On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 06:50:16PM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote:
> On Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:12 +1100
> David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
> > Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
> > run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The
> > effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
> > quite different.
> >
> > Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
> > ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu
> > does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.
> >
> > Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
> > which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't
> > enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to
> > create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support
> > property to point to it.
> >
> > Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
> > such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
> > secure mode. Qemu has no direct way of knowing if the guest is in
> > secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine
> > creation time.
> >
> > To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options:
> > -object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
>
> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@xxxxxxxx>
>
> Just some cosmetic comments in case you need to respin. See below.
>
> > docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 3 +
> > docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 +++++++
> > hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 +
> > hw/ppc/pef.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > hw/ppc/spapr.c | 8 +-
> > include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 17 ++++
> > target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 ----
> > target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 --
> > 8 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt
> > create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c
> > create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h
> >
> > diff --git a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt
> > index bd439ac800..4da4c91bd3 100644
> > --- a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt
> > +++ b/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt
> > @@ -40,4 +40,7 @@ Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are:
> > AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
> > docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> >
> > +POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF)
> > + docs/papr-pef.txt
> > +
> > Other mechanisms may be supported in future.
> > diff --git a/docs/papr-pef.txt b/docs/papr-pef.txt
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000..72550e9bf8
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/docs/papr-pef.txt
> > @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
> > +POWER (PAPR) Protected Execution Facility (PEF)
> > +===============================================
> > +
> > +Protected Execution Facility (PEF), also known as Secure Guest support
> > +is a feature found on IBM POWER9 and POWER10 processors.
> > +
> > +If a suitable firmware including an Ultravisor is installed, it adds
> > +an extra memory protection mode to the CPU. The ultravisor manages a
> > +pool of secure memory which cannot be accessed by the hypervisor.
> > +
> > +When this feature is enabled in QEMU, a guest can use ultracalls to
> > +enter "secure mode". This transfers most of its memory to secure
> > +memory, where it cannot be eavesdropped by a compromised hypervisor.
> > +
> > +Launching
> > +---------
> > +
> > +To launch a guest which will be permitted to enter PEF secure mode:
> > +
> > +# ${QEMU} \
> > + -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \
> > + -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0 \
> > + ...
> > +
> > +Live Migration
> > +----------------
> > +
> > +Live migration is not yet implemented for PEF guests. For
> > +consistency, we currently prevent migration if the PEF feature is
> > +enabled, whether or not the guest has actually entered secure mode.
> > diff --git a/hw/ppc/meson.build b/hw/ppc/meson.build
> > index ffa2ec37fa..218631c883 100644
> > --- a/hw/ppc/meson.build
> > +++ b/hw/ppc/meson.build
> > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ ppc_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_PSERIES', if_true: files(
> > 'spapr_nvdimm.c',
> > 'spapr_rtas_ddw.c',
> > 'spapr_numa.c',
> > + 'pef.c',
> > ))
> > ppc_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPAPR_RNG', if_true: files('spapr_rng.c'))
> > ppc_ss.add(when: ['CONFIG_PSERIES', 'CONFIG_LINUX'], if_true: files(
> > diff --git a/hw/ppc/pef.c b/hw/ppc/pef.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000..f9fd1f2a71
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/hw/ppc/pef.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
> > +/*
> > + * PEF (Protected Execution Facility) for POWER support
> > + *
> > + * Copyright Red Hat.
> > + *
> > + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
> > + * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include "qemu/osdep.h"
> > +
> > +#include "qapi/error.h"
> > +#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
> > +#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
> > +#include "migration/blocker.h"
> > +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
> > +#include "hw/ppc/pef.h"
> > +
> > +#define TYPE_PEF_GUEST "pef-guest"
> > +OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(PefGuest, PEF_GUEST)
> > +
> > +typedef struct PefGuest PefGuest;
> > +typedef struct PefGuestClass PefGuestClass;
> > +
> > +struct PefGuestClass {
> > + ConfidentialGuestSupportClass parent_class;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * PefGuest:
> > + *
> > + * The PefGuest object is used for creating and managing a PEF
> > + * guest.
> > + *
> > + * # $QEMU \
> > + * -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \
> > + * -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=pef0
> > + */
> > +struct PefGuest {
> > + ConfidentialGuestSupport parent_obj;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int kvmppc_svm_init(Error **errp)
>
> FWIW, this function could return bool.
Yes, but I feel like returning 0 vs. negative is more idiomatic for
errors than a bool.
> > +{
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
> > + if (!kvm_check_extension(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST)) {
> > + error_setg(errp,
> > + "KVM implementation does not support Secure VMs (is an ultravisor running?)");
> > + return -1;
> > + } else {
> > + int ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST, 0, 1);
> > +
> > + if (ret < 0) {
> > + error_setg(errp,
> > + "Error enabling PEF with KVM");
> > + return -1;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +#else
> > + g_assert_not_reached();
> > +#endif
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Don't set error if KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl is invoked on kernels
> > + * that don't support this ioctl.
> > + */
> > +static int kvmppc_svm_off(Error **errp)
> > +{
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + rc = kvm_vm_ioctl(KVM_STATE(current_accel()), KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF);
> > + if (rc && rc != -ENOTTY) {
> > + error_setg_errno(errp, -rc, "KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl failed");
> > + return rc;
>
> The ultimate caller for this is spapr_machine_reset() which doesn't
> care for a return value since it passes &error_fatal. Is there any
> chance that callers ever need to know about the errno value actually ?
> If not, it looks like this could return bool all the same.
Probably not, but again, I feel like this is more idiomatic.
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > +#else
> > + g_assert_not_reached();
> > +#endif
> > +}
> > +
> > +int pef_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
>
> Ditto.
>
> > +{
> > + if (!object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_PEF_GUEST)) {
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!kvm_enabled()) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "PEF requires KVM");
> > + return -1;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return kvmppc_svm_init(errp);
> > +}
> > +
> > +int pef_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
>
> Ditto.
>
> > +{
> > + if (!object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_PEF_GUEST)) {
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If we don't have KVM we should never have been able to
> > + * initialize PEF, so we should never get this far
> > + */
> > + assert(kvm_enabled());
> > +
> > + return kvmppc_svm_off(errp);
> > +}
> > +
> > +OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_INTERFACES(PefGuest,
> > + pef_guest,
> > + PEF_GUEST,
> > + CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT,
> > + { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
> > + { NULL })
> > +
> > +static void pef_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void pef_guest_init(Object *obj)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void pef_guest_finalize(Object *obj)
> > +{
> > +}
> > diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr.c b/hw/ppc/spapr.c
> > index 6c47466fc2..612356e9ec 100644
> > --- a/hw/ppc/spapr.c
> > +++ b/hw/ppc/spapr.c
> > @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
> > #include "hw/ppc/spapr_tpm_proxy.h"
> > #include "hw/ppc/spapr_nvdimm.h"
> > #include "hw/ppc/spapr_numa.h"
> > +#include "hw/ppc/pef.h"
> >
> > #include "monitor/monitor.h"
> >
> > @@ -1574,7 +1575,7 @@ static void spapr_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
> > void *fdt;
> > int rc;
> >
> > - kvmppc_svm_off(&error_fatal);
> > + pef_kvm_reset(machine->cgs, &error_fatal);
> > spapr_caps_apply(spapr);
> >
> > first_ppc_cpu = POWERPC_CPU(first_cpu);
> > @@ -2658,6 +2659,11 @@ static void spapr_machine_init(MachineState *machine)
> > char *filename;
> > Error *resize_hpt_err = NULL;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * if Secure VM (PEF) support is configured, then initialize it
> > + */
> > + pef_kvm_init(machine->cgs, &error_fatal);
> > +
> > msi_nonbroken = true;
> >
> > QLIST_INIT(&spapr->phbs);
> > diff --git a/include/hw/ppc/pef.h b/include/hw/ppc/pef.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000..707dbe524c
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/hw/ppc/pef.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
> > +/*
> > + * PEF (Protected Execution Facility) for POWER support
> > + *
> > + * Copyright Red Hat.
> > + *
> > + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
> > + * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +
> > +#ifndef HW_PPC_PEF_H
> > +#define HW_PPC_PEF_H
> > +
> > +int pef_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> > +int pef_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
> > +
> > +#endif /* HW_PPC_PEF_H */
> > diff --git a/target/ppc/kvm.c b/target/ppc/kvm.c
> > index daf690a678..0c5056dd5b 100644
> > --- a/target/ppc/kvm.c
> > +++ b/target/ppc/kvm.c
> > @@ -2929,21 +2929,3 @@ void kvmppc_set_reg_tb_offset(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int64_t tb_offset)
> > kvm_set_one_reg(cs, KVM_REG_PPC_TB_OFFSET, &tb_offset);
> > }
> > }
> > -
> > -/*
> > - * Don't set error if KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl is invoked on kernels
> > - * that don't support this ioctl.
> > - */
> > -void kvmppc_svm_off(Error **errp)
> > -{
> > - int rc;
> > -
> > - if (!kvm_enabled()) {
> > - return;
> > - }
> > -
> > - rc = kvm_vm_ioctl(KVM_STATE(current_accel()), KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF);
> > - if (rc && rc != -ENOTTY) {
> > - error_setg_errno(errp, -rc, "KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl failed");
> > - }
> > -}
> > diff --git a/target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h b/target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h
> > index 73ce2bc951..989f61ace0 100644
> > --- a/target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h
> > +++ b/target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h
> > @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ int kvmppc_booke_watchdog_enable(PowerPCCPU *cpu);
> > target_ulong kvmppc_configure_v3_mmu(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
> > bool radix, bool gtse,
> > uint64_t proc_tbl);
> > -void kvmppc_svm_off(Error **errp);
> > #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
> > bool kvmppc_spapr_use_multitce(void);
> > int kvmppc_spapr_enable_inkernel_multitce(void);
> > @@ -216,11 +215,6 @@ static inline target_ulong kvmppc_configure_v3_mmu(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > -static inline void kvmppc_svm_off(Error **errp)
> > -{
> > - return;
> > -}
> > -
> > static inline void kvmppc_set_reg_ppc_online(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
> > unsigned int online)
> > {
>
--
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_
| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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