On Wed, Mar 10, 2021, Martin Radev wrote: > On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 08:08:37AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 10, 2021, Joerg Roedel wrote: > > > + /* > > > + * Sanity check CPUID results from the Hypervisor. See comment in > > > + * do_vc_no_ghcb() for more details on why this is necessary. > > > + */ > > > + > > > + /* Fail if Hypervisor bit not set in CPUID[1].ECX[31] */ > > > > This check is flawed, as is the existing check in 64-bit boot. Or I guess more > > accurately, the check in get_sev_encryption_bit() is flawed. AIUI, SEV-ES > > doesn't require the hypervisor to intercept CPUID. A malicious hypervisor can > > temporarily pass-through CPUID to bypass the CPUID[1].ECX[31] check. > > If erroneous information is provided, either through interception or without, there's > this check which is performed every time a new page table is set in the early linux stages: > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12-rc2/source/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S#L22 > > This should lead to a halt if corruption is detected, unless I'm overlooking something. > Please share more info. That check is predicated on sme_me_mask != 0, sme_me_mask is set based on the result of get_sev_encryption_bit(), and that returns '0' if CPUID[1].ECX[31] is '0'. sme_enable() also appears to have the same issue, as CPUID[1].ECX[31]=0 would cause it to check for SME instead of SEV, and the hypervisor can simply return 0 for a VMGEXIT to get MSR_K8_SYSCFG. I've no idea if the guest would actually survive with a bogus sme_me_mask, but relying on CPUID[1] to #VC is flawed. Since MSR_AMD64_SEV is non-interceptable, that seems like it should be the canonical way to detect SEV/SEV-ES. The only complication seems to be handling #GP faults on the RDMSR in early boot. > > The hypervisor likely has access to the guest firmware source, so it > > wouldn't be difficult for the hypervisor to disable CPUID interception once > > it detects that firmware is handing over control to the kernel. > > > > You probably don't even need to know the firmware for that. There the option > to set CR* changes to cause #AE which probably gives away enough information.
