On 4/2/20 11:37 AM, Venu Busireddy wrote:
> On 2020-04-02 07:59:54 -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> Hi Venu,
>>
>> Thanks for the feedback.
>>
>> On 4/2/20 1:27 AM, Venu Busireddy wrote:
>>> On 2020-03-30 06:19:59 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@xxxxxxx>
>>>>
>>>> The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.
>>>>
>>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
>>>> Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>> Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 27 ++++
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
>>>> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 8 +-
>>>> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 12 ++
>>>> 4 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>>>> index c3129b9ba5cb..4fd34fc5c7a7 100644
>>>> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>>>> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
>>>> @@ -263,6 +263,33 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>>>> __u32 trans_len;
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> +10. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
>>>> +----------------------
>>>> +
>>>> +The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
>>>> +outgoing guest encryption context.
>>>> +
>>>> +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
>>>> +
>>>> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>>>> +
>>>> +::
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_send_start {
>>>> + __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
>>>> +
>>>> + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr; /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
>>>> + __u32 pdh_cert_len;
>>>> +
>>>> + __u64 plat_certs_uadr; /* platform certificate chain */
>>> Could this please be changed to plat_certs_uaddr, as it is referred to
>>> in the rest of the code?
>>>
>>>> + __u32 plat_certs_len;
>>>> +
>>>> + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr; /* AMD certificate */
>>>> + __u32 amd_cert_len;
>>> Could this please be changed to amd_certs_len, as it is referred to in
>>> the rest of the code?
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> + __u64 session_uaddr; /* Guest session information */
>>>> + __u32 session_len;
>>>> + };
>>>> +
>>>> References
>>>> ==========
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>>>> index 50d1ebafe0b3..63d172e974ad 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>>>> @@ -7149,6 +7149,131 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>> return ret;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
>>>> +static int
>>>> +__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> + struct sev_data_send_start *data;
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>> + if (data == NULL)
>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>> +
>>>> + data->handle = sev->handle;
>>>> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
>>>> +
>>>> + params->session_len = data->session_len;
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
>>>> + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
>>>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + kfree(data);
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>> + struct sev_data_send_start *data;
>>>> + struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
>>>> + void *amd_certs, *session_data;
>>>> + void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
>>>> + return -ENOTTY;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
>>>> + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
>>>> + if (!params.session_len)
>>>> + return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
>>>> + ¶ms);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* some sanity checks */
>>>> + if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
>>>> + !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
>>>> + session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>> + if (!session_data)
>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
>>>> + pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
>>>> + params.pdh_cert_len);
>>>> + if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
>>>> + ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
>>>> + goto e_free_session;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
>>>> + params.plat_certs_len);
>>>> + if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
>>>> + ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
>>>> + goto e_free_pdh;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
>>>> + params.amd_certs_len);
>>>> + if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
>>>> + ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
>>>> + goto e_free_plat_cert;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>> + if (data == NULL) {
>>>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> + goto e_free_amd_cert;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
>>>> + data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
>>>> + data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
>>>> + data->plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
>>>> + data->plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
>>>> + data->amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
>>>> + data->amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
>>>> + data->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
>>>> + data->session_len = params.session_len;
>>>> + data->handle = sev->handle;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
>>>> +
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t) params.session_uaddr,
>>>> + session_data, params.session_len)) {
>>>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> + goto e_free;
>>>> + }
>>> To optimize the amount of data being copied to user space, could the
>>> above section of code changed as follows?
>>>
>>> params.session_len = data->session_len;
>>> if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t) params.session_uaddr,
>>> session_data, params.session_len)) {
>>> ret = -EFAULT;
>>> goto e_free;
>>> }
>>
>> We should not be using the data->session_len, it will cause -EFAULT when
>> user has not allocated enough space in the session_uaddr. Lets consider
>> the case where user passes session_len=10 but firmware thinks the
>> session length should be 64. In that case the data->session_len will
>> contains a value of 64 but userspace has allocated space for 10 bytes
>> and copy_to_user() will fail. If we are really concern about the amount
>> of data getting copied to userspace then use min_t(size_t,
>> params.session_len, data->session_len).
> We are allocating a buffer of params.session_len size and passing that
> buffer, and that length via data->session_len, to the firmware. Why would
> the firmware set data->session_len to a larger value, in spite of telling
> it that the buffer is only params.session_len long? I thought that only
> the reverse is possible, that is, the user sets the params.session_len
> to the MAX, but the session data is actually smaller than that size.
The question is, how does a userspace know the session length ? One
method is you can precalculate a value based on your firmware version
and have userspace pass that, or another approach is set
params.session_len = 0 and query it from the FW. The FW spec allow to
query the length, please see the spec. In the qemu patches I choose
second approach. This is because session blob can change from one FW
version to another and I tried to avoid calculating or hardcoding the
length for a one version of the FW. You can certainly choose the first
method. We want to ensure that kernel interface works on the both cases.
> Also, if for whatever reason the firmware sets data->session_len to
> a larger value than what is passed, what is the user space expected
> to do when the call returns? If the user space tries to access
> params.session_len amount of data, it will possibly get a memory access
> violation, because it did not originally allocate that large a buffer.
>
> If we do go with using min_t(size_t, params.session_len,
> data->session_len), then params.session_len should also be set to the
> smaller of the two, right?
>
>>>> +
>>>> + params.policy = data->policy;
>>>> + params.session_len = data->session_len;
>>>> + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
>>>> + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
>>>> + ret = -EFAULT;
>>> Since the only fields that are changed in the kvm_sev_send_start structure
>>> are session_len and policy, why do we need to copy the entire structure
>>> back to the user? Why not just those two values? Please see the changes
>>> proposed to kvm_sev_send_start structure further below to accomplish this.
>> I think we also need to consider the code readability while saving the
>> CPU cycles. This is very small structure. By duplicating into two calls
>> #1 copy params.policy and #2 copy params.session_len we will add more
>> CPU cycle. And, If we get creative and rearrange the structure then code
>> readability is lost because now the copy will depend on how the
>> structure is layout in the memory.
> I was not recommending splitting that call into two. That would certainly
> be more expensive, than copying the entire structure. That is the reason
> why I suggested reordering the members of kvm_sev_send_start. Isn't
> there plenty of code where structures are defined in a way to keep the
> data movement efficient? :-)
>
> Please see my other comment below.
>
>>> params.policy = data->policy;
>>> if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
>>> sizeof(params.policy) + sizeof(params.session_len))
>>> ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +e_free:
>>>> + kfree(data);
>>>> +e_free_amd_cert:
>>>> + kfree(amd_certs);
>>>> +e_free_plat_cert:
>>>> + kfree(plat_certs);
>>>> +e_free_pdh:
>>>> + kfree(pdh_cert);
>>>> +e_free_session:
>>>> + kfree(session_data);
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>>>> {
>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
>>>> @@ -7193,6 +7318,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>>>> case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
>>>> r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>>>> break;
>>>> + case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
>>>> + r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>>>> + break;
>>>> default:
>>>> r = -EINVAL;
>>>> goto out;
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> index 5167bf2bfc75..9f63b9d48b63 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>>> @@ -323,11 +323,11 @@ struct sev_data_send_start {
>>>> u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
>>>> u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In */
>>>> u32 reserved1;
>>>> - u64 plat_cert_address; /* In */
>>>> - u32 plat_cert_len; /* In */
>>>> + u64 plat_certs_address; /* In */
>>>> + u32 plat_certs_len; /* In */
>>>> u32 reserved2;
>>>> - u64 amd_cert_address; /* In */
>>>> - u32 amd_cert_len; /* In */
>>>> + u64 amd_certs_address; /* In */
>>>> + u32 amd_certs_len; /* In */
>>>> u32 reserved3;
>>>> u64 session_address; /* In */
>>>> u32 session_len; /* In/Out */
>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
>>>> index 4b95f9a31a2f..17bef4c245e1 100644
>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
>>>> @@ -1558,6 +1558,18 @@ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
>>>> __u32 len;
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> +struct kvm_sev_send_start {
>>>> + __u32 policy;
>>>> + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
>>>> + __u32 pdh_cert_len;
>>>> + __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
>>>> + __u32 plat_certs_len;
>>>> + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
>>>> + __u32 amd_certs_len;
>>>> + __u64 session_uaddr;
>>>> + __u32 session_len;
>>>> +};
>>> Redo this structure as below:
>>>
>>> struct kvm_sev_send_start {
>>> __u32 policy;
>>> __u32 session_len;
>>> __u64 session_uaddr;
>>> __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
>>> __u32 pdh_cert_len;
>>> __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
>>> __u32 plat_certs_len;
>>> __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
>>> __u32 amd_certs_len;
>>> };
>>>
>>> Or as below, just to make it look better.
>>>
>>> struct kvm_sev_send_start {
>>> __u32 policy;
>>> __u32 session_len;
>>> __u64 session_uaddr;
>>> __u32 pdh_cert_len;
>>> __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
>>> __u32 plat_certs_len;
>>> __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
>>> __u32 amd_certs_len;
>>> __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
>>> };
>>>
>> Wherever applicable, I tried best to not divert from the SEV spec
>> structure layout. Anyone who is reading the SEV FW spec will see a
>> similar structure layout in the KVM/PSP header files. I would prefer to
>> stick to that approach.
> This structure is in uapi, and is anyway different from the
> sev_data_send_start, right? Does it really need to stay close to the
> firmware structure layout? Just because the firmware folks thought of
> a structure layout, that should not prevent our code to be efficient.
>
>>
>>>> +
>>>> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
>>>> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
>>>> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
>>>> --
>>>> 2.17.1
>>>>
