On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 3:27 PM Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > On 3/29/20 11:21 PM, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@xxxxxxx> > > > > The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest > > ready for the execution. > > > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx> > > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> > > Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx > > Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx> > > --- > > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > __u32 trans_len; > > }; > > > > +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH > > +------------------------ > > + > > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be > > +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > > + > > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > + > > References > > ========== > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > index 5fc5355536d7..7c2721e18b06 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > @@ -7573,6 +7573,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > return ret; > > } > > > > +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > +{ > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; > > + int ret; > > + > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > + return -ENOTTY; > > + > > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!data) > > + return -ENOMEM; > > + > > + data->handle = sev->handle; > > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > > + > > + kfree(data); > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > { > > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > > @@ -7632,6 +7652,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > > r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > break; > > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > > + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > + break; > > default: > > r = -EINVAL; > > goto out; > Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@xxxxxxxxxx> As to ENOTTY, man page for ioctl translates it as "The specified request does not apply to the kind of object that the file descriptor fd references", which seems appropriate here. Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxxx>