Hi Eric,
> From: Auger Eric <eric.auger@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 12:06 AM
>
> Hi Yi,
>
> On 7/12/20 1:21 PM, Liu Yi L wrote:
> > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
> > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
> > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passsed from user-space.
> passed
got it.
> > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
> >
> > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
> > CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++
> > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++--
> > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > index 4d54198..a9504cb 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain
> *domain, struct device *dev,
> > int granu = 0;
> > u64 pasid = 0;
> > u64 addr = 0;
> > + void *pdata;
> >
> > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
> > if (granu == -EINVAL) {
> > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain
> *domain, struct device *dev,
> > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags &
> IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
> > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
> >
> > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> > + if (!pdata) {
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out_unlock;
> > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
> > + goto out_unlock;
> > + }
> > +
> > switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
> > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
> > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > index d2c0e1a..212dee0 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev,
> > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> >
> > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
> I do not get what the call was supposed to do before that patch?
you mean patch 10/15 by "that patch", right? the ownership check should
be done as to prevent illegal bind request from userspace. before patch
10/15, it should be added.
> > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
> > if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
> > ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
> > goto out;
> > @@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain
> *domain,
> > struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid)
> > {
> > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
> > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
> > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
> > struct intel_svm *svm;
> > int ret = -EINVAL;
> > @@ -443,8 +444,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain
> *domain,
> > if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> > +
> > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
> > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> just to make sure, about the locking, can't domain->ioasid_sid change
> under the hood?
I guess not. intel_svm_unbind_gpasid() and iommu_domain_set_attr()
is called by vfio today, and within vfio, there is vfio_iommu->lock.
Regards,
Yi Liu
>
> Thanks
>
> Eric
> > if (!svm) {
> > ret = -EINVAL;
> > goto out;
> >
