On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 11:29:03AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Janosch Frank (frankja@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote: > > On 6/26/20 11:32 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 11:01:58AM +0200, Janosch Frank wrote: > > >> On 6/26/20 8:53 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > > >>>>>>> Does this have any implications when probing with the 'none' machine? > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I'm not sure. In your case, I guess the cpu bit would still show up > > >>>>>> as before, so it would tell you base feature availability, but not > > >>>>>> whether you can use the new configuration option. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Since the HTL option is generic, you could still set it on the "none" > > >>>>>> machine, though it wouldn't really have any effect. That is, if you > > >>>>>> could create a suitable object to point it at, which would depend on > > >>>>>> ... details. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> The important point is that we never want the (expanded) host cpu model > > >>>>> look different when either specifying or not specifying the HTL > > >>>>> property. > > >>>> > > >>>> Ah, yes, I see your point. So my current suggestion will satisfy > > >>>> that, basically it is: > > >>>> > > >>>> cpu has unpack (inc. by default) && htl specified > > >>>> => works (allowing secure), as expected > > >>> > > >>> ack > > >>> > > >>>> > > >>>> !cpu has unpack && htl specified > > >>>> => bails out with an error > > >>> > > >>> ack > > >>> > > >>>> > > >>>> !cpu has unpack && !htl specified > > >>>> => works for a non-secure guest, as expected > > >>>> => guest will fail if it attempts to go secure > > >>> > > >>> ack, behavior just like running on older hw without unpack > > >>> > > >>>> > > >>>> cpu has unpack && !htl specified > > >>>> => works as expected for a non-secure guest (unpack feature is > > >>>> present, but unused) > > >>>> => secure guest may work "by accident", but only if all virtio > > >>>> properties have the right values, which is the user's > > >>>> problem > > >>>> > > >>>> That last case is kinda ugly, but I think it's tolerable. > > >>> > > >>> Right, we must not affect non-secure guests, and existing secure setups > > >>> (e.g., older qemu machines). Will have to think about this some more, > > >>> but does not sound too crazy. > > >> > > >> I severely dislike having to specify things to make PV work. > > >> The IOMMU is already a thorn in our side and we're working on making the > > >> whole ordeal completely transparent so the only requirement to make this > > >> work is the right machine, kernel, qemu and kernel cmd line option > > >> "prot_virt=1". That's why we do the reboot into PV mode in the first place. > > >> > > >> I.e. the goal is that if customers convert compatible guests into > > >> protected ones and start them up on a z15 on a distro with PV support > > >> they can just use the guest without having to change XML or command line > > >> parameters. > > > > > > If you're exposing new features to the guest machine, then it is usually > > > to be expected that XML and QEMU command line will change. Some simple > > > things might be hidable behind a new QEMU machine type or CPU model, but > > > there's a limit to how much should be hidden that way while staying sane. > > > > > > I'd really expect the configuration to change when switching a guest to > > > a new hardware platform and wanting major new functionality to be enabled. > > > The XML / QEMU config is a low level instantiation of a particular feature > > > set, optimized for a specific machine, rather than a high level description > > > of ideal "best" config independent of host machine. > > > > You still have to set the host command line and make sure that unpack is > > available. Currently you also have to specify the IOMMU which we like to > > drop as a requirement. Everything else is dependent on runtime > > information which tells us if we need to take a PV or non-PV branch. > > Having the unpack facility should be enough to use the unpack facility. > > > > Keep in mind that we have no real concept of a special protected VM to > > begin with. If the VM never boots into a protected kernel it will never > > be protected. On a reboot it drops from protected into unprotected mode > > to execute the bios and boot loader and then may or may not move back > > into a protected state. > > My worry isn't actually how painful adding all the iommu glue is, but > what happens when users forget; especially if they forget for one > device. > > I could appreciate having a machine option to cause iommu to then get > turned on with all other devices; but I think also we could do with > something that failed with a nice error if an iommu flag was missing. > For SEV this could be done pretty early, but for power/s390 I guess > you'd have to do this when someone tried to enable secure mode, but > I'm not sure you can tell. What is the cost / downside of turning on the iommu option for virtio devices ? Is it something that is reasonable for a mgmt app todo unconditionally, regardless of whether memory encryption is in use, or will that have a negative impact on things ? Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
