On Thu, 2019-03-07 at 19:15 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 07/03/19 18:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 05:31:43PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> > > At present, we report F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) for x86 arch(both vmx and svm)
> > > unconditionally, but we only emulate this MSR in vmx. It will cause #GP
> > > while guest kernel rdmsr(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) in an AMD host.
> > >
> > > Since MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is an intel-specific MSR, it makes no
> > > sense to emulate it in svm. Thus this patch chooses to only emulate it
> > > for vmx, and moves the related handling to vmx related files.
> >
> > What about emulating the MSR on an AMD host for testing purpsoes? It
> > might be a useful way for someone without Intel hardware to test spectre
> > related flows.
> >
> > In other words, an alternative to restricting emulation of the MSR to
> > Intel CPUS would be to move MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES handling into
> > kvm_{get,set}_msr_common(). Guest access to MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
> > is gated by X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES in the guest's CPUID, e.g.
> > RDMSR will naturally #GP fault if userspace passes through the host's
> > CPUID on a non-Intel system.
>
> This is also better because it wouldn't change the guest ABI for AMD
> processors. Dropping CPUID flags is generally not a good idea.
>
> Paolo
Hi, Paolo and Sean,
OK, as you think it's better to emulate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES on all x86 host,
so should I make the same to MSR CORE_CAPABILITY?
If so, I will make it for our v5 patches of split lock detection to emualte MSR
CORE_CAPABILITY in this way.
Thanks,
Xiaoyao
