On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 03:15:14PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> > > This patch series provides support for running SEV-ES guests under KVM. >From the x86/VMX side of things, the GPR hooks are the only changes that I strongly dislike. For the vmsa_encrypted flag and related things like allow_debug(), I'd really like to aim for a common implementation between SEV-ES and TDX[*] from the get go, within reason obviously. From a code perspective, I don't think it will be too onerous as the basic tenets are quite similar, e.g. guest state is off limits, FPU state is autoswitched, etc..., but I suspect (or maybe worry?) that there are enough minor differences that we'll want a more generic way of marking ioctls() as disallowed to avoid having one-off checks all over the place. That being said, it may also be that there are some ioctls() that should be disallowed under SEV-ES, but aren't in this series. E.g. I assume kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi() should be rejected as KVM can't do the necessary emulation (I assume this applies to vanilla SEV as well?). One thought to try and reconcile the differences between SEV-ES and TDX would be expicitly list which ioctls() are and aren't supported and go from there? E.g. if there is 95% overlap than we probably don't need to get fancy with generic allow/deny. Given that we don't yet have publicly available KVM code for TDX, what if I generate and post a list of ioctls() that are denied by either SEV-ES or TDX, organized by the denier(s)? Then for the ioctls() that are denied by one and not the other, we add a brief explanation of why it's denied? If that sounds ok, I'll get the list and the TDX side of things posted tomorrow. Thanks! [*] https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
