On 7/6/21 9:03 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
On 03/07/21 00:04, isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Add a flag for TDX to flag RO memory as unsupported and propagate it to
KVM_MEM_READONLY to allow reporting RO memory as unsupported on a per-VM
basis. TDX1 doesn't expose permission bits to the VMM in the SEPT
tables, i.e. doesn't support read-only private memory.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 8 +++++---
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index cd9407982366..87212d7563ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3897,7 +3897,6 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm
*kvm, long ext)
case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF_INT:
case KVM_CAP_GET_TSC_KHZ:
case KVM_CAP_KVMCLOCK_CTRL:
- case KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM:
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TIME:
case KVM_CAP_IOAPIC_POLARITY_IGNORED:
case KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER:
@@ -4009,6 +4008,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm
*kvm, long ext)
if (static_call(kvm_x86_is_vm_type_supported)(KVM_X86_TDX_VM))
r |= BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM);
break;
+ case KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM:
+ r = kvm && kvm->readonly_mem_unsupported ? 0 : 1;
+ break;
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index ddd4d0f68cdf..7ee7104b4b59 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -597,6 +597,10 @@ struct kvm {
unsigned int max_halt_poll_ns;
u32 dirty_ring_size;
+#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_READONLY_MEM
+ bool readonly_mem_unsupported;
+#endif
+
bool vm_bugged;
};
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 52d40ea75749..63d0c2833913 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1258,12 +1258,14 @@ static void update_memslots(struct
kvm_memslots *slots,
}
}
-static int check_memory_region_flags(const struct
kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
+static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
+ const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
{
u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_READONLY_MEM
- valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
+ if (!kvm->readonly_mem_unsupported)
+ valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
#endif
if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)
@@ -1436,7 +1438,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
int as_id, id;
int r;
- r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
+ r = check_memory_region_flags(kvm, mem);
if (r)
return r;
For all these flags, which of these limitations will be common to SEV-ES
and SEV-SNP (ExtINT injection, MCE injection, changing TSC, read-only
memory, dirty logging)? Would it make sense to use vm_type instead of
all of them? I guess this also guides the choice of whether to use a
single vm-type for TDX and SEV-SNP or two. Probably two is better, and
there can be static inline bool functions to derive the support flags
from the vm-type.
The SEV-ES does not need any of these flags. However, with SEV-SNP, we
may able use the ExtINT injection.
-Brijesh
