do hope/think it will yield > to cleaner code. > > > > to coerce KVM into access private memory. Note, avoiding copy_to/from_user() and > > > friends isn't strictly necessary, it's more of a happy side effect. > > > > > > A new KVM exit reason, e.g. KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR, and data struct in vcpu->run > > > is added to propagate illegal accesses (see above) and implicit conversions > > > > Sorry, illegal accesses from VM? > > Illegal accesses from the host, e.g. attempting to read/write guest private memory > via gfn_to_hva(). > Sorry, I do not get it. Without a valid HVA, how would the host perform such illegal accesses? > > Do you actually mean a KVM page fault caused by private access from VM, which > > implicitly notifies KVM to mark it as private(e.g. by bouncing to Qemu, which > > then creates a private memory region and ioctls into KVM)? > > > > If the answer is yes, how about naming the exit reason as KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_PRIVATE? > > Meanwhile, is Qemu also supposed to invoke some system call into host kernel > > before ioctls into KVM? I'm still confused where the kernel callbacks like > > the gfn_to_pfn() come from(and how they function)... :) > > I would like the exit to be generic so that it can be reused for other, completely > unrelated (yet similar) scenarios (see links below). > > > > to userspace (see below). Note, the new exit reason + struct can also be to > > > support several other feature requests in KVM[1][2]. > > > > > > The guest may explicitly or implicity request KVM to map a shared/private variant > > > of a GFN. An explicit map request is done via hypercall (out of scope for this > > > proposal as both TDX and SNP ABIs define such a hypercall). An implicit map request > > > is triggered simply by the guest accessing the shared/private variant, which KVM > > > sees as a guest page fault (EPT violation or #NPF). Ideally only explicit requests > > > would be supported, but neither TDX nor SNP require this in their guest<->host ABIs. > > > > Well, I am wondering, should we assume all guest pages as shared or private by > > default? I mean, if all guest pages are private when the VM is created, maybe > > the private memslots can be initialized in VM creation time, and be deleted/splited > > later(e.g. in response to guest sharing hypercalls)? > > Define "we". I absolutely expect the userspace VMM to assume all guest pages are > private by default. But I feel very strongly that KVM should not be involved in > the control logic for decided when to convert a given page between shared and > private. Thus, deciding the default state is not KVM's responsibility. > Could qemu just tell KVM this is a protected VM when creating it? For runtime conversion, KVM can handle hypercalls from guest, and forward to Qemu, just like what Kirill did in previous RFC patches. > > It may simplify the logic, but may also restrict the VM type(e.g. to be TD guest). > > > > > > > > For implicit or explicit mappings, if a memslot is found that fully covers the > > > requested range (which is a single gfn for implicit mappings), KVM's normal guest > > > page fault handling works with minimal modification. > > > > > > If a memslot is not found, for explicit mappings, KVM will exit to userspace with > > > the aforementioned dedicated exit reason. For implict _private_ mappings, KVM will > > > also immediately exit with the same dedicated reason. For implicit shared mappings, > > > an additional check is required to differentiate between emulated MMIO and an > > > implicit private->shared conversion[*]. If there is an existing private memslot > > > for the gfn, KVM will exit to userspace, otherwise KVM will treat the access as an > > > emulated MMIO access and handle the page fault accordingly. > > > > > > [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YKxJLcg/WomPE422@xxxxxxxxxx > > > [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200617230052.GB27751@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > Punching Holes > > > ============== > > > > > > The expected userspace memory model is that mapping requests will be handled as > > > conversions, e.g. on a shared mapping request, first unmap the private gfn range, > > > then map the shared gfn range. A new KVM ioctl() will likely be needed to allow > > > userspace to punch a hole in a memslot, as expressing such an operation isn't > > > possible with KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. While userspace could delete the > > > memslot, then recreate three new memslots, doing so would be destructive to guest > > > data as unmapping guest private memory (from the EPT/NPT tables) is destructive > > > to the data for both TDX and SEV-SNP guests. > > > > May I ask why? Thanks! > > Hmm, for SNP it might not actually be destructive, I forget the exact flows for > unmapping memory. > > Anyways, for TDX it's most certainly destructive. When mapping private pages into > the guest (ignore pre-boot), the guest must accept a page before accessing the page, > as a #VE will occur if the page is not accepted. This holds true even if the host > unmaps and remaps the same PFN -> GFN. The TDX module also explicitly zeroes the > page when installing a new mapping. > > And to prevent use-after-free, KVM must fully unmap a page if its corresponding > memslot is deleted, e.g. it can't trust userspace to remap the memory at the exact > gfn:pfn combo. > > Without a new API to punch a hole, deleting private memslots to create two smaller, > discontiguous memslots would destroy the data in the two remaining/new memslots. > So that's because deleting a memslot will inevitably zeros guest private pages? > > > Pros (vs. struct page) > > > ====================== > > > > > > Easy to enforce 1:1 fd:guest pairing, as well as 1:1 gfn:pfn mapping. > > > > > > Userspace page tables are not populated, e.g. reduced memory footprint, lower > > > probability of making private memory accessible to userspace. > > > > > > Provides line of sight to supporting page migration and swap. > > > > > > Provides line of sight to mapping MMIO pages into guest private memory. > > > > > > Cons (vs. struct page) > > > ====================== > > > > > > Significantly more churn in KVM, e.g. to plumb 'private' through where needed, > > > support memslot hole punching, etc... > > > > > > KVM's MMU gets another method of retrieving host pfn and page size. > > > > And the method is provided by host kernel? How does this method work? > > It's a function callback provided by the backing store. The details of the > function would be likely specific to the backing store's implementation, e.g. > HugeTLBFS would likely have its own implementation. > HugeTLBFS is a nice-to-have, not a must, right? Is there any other backing store we need support first? > > [...] > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > > index a272ccbddfa1..771080235b2d 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > > > @@ -2896,6 +2896,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, > > > if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) > > > return PG_LEVEL_4K; > > > > > > + if (memslot_is_private(slot)) > > > + return slot->private_ops->pfn_mapping_level(...); > > > + > > > > Oh, any suggestion how host kernel decides the mapping level here? > > That decision comes from the backing store. E.g. HugeTLBFS would simply return > its static/configured size/level. > > > > host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, pfn, slot); > > > return min(host_level, max_level); > > > } > > > @@ -3835,9 +3838,11 @@ static bool kvm_arch_setup_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, > > > > > > static bool kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, int *r) > > > { > > > - struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn); > > > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; > > > bool async; > > > > > > + slot = __kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn, fault->private); > > > + > > > /* > > > * Retry the page fault if the gfn hit a memslot that is being deleted > > > * or moved. This ensures any existing SPTEs for the old memslot will > > > @@ -3846,8 +3851,19 @@ static bool kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, > > > if (slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)) > > > goto out_retry; > > > > > > + /* > > > + * Exit to userspace to map the requested private/shared memory region > > > + * if there is no memslot and (a) the access is private or (b) there is > > > + * an existing private memslot. Emulated MMIO must be accessed through > > > + * shared GPAs, thus a memslot miss on a private GPA is always handled > > > + * as an implicit conversion "request". > > > + */ > > > > For (b), do you mean this fault is for a GFN which marked as private, but now > > converted to a shared? > > Yes. > > > If true, could we just disallow it if no explict sharing hypercall is triggered? > > Sadly, no. Even if all hardware vendor specs _required_ such behavior, KVM has no > recourse but to exit to userspace because there's no way to communicate to the > guest that it accessed a "bad" address. E.g. KVM can't inject exceptions in TDX, > and it can't touch guest register state to "return" an error code, Not to mention > that the guest would be in some random flow accessing memory. So, guest can just use a shared GPA(with shared-bit set) directly, without the need to explicitly ask KVM to convert the private one? > > Happily for KVM, it's userspace's problem^Wdecision. > And with KVM_EXIT_MAP_MEMORY returned, qemu should trigger a new ioctl into KVM, which puches holes in KVM private address space's memslots? B.R. Yu
