On 08/06/21 15:15, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Tue, Jun 08, 2021 at 09:56:09AM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Alternatively you can add a KVM_DEV_IOASID_{ADD,DEL} pair of ioctls. But it
seems useless complication compared to just using what we have now, at least
while VMs only use IOASIDs via VFIO.
The simplest is KVM_ENABLE_WBINVD(<fd security proof>) and be done
with it.
The simplest one is KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_ADD/DEL, that already exists and also
covers hot-unplug. The second simplest one is KVM_DEV_IOASID_ADD/DEL.
This isn't the same thing, this is back to trying to have the kernel
set policy for userspace.
If you want a userspace policy then there would be three states:
* WBINVD enabled because a WBINVD-enabled VFIO device is attached.
* WBINVD potentially enabled but no WBINVD-enabled VFIO device attached
* WBINVD forcefully disabled
KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_ADD/DEL can still be used to distinguish the first
two. Due to backwards compatibility, those two describe the default
behavior; disabling wbinvd can be done easily with a new sub-ioctl of
KVM_ENABLE_CAP and doesn't require any security proof.
The meaning of WBINVD-enabled is "won't return -ENXIO for the wbinvd
ioctl", nothing more nothing less. If all VFIO devices are going to be
WBINVD-enabled, then that will reflect on KVM as well, and I won't have
anything to object if there's consensus on the device assignment side of
things that the wbinvd ioctl won't ever fail.
Paolo
