On 12/06/2019 19:53, Jacob Pan wrote:
>>> You are right, the worst case of the spurious PS is to terminate the
>>> group prematurely. Need to know the scope of the HW damage in case
>>> of mdev where group IDs can be shared among mdevs belong to the
>>> same PF.
>>
>> But from the IOMMU fault API point of view, the full page request is
>> identified by both PRGI and PASID. Given that each mdev has its own
>> set of PASIDs, it should be easy to isolate page responses per mdev.
>>
> On Intel platform, devices sending page request with private data must
> receive page response with matching private data. If we solely depend
> on PRGI and PASID, we may send stale private data to the device in
> those incorrect page response. Since private data may represent PF
> device wide contexts, the consequence of sending page response with
> wrong private data may affect other mdev/PASID.
>
> One solution we are thinking to do is to inject the sequence #(e.g.
> ktime raw mono clock) as vIOMMU private data into to the guest. Guest
> would return this fake private data in page response, then host will
> send page response back to the device that matches PRG1 and PASID and
> private_data.
>
> This solution does not expose HW context related private data to the
> guest but need to extend page response in iommu uapi.
>
> /**
> * struct iommu_page_response - Generic page response information
> * @version: API version of this structure
> * @flags: encodes whether the corresponding fields are valid
> * (IOMMU_FAULT_PAGE_RESPONSE_* values)
> * @pasid: Process Address Space ID
> * @grpid: Page Request Group Index
> * @code: response code from &enum iommu_page_response_code
> * @private_data: private data for the matching page request
> */
> struct iommu_page_response {
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_VERSION_1 1
> __u32 version;
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_PASID_VALID (1 << 0)
> #define IOMMU_PAGE_RESP_PRIVATE_DATA (1 << 1)
> __u32 flags;
> __u32 pasid;
> __u32 grpid;
> __u32 code;
> __u32 padding;
> __u64 private_data[2];
> };
>
> There is also the change needed for separating storage for the real and
> fake private data.
>
> Sorry for the last minute change, did not realize the HW implications.
>
> I see this as a future extension due to limited testing,
I'm wondering how we deal with:
(1) old userspace that won't fill the new private_data field in
page_response. A new kernel still has to support it.
(2) old kernel that won't recognize the new PRIVATE_DATA flag. Currently
iommu_page_response() rejects page responses with unknown flags.
I guess we'll need a two-way negotiation, where userspace queries
whether the kernel supports the flag (2), and the kernel learns whether
it should expect the private data to come back (1).
> perhaps for
> now, can you add paddings similar to page request? Make it 64B as well.
I don't think padding is necessary, because iommu_page_response is sent
by userspace to the kernel, unlike iommu_fault which is allocated by
userspace and filled by the kernel.
Page response looks a lot more like existing VFIO mechanisms, so I
suppose we'll wrap the iommu_page_response structure and include an
argsz parameter at the top:
struct vfio_iommu_page_response {
u32 argsz;
struct iommu_page_response pr;
};
struct vfio_iommu_page_response vpr = {
.argsz = sizeof(vpr),
.pr = ...
...
};
ioctl(devfd, VFIO_IOMMU_PAGE_RESPONSE, &vpr);
In that case supporting private data can be done by simply appending a
field at the end (plus the negotiation above).
Thanks,
Jean
