Hello Brijesh, Steve,
On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 03:18:18AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> Hello Brijesh,
>
> On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 09:34:15PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> >
> > On 4/7/20 8:38 PM, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 6:17 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >> Hello Steve, Brijesh,
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 05:35:57PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > >>> On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 5:29 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On 4/7/20 7:01 PM, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > >>>>> On Mon, Apr 6, 2020 at 10:27 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >>>>>> Hello Steve,
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 07:17:37PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Mar 29, 2020 at 11:22 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@xxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> This hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page
> > >>>>>>>> encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked
> > >>>>>>>> only when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted
> > >>>>>>>> and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted.
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>>>>>>> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > >>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> > >>>>>>>> ---
> > >>>>>>>> Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst | 15 +++++
> > >>>>>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
> > >>>>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >>>>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 1 +
> > >>>>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++
> > >>>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 +
> > >>>>>>>> 6 files changed, 120 insertions(+)
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst
> > >>>>>>>> index dbaf207e560d..ff5287e68e81 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.rst
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -169,3 +169,18 @@ a0: destination APIC ID
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> :Usage example: When sending a call-function IPI-many to vCPUs, yield if
> > >>>>>>>> any of the IPI target vCPUs was preempted.
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> +8. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS
> > >>>>>>>> +-------------------------
> > >>>>>>>> +:Architecture: x86
> > >>>>>>>> +:Status: active
> > >>>>>>>> +:Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest)
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> +a0: the guest physical address of the start page
> > >>>>>>>> +a1: the number of pages
> > >>>>>>>> +a2: encryption attribute
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + Where:
> > >>>>>>>> + * 1: Encryption attribute is set
> > >>>>>>>> + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > >>>>>>>> index 98959e8cd448..90718fa3db47 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -1267,6 +1267,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> bool (*apic_init_signal_blocked)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > >>>>>>>> int (*enable_direct_tlbflush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > >>>>>>>> + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode);
> > >>>>>>> Nit: spell out size instead of sz.
> > >>>>>>>> };
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > >>>>>>>> index 7c2721e18b06..1d8beaf1bceb 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
> > >>>>>>>> int fd; /* SEV device fd */
> > >>>>>>>> unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
> > >>>>>>>> struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap;
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size;
> > >>>>>>>> };
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> struct kvm_svm {
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -1991,6 +1993,9 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
> > >>>>>>>> sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
> > >>>>>>>> + sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL;
> > >>>>>>>> }
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -7593,6 +7598,94 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> > >>>>>>>> return ret;
> > >>>>>>>> }
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> +static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size)
> > >>>>>>>> +{
> > >>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long *map;
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long sz;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size)
> > >>>>>>>> + return 0;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + map = vmalloc(sz);
> > >>>>>>>> + if (!map) {
> > >>>>>>>> + pr_err_once("Failed to allocate encrypted bitmap size %lx\n",
> > >>>>>>>> + sz);
> > >>>>>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
> > >>>>>>>> + }
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + /* mark the page encrypted (by default) */
> > >>>>>>>> + memset(map, 0xff, sz);
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size);
> > >>>>>>>> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + sev->page_enc_bmap = map;
> > >>>>>>>> + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + return 0;
> > >>>>>>>> +}
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> +static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> > >>>>>>>> + unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc)
> > >>>>>>>> +{
> > >>>>>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> > >>>>>>>> + kvm_pfn_t pfn_start, pfn_end;
> > >>>>>>>> + gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end;
> > >>>>>>>> + int ret;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> > >>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (!npages)
> > >>>>>>>> + return 0;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
> > >>>>>>>> + gfn_end = gfn_start + npages;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + /* out of bound access error check */
> > >>>>>>>> + if (gfn_end <= gfn_start)
> > >>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + /* lets make sure that gpa exist in our memslot */
> > >>>>>>>> + pfn_start = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_start);
> > >>>>>>>> + pfn_end = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_end);
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_start) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_start)) {
> > >>>>>>>> + /*
> > >>>>>>>> + * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
> > >>>>>>>> + * to the page encryption bitmap.
> > >>>>>>>> + */
> > >>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
> > >>>>>>>> + }
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_end) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_end)) {
> > >>>>>>>> + /*
> > >>>>>>>> + * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
> > >>>>>>>> + * to the page encryption bitmap.
> > >>>>>>>> + */
> > >>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
> > >>>>>>>> + }
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> > >>>>>>>> + ret = sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end);
> > >>>>>>>> + if (ret)
> > >>>>>>>> + goto unlock;
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + if (enc)
> > >>>>>>>> + __bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
> > >>>>>>>> + gfn_end - gfn_start);
> > >>>>>>>> + else
> > >>>>>>>> + __bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
> > >>>>>>>> + gfn_end - gfn_start);
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> +unlock:
> > >>>>>>>> + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
> > >>>>>>>> + return ret;
> > >>>>>>>> +}
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> > >>>>>>>> {
> > >>>>>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -7995,6 +8088,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
> > >>>>>>>> .need_emulation_on_page_fault = svm_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> .apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
> > >>>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>>> + .page_enc_status_hc = svm_page_enc_status_hc,
> > >>>>>>>> };
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> static int __init svm_init(void)
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > >>>>>>>> index 079d9fbf278e..f68e76ee7f9c 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -8001,6 +8001,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
> > >>>>>>>> .nested_get_evmcs_version = NULL,
> > >>>>>>>> .need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
> > >>>>>>>> .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
> > >>>>>>>> + .page_enc_status_hc = NULL,
> > >>>>>>>> };
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > >>>>>>>> index cf95c36cb4f4..68428eef2dde 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -7564,6 +7564,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > >>>>>>>> kvm_sched_yield(vcpu->kvm, a0);
> > >>>>>>>> ret = 0;
> > >>>>>>>> break;
> > >>>>>>>> + case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS:
> > >>>>>>>> + ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> > >>>>>>>> + if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc)
> > >>>>>>>> + ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm,
> > >>>>>>>> + a0, a1, a2);
> > >>>>>>>> + break;
> > >>>>>>>> default:
> > >>>>>>>> ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> > >>>>>>>> break;
> > >>>>>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
> > >>>>>>>> index 8b86609849b9..847b83b75dc8 100644
> > >>>>>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
> > >>>>>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
> > >>>>>>>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> > >>>>>>>> #define KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING 9
> > >>>>>>>> #define KVM_HC_SEND_IPI 10
> > >>>>>>>> #define KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD 11
> > >>>>>>>> +#define KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS 12
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> /*
> > >>>>>>>> * hypercalls use architecture specific
> > >>>>>>>> --
> > >>>>>>>> 2.17.1
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> I'm still not excited by the dynamic resizing. I believe the guest
> > >>>>>>> hypercall can be called in atomic contexts, which makes me
> > >>>>>>> particularly unexcited to see a potentially large vmalloc on the host
> > >>>>>>> followed by filling the buffer. Particularly when the buffer might be
> > >>>>>>> non-trivial in size (~1MB per 32GB, per some back of the envelope
> > >>>>>>> math).
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>> I think looking at more practical situations, most hypercalls will
> > >>>>>> happen during the boot stage, when device specific initializations are
> > >>>>>> happening, so typically the maximum page encryption bitmap size would
> > >>>>>> be allocated early enough.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> In fact, initial hypercalls made by OVMF will probably allocate the
> > >>>>>> maximum page bitmap size even before the kernel comes up, especially
> > >>>>>> as they will be setting up page enc/dec status for MMIO, ROM, ACPI
> > >>>>>> regions, PCI device memory, etc., and most importantly for
> > >>>>>> "non-existent" high memory range (which will probably be the
> > >>>>>> maximum size page encryption bitmap allocated/resized).
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Let me know if you have different thoughts on this ?
> > >>>>> Hi Ashish,
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> If this is not an issue in practice, we can just move past this. If we
> > >>>>> are basically guaranteed that OVMF will trigger hypercalls that expand
> > >>>>> the bitmap beyond the top of memory, then, yes, that should work. That
> > >>>>> leaves me slightly nervous that OVMF might regress since it's not
> > >>>>> obvious that calling a hypercall beyond the top of memory would be
> > >>>>> "required" for avoiding a somewhat indirectly related issue in guest
> > >>>>> kernels.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> If possible then we should try to avoid growing/shrinking the bitmap .
> > >>>> Today OVMF may not be accessing beyond memory but a malicious guest
> > >>>> could send a hypercall down which can trigger a huge memory allocation
> > >>>> on the host side and may eventually cause denial of service for other.
> > >>> Nice catch! Was just writing up an email about this.
> > >>>> I am in favor if we can find some solution to handle this case. How
> > >>>> about Steve's suggestion about VMM making a call down to the kernel to
> > >>>> tell how big the bitmap should be? Initially it should be equal to the
> > >>>> guest RAM and if VMM ever did the memory expansion then it can send down
> > >>>> another notification to increase the bitmap ?
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Optionally, instead of adding a new ioctl, I was wondering if we can
> > >>>> extend the kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() to make svm specific x86_ops
> > >>>> which can take read the userspace provided memory region and calculate
> > >>>> the amount of guest RAM managed by the KVM and grow/shrink the bitmap
> > >>>> based on that information. I have not looked deep enough to see if its
> > >>>> doable but if it can work then we can avoid adding yet another ioctl.
> > >>> We also have the set bitmap ioctl in a later patch in this series. We
> > >>> could also use the set ioctl for initialization (it's a little
> > >>> excessive for initialization since there will be an additional
> > >>> ephemeral allocation and a few additional buffer copies, but that's
> > >>> probably fine). An enable_cap has the added benefit of probably being
> > >>> necessary anyway so usermode can disable the migration feature flag.
> > >>>
> > >>> In general, userspace is going to have to be in direct control of the
> > >>> buffer and its size.
> > >> My only practical concern about setting a static bitmap size based on guest
> > >> memory is about the hypercalls being made initially by OVMF to set page
> > >> enc/dec status for ROM, ACPI regions and especially the non-existent
> > >> high memory range. The new ioctl will statically setup bitmap size to
> > >> whatever guest RAM is specified, say 4G, 8G, etc., but the OVMF
> > >> hypercall for non-existent memory will try to do a hypercall for guest
> > >> physical memory range like ~6G->64G (for 4G guest RAM setup), this
> > >> hypercall will basically have to just return doing nothing, because
> > >> the allocated bitmap won't have this guest physical range available ?
> >
> >
> > IMO, Ovmf issuing a hypercall beyond the guest RAM is simple wrong, it
> > should *not* do that. There was a feature request I submitted sometime
> > back to Tianocore https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=623 as
> > I saw this coming in future. I tried highlighting the problem in the
> > MdeModulePkg that it does not provide a notifier to tell OVMF when core
> > creates the MMIO holes etc. It was not a big problem with the SEV
> > initially because we were never getting down to hypervisor to do
> > something about those non-existent regions. But with the migration its
> > now important that we should restart the discussion with UEFI folks and
> > see what can be done. In the kernel patches we should do what is right
> > for the kernel and not workaround the Ovmf limitation.
>
> Ok, this makes sense. I will start exploring
> kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() to see if it can assist in computing
> the guest RAM or otherwise i will look at adding a new ioctl interface
> for the same.
>
I looked at kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() and
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region() and kvm_arch_commit_memory_region()
looks to be ideal to use for this.
I walked the kvm_memslots in this function and i can compute the
approximate guest RAM mapped by KVM, though, i get the guest RAM size as
"twice" the configured size because of the two address spaces on x86 KVM,
i believe there is one additional address space for SMM/SMRAM use.
I don't think we have a use case of migrating a SEV guest with SMM
support ?
Considering that, i believe that i can just compute the guest RAM size
using memslots for address space #0 and use that to grow/shrink the bitmap.
As you mentioned i will need to add a new SVM specific x86_ops to
callback as part of kvm_arch_commit_memory_region() which will in-turn
call sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap().
Thanks,
Ashish
> >
> >
> > >> Also, hypercalls for ROM, ACPI, device regions and any memory holes within
> > >> the static bitmap setup as per guest RAM config will work, but what
> > >> about hypercalls for any device regions beyond the guest RAM config ?
> > >>
> > >> Thanks,
> > >> Ashish
> > > I'm not super familiar with what the address beyond the top of ram is
> > > used for. If the memory is not backed by RAM, will it even matter for
> > > migration? Sounds like the encryption for SEV won't even apply to it.
> > > If we don't need to know what the c-bit state of an address is, we
> > > don't need to track it. It doesn't hurt to track it (which is why I'm
> > > not super concerned about tracking the memory holes).
