On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 04:43:36PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:12:46AM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote: > > There're two different places storing Guest CET states, the states > > managed with XSAVES/XRSTORS, as restored/saved > > in previous patch, can be read/write directly from/to the MSRs. > > For those stored in VMCS fields, they're access via vmcs_read/ > > vmcs_write. > > > > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@xxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > > index 123285177c6b..e5eacd01e984 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > > @@ -1774,6 +1774,27 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) > > else > > msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2]; > > break; > > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET: > > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET: > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_info->data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: > > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP: > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, msr_info->data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP: > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, msr_info->data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP: > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, msr_info->data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP: > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, msr_info->data); > > + break; > > These all need appropriate checks on guest and host support. The guest > checks won't come into play very often, if ever, for the MSRs that exist > if IBT *or* SHSTK is supported due to passing the MSRs through to the > guest, but I don't think we want this code reliant on the interception > logic. E.g.: > > case MSR_IA32_S_CET: > if (!(host_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) > return 1; > > if (!msr_info->host_initiated && > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > return 1; > > MSR_IA32_U_CET is same as above, s/KERNEL/USER. > > case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: > if (!(host_xss & (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL | > XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER))) > return 1; > > if (!msr_info->host_initiated && > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > return 1; > > MSR_IA32_PL[0-3]_SSP are same as above, but only check the appropriate > KERNEL or USER bit. > > Note, the PL[0-2]_SSP MSRs can be collapsed into a single case, e.g.: > > case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP: > <error handling code>; > > rdmsrl(msr_index, msr_info->data); > break; > > > Rinse and repeat for vmx_set_msr(). > Thanks you, will modify this part of code. > > case MSR_TSC_AUX: > > if (!msr_info->host_initiated && > > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) > > @@ -2007,6 +2028,28 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) > > else > > vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data; > > break; > > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET: > > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET: > > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: > > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP: > > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP: > > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP: > > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, data); > > + break; > > + case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP: > > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, data); > > + break; > > + > > case MSR_TSC_AUX: > > if (!msr_info->host_initiated && > > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) > > -- > > 2.17.2 > >
