On 4/20/21 4:34 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> Thanks > --- > Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 469a6308765b..34ce2d1fcb89 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at > boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner > expects. > > +If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and > +uaddr is unused. > + > Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_measure > > Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > @@ -271,6 +274,9 @@ report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory and VMSA passed through > commands and signed with the PEK. The digest returned by the command should match the digest > used by the guest owner with the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE. > > +If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and > +uaddr is unused. > + > Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_attestation > > Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
