Re: [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation

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On 7/31/19 6:31 PM, Dario Faggioli wrote:
Hello all,

I know this is a bit of an old thread, so apologies for being late to
the party. :-)

And sorry for the late reply, I was away for a while.

I would have a question about this:

On 7/12/19 2:36 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
On Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 02:17:20PM +0200, Alexandre Chartre
wrote:
On 7/12/19 1:44 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
AFAIK3 this wants/needs to be combined with core-scheduling
to be
useful, but not a single mention of that is anywhere.

No. This is actually an alternative to core-scheduling.
Eventually, ASI
will kick all sibling hyperthreads when exiting isolation and
it needs to
run with the full kernel page-table (note that's currently
not in these
patches).

I.e., about the fact that ASI is presented as an alternative to
core-scheduling or, at least, as it will only need integrate a small
subset of the logic (and of the code) from core-scheduling, as said
here:

I haven't looked at details about what has been done so far.
Hopefully, we
can do something not too complex, or reuse a (small) part of co-
scheduling.

Now, sticking to virtualization examples, if you don't have core-
scheduling, it means that you can have two vcpus, one from VM A and the
other from VM B, running on the same core, one on thread 0 and the
other one on thread 1, at the same time.

And if VM A's vcpu, running on thread 0, exits, then VM B's vcpu
running in guest more on thread 1 can read host memory, as it is
speculatively accessed (either "normally" or because of cache load
gadgets) and brought in L1D cache by thread 0. And Indeed I do see how
ASI protects us from this attack scenario.


However, when the two VMs' vcpus are both running in guest mode, each
one on a thread of the same core, VM B's vcpu running on thread 1 can
exploit L1TF to peek at and steal secrets that VM A's vcpu, running on
thread 0, is accessing, as they're brought into L1D cache... can't it?

How can, ASI *without* core-scheduling, prevent this other attack
scenario?

Because I may very well be missing something, but it looks to me that
it can't. In which case, I'm not sure we can call it "alternative" to
core-scheduling.... Or is the second attack scenario that I tried to
describe above, not considered interesting?


Correct, ASI doesn't prevent this attack scenario. However, this case can
be prevented by pinning each VM to different CPU cores (for example, using
cgroups) so that you never have two different VMs running with CPU threads
from the same CPU core. Of course, this limits the number of VMs you can
run to the number of CPU cores on the system but we assume this is a
reasonable configuration when you want to have high performing VM.

Rgds,

alex.



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