On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 11:34:27AM +0800, lantianyu1986@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Hyper-V direct tlb flush targets KVM on Hyper-V guest.
> Enable direct TLB flush for its guests meaning that TLB
> flush hypercalls are handled by Level 0 hypervisor (Hyper-V)
> bypassing KVM in Level 1. Due to the different ABI for hypercall
> parameters between Hyper-V and KVM, KVM capabilities should be
> hidden when enable Hyper-V direct tlb flush otherwise KVM
> hypercalls may be intercepted by Hyper-V. Add new parameter
> "hv-direct-tlbflush". Check expose_kvm and Hyper-V tlb flush
> capability status before enabling the feature.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Change since v3:
> - Fix logic of Hyper-V passthrough mode with direct
> tlb flush.
>
> Change sicne v2:
> - Update new feature description and name.
> - Change failure print log.
>
> Change since v1:
> - Add direct tlb flush's Hyper-V property and use
> hv_cpuid_check_and_set() to check the dependency of tlbflush
> feature.
> - Make new feature work with Hyper-V passthrough mode.
> ---
> docs/hyperv.txt | 10 ++++++++++
> target/i386/cpu.c | 2 ++
> target/i386/cpu.h | 1 +
> target/i386/kvm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/docs/hyperv.txt b/docs/hyperv.txt
> index 8fdf25c829..140a5c7e44 100644
> --- a/docs/hyperv.txt
> +++ b/docs/hyperv.txt
> @@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ enabled.
>
> Requires: hv-vpindex, hv-synic, hv-time, hv-stimer
>
> +3.18. hv-direct-tlbflush
> +=======================
> +Enable direct TLB flush for KVM when it is running as a nested
> +hypervisor on top Hyper-V. When enabled, TLB flush hypercalls from L2
> +guests are being passed through to L0 (Hyper-V) for handling. Due to ABI
> +differences between Hyper-V and KVM hypercalls, L2 guests will not be
> +able to issue KVM hypercalls (as those could be mishanled by L0
> +Hyper-V), this requires KVM hypervisor signature to be hidden.
On a second thought, I wonder if this is the only conflict we have.
In KVM, kvm_emulate_hypercall, when sees Hyper-V hypercalls enabled,
just calls kvm_hv_hypercall and returns. I.e. once the userspace
enables Hyper-V hypercalls (which QEMU does when any of hv_* flags is
given), KVM treats *all* hypercalls as Hyper-V ones and handles *no* KVM
hypercalls.
So, if hiding the KVM hypervisor signature is the only way to prevent the
guest from issuing KVM hypercalls (need to double-check), then, I'm
afraid, we just need to require it as soon as any Hyper-V feature is
enabled.
> +Requires: hv-tlbflush, -kvm
>
> 4. Development features
> ========================
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
> index 44f1bbdcac..7bc7fee512 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
> @@ -6156,6 +6156,8 @@ static Property x86_cpu_properties[] = {
> HYPERV_FEAT_IPI, 0),
> DEFINE_PROP_BIT64("hv-stimer-direct", X86CPU, hyperv_features,
> HYPERV_FEAT_STIMER_DIRECT, 0),
> + DEFINE_PROP_BIT64("hv-direct-tlbflush", X86CPU, hyperv_features,
> + HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH, 0),
> DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("hv-passthrough", X86CPU, hyperv_passthrough, false),
>
> DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("check", X86CPU, check_cpuid, true),
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
> index eaa5395aa5..3cb105f7d6 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.h
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
> @@ -907,6 +907,7 @@ typedef uint64_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];
> #define HYPERV_FEAT_EVMCS 12
> #define HYPERV_FEAT_IPI 13
> #define HYPERV_FEAT_STIMER_DIRECT 14
> +#define HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH 15
>
> #ifndef HYPERV_SPINLOCK_NEVER_RETRY
> #define HYPERV_SPINLOCK_NEVER_RETRY 0xFFFFFFFF
> diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
> index 11b9c854b5..43f5cbc3f6 100644
> --- a/target/i386/kvm.c
> +++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
> @@ -900,6 +900,10 @@ static struct {
> },
> .dependencies = BIT(HYPERV_FEAT_STIMER)
> },
> + [HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH] = {
> + .desc = "direct paravirtualized TLB flush (hv-direct-tlbflush)",
> + .dependencies = BIT(HYPERV_FEAT_TLBFLUSH)
> + },
> };
>
> static struct kvm_cpuid2 *try_get_hv_cpuid(CPUState *cs, int max)
> @@ -1224,6 +1228,7 @@ static int hyperv_handle_properties(CPUState *cs,
> r |= hv_cpuid_check_and_set(cs, cpuid, HYPERV_FEAT_EVMCS);
> r |= hv_cpuid_check_and_set(cs, cpuid, HYPERV_FEAT_IPI);
> r |= hv_cpuid_check_and_set(cs, cpuid, HYPERV_FEAT_STIMER_DIRECT);
> + r |= hv_cpuid_check_and_set(cs, cpuid, HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH);
>
> /* Additional dependencies not covered by kvm_hyperv_properties[] */
> if (hyperv_feat_enabled(cpu, HYPERV_FEAT_SYNIC) &&
> @@ -1243,6 +1248,25 @@ static int hyperv_handle_properties(CPUState *cs,
> goto free;
> }
>
> + if (hyperv_feat_enabled(cpu, HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH)) {
> + if (kvm_vcpu_enable_cap(cs, KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH, 0, 0)) {
> + if (!cpu->hyperv_passthrough) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "Hyper-V %s is not supported by kernel\n",
> + kvm_hyperv_properties[HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH].desc);
> + return -ENOSYS;
> + }
> +
> + cpu->hyperv_features &= ~BIT(HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH);
> + } else if (cpu->expose_kvm) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "Hyper-V %s requires KVM hypervisor signature "
> + "to be hidden (-kvm).\n",
> + kvm_hyperv_properties[HYPERV_FEAT_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH].desc);
> + return -ENOSYS;
> + }
In view of my comment above, this "else if" clause may become
unnecessary.
However, it doesn't hurt either, and doesn't make things worse, so, if
this is seen as 4.2 material and the general KVM vs Hyper-V hypercall
conflict resolution is postponed till after 4.2, the patch looks ok as
it is.
Under this provision
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> + }
> +
> if (cpu->hyperv_passthrough) {
> /* We already copied all feature words from KVM as is */
> r = cpuid->nent;
> --
> 2.14.5
>
