On 9/25/20 2:03 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> > > This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest. > > Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) expands on the > SEV support to protect the guest register state from the hypervisor. See > "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming", > section "15.35 Encrypted State (SEV-ES)" [1]. > > In order to allow a hypervisor to perform functions on behalf of a guest, > there is architectural support for notifying a guest's operating system > when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to > selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested > function. The notification is performed using a new exception, the VMM > Communication exception (#VC). The information is shared through the > Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB) using the VMGEXIT instruction. > The GHCB format and the protocol for using it is documented in "SEV-ES > Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" [2]. > > The main areas of the Qemu code that are updated to support SEV-ES are > around the SEV guest launch process and AP booting in order to support > booting multiple vCPUs. > > There are no new command line switches required. Instead, the desire for > SEV-ES is presented using the SEV policy object. Bit 2 of the SEV policy > object indicates that SEV-ES is required. > > The SEV launch process is updated in two ways. The first is that a the > KVM_SEV_ES_INIT ioctl is used to initialize the guest instead of the > standard KVM_SEV_INIT ioctl. The second is that before the SEV launch > measurement is calculated, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA SEV API is invoked for > each vCPU that Qemu has created. Once the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA API has been > invoked, no direct changes to the guest register state can be made. > > AP booting poses some interesting challenges. The INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence > is typically used to boot the APs. However, the hypervisor is not allowed > to update the guest registers. For the APs, the reset vector must be known > in advance. An OVMF method to provide a known reset vector address exists > by providing an SEV information block, identified by UUID, near the end of > the firmware [3]. OVMF will program the jump to the actual reset vector in > this area of memory. Since the memory location is known in advance, an AP > can be created with the known reset vector address as its starting CS:IP. > The GHCB document [2] talks about how SMP booting under SEV-ES is > performed. SEV-ES also requires the use of the in-kernel irqchip support > in order to minimize the changes required to Qemu to support AP booting. > > [1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf > [2] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf > [3] 30937f2f98c4 ("OvmfPkg: Use the SEV-ES work area for the SEV-ES AP reset vector") > https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/30937f2f98c42496f2f143fe8374ae7f7e684847 > > --- > > These patches are based on commit: > d0ed6a69d3 ("Update version for v5.1.0 release") > > (I tried basing on the latest Qemu commit, but I was having build issues > that level) Sorry, forgot to update this part... These patches are based on commit: 1bd5556f66 ("Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/kraxel/tags/audio-20200923-pull-request' into staging") Thanks, Tom > > A version of the tree can be found at: > https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/sev-es-v12 > > Changes since v3: > - Use the QemuUUID structure for GUID definitions > - Use SEV-ES policy bit definition from target/i386/sev_i386.h > - Update SMM support to a per-VM check in order to check SMM capability > at the VM level since SEV-ES guests don't currently support SMM > - Make the CPU resettable check an arch-specific check > > Changes since v2: > - Add in-kernel irqchip requirement for SEV-ES guests > > Changes since v1: > - Fixed checkpatch.pl errors/warnings > > Tom Lendacky (6): > sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES > sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests > sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES > sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest > kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability > sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy > > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++ > hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 +++- > include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 + > include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 5 ++ > include/sysemu/kvm.h | 26 +++++++++ > include/sysemu/sev.h | 3 ++ > softmmu/cpus.c | 5 ++ > softmmu/vl.c | 5 +- > target/arm/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/i386/cpu.c | 1 + > target/i386/kvm.c | 10 +++- > target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ > target/i386/sev.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + > target/mips/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/ppc/kvm.c | 5 ++ > target/s390x/kvm.c | 5 ++ > 18 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >
