svm.c was pretty huge, and the recent addition of SEV feature
grew it further. Before we add more SEV command handling lets split
the SEV bits into a separate file. The sev.c will be compiled only
when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV is selected.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/sev.c | 1076 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/sev.h | 40 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 1079 +----------------------------------------
4 files changed, 1141 insertions(+), 1056 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 69b3a7c30013..4a434914d6a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ kvm-y += x86.o mmu.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \
kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o
kvm-amd-y += svm.o pmu_amd.o
+kvm-amd-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) += sev.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) += kvm-intel.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD) += kvm-amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..749f5d6db63b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1076 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+#include "sev.h"
+
+static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
+
+static void __sev_asid_free(int asid);
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle);
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+ unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n, int write);
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+ unsigned long npages);
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages);
+static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct enc_region *region);
+
+bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
+{
+ return !!max_sev_asid;
+}
+
+unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void)
+{
+ return max_sev_asid;
+}
+
+__init int sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_status *status;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
+ max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+
+ if (!max_sev_asid)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
+ min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F);
+
+ /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
+ sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
+ return 1;
+
+ status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!status)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check SEV platform status.
+ *
+ * PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query
+ * the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV
+ * feature or SEV firmware is dead.
+ */
+ rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+
+err:
+ kfree(status);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+__exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ if (svm_sev_enabled())
+ bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int sev_asid_new(void)
+{
+ int pos;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
+ */
+ pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
+ if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+ return pos + 1;
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ int asid, ret;
+
+
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ if (unlikely(sev->active))
+ return ret;
+
+ asid = sev_asid_new();
+ if (asid < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ sev->active = true;
+ sev->asid = asid;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
+
+ return 0;
+
+e_free:
+ __sev_asid_free(asid);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+ struct sev_data_activate *data;
+ int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+ int ret;
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* activate ASID on the given handle */
+ data->handle = handle;
+ data->asid = asid;
+ ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+ struct fd f;
+ int ret;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+ return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+ void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
+ int *error = &argp->error;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!start)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ dh_blob = NULL;
+ if (params.dh_uaddr) {
+ dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
+ start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
+ }
+
+ session_blob = NULL;
+ if (params.session_uaddr) {
+ session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
+ goto e_free_dh;
+ }
+
+ start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
+ start->session_len = params.session_len;
+ }
+
+ start->handle = params.handle;
+ start->policy = params.policy;
+
+ /* create memory encryption context */
+ ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_session;
+
+ /* Bind ASID to this guest */
+ ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_session;
+
+ /* return handle to userspace */
+ params.handle = start->handle;
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
+ sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free_session;
+ }
+
+ sev->handle = start->handle;
+ sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+
+e_free_session:
+ kfree(session_blob);
+e_free_dh:
+ kfree(dh_blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(start);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
+ unsigned long npages)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
+ int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
+
+ /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
+ paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
+ while (i < npages) {
+ next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
+ if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
+ pages++;
+ paddr = next_paddr;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return pages;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
+ struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ int i, ret, pages;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ vaddr = params.uaddr;
+ size = params.len;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+
+ /* Lock the user memory. */
+ inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
+ if (!inpages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
+ * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+ * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+ * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
+
+ for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
+ int offset, len;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
+ * within the page.
+ */
+ offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+ /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
+ pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
+
+ len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ data->len = len;
+ data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_unpin;
+
+ size -= len;
+ next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+ }
+
+e_unpin:
+ /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+ mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+ }
+ /* unlock the user pages */
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+ void __user *p = NULL;
+ void *blob = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* User wants to query the blob length */
+ if (!params.len)
+ goto cmd;
+
+ p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
+ if (p) {
+ if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!blob)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+ data->len = params.len;
+ }
+
+cmd:
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
+
+ /*
+ * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+ */
+ if (!params.len)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_blob;
+
+ if (blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+done:
+ params.len = data->len;
+ if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+ kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_finish *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
+
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
+ struct sev_data_guest_status *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ params.policy = data->policy;
+ params.state = data->state;
+ params.handle = data->handle;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
+ unsigned long dst, int size,
+ int *error, bool enc)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_dbg *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ data->dst_addr = dst;
+ data->src_addr = src;
+ data->len = size;
+
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
+ enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
+ data, error);
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
+ unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
+{
+ int offset;
+
+ /*
+ * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
+ * destination has enough space.
+ */
+ src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
+ offset = src_paddr & 15;
+ sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
+
+ return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+ unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
+ unsigned long dst_paddr,
+ int size, int *err)
+{
+ struct page *tpage = NULL;
+ int ret, offset;
+
+ /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
+ tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tpage)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ if (tpage) {
+ offset = paddr & 15;
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
+ page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+e_free:
+ if (tpage)
+ __free_page(tpage);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+ unsigned long __user vaddr,
+ unsigned long dst_paddr,
+ unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
+ int size, int *error)
+{
+ struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
+ struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
+ int ret, len = size;
+
+ /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
+ src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!src_tpage)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
+ (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
+ __free_page(src_tpage);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
+ * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
+ * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
+ * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
+ */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
+ int dst_offset;
+
+ dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst_tpage) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
+ __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ /*
+ * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
+ * copy_from_user().
+ */
+ dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
+
+ if (src_tpage)
+ memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+ page_address(src_tpage), size);
+ else {
+ if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+ (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+ paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
+ dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
+ len = round_up(size, 16);
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
+
+e_free:
+ if (src_tpage)
+ __free_page(src_tpage);
+ if (dst_tpage)
+ __free_page(dst_tpage);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+ unsigned long dst_vaddr;
+ struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
+ struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
+ unsigned long n;
+ int ret, size;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
+ size = debug.len;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+ dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
+
+ for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
+ int len, s_off, d_off;
+
+ /* lock userspace source and destination page */
+ src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+ if (!src_p)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
+ if (!dst_p) {
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
+ * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+ * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+ * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
+ sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
+ * offset within the page.
+ */
+ s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+
+ if (dec)
+ ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
+ __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+ dst_vaddr,
+ __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+ len, &argp->error);
+ else
+ ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
+ __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+ vaddr,
+ __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+ dst_vaddr,
+ len, &argp->error);
+
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+ dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
+ size -= len;
+ }
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
+ struct page **pages;
+ void *blob, *hdr;
+ unsigned long n;
+ int ret, offset;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
+ if (!pages)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
+ * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
+ */
+ if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto e_unpin_memory;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ goto e_unpin_memory;
+
+ offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
+ data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
+
+ blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
+ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+ hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
+ goto e_free_blob;
+ }
+ data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+ data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
+
+ kfree(hdr);
+
+e_free_blob:
+ kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+e_unpin_memory:
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ switch (sev_cmd.id) {
+ case KVM_SEV_INIT:
+ r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
+ r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
+ r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+ r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
+ r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
+ r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
+ r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
+ r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
+ break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
+ r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct enc_region *region;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!region)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
+ if (!region->pages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
+ * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
+ * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
+ * correct C-bit.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
+
+ region->uaddr = range->addr;
+ region->size = range->size;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ return ret;
+
+e_free:
+ kfree(region);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct enc_region *
+find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+ struct enc_region *i;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
+ if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
+ i->size == range->size)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+ struct enc_region *region;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
+ ret = -ENOTTY;
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
+ if (!region) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return 0;
+
+failed:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
+{
+ clear_bit(asid - 1, sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+ __sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
+}
+
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+{
+ struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
+ struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
+
+ if (!handle)
+ return;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return;
+
+ /* deactivate handle */
+ data->handle = handle;
+ sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+ sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decommission)
+ return;
+
+ /* decommission handle */
+ decommission->handle = handle;
+ sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
+
+ kfree(decommission);
+}
+
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+ unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
+ int write)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
+ unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
+ struct page **pages;
+ unsigned long first, last;
+
+ if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Calculate number of pages. */
+ first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ npages = (last - first + 1);
+
+ locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
+ lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
+ pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
+ size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+ pages = vmalloc(size);
+ else
+ pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!pages)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Pin the user virtual address. */
+ npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
+ if (npinned != npages) {
+ pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *n = npages;
+ sev->pages_locked = locked;
+
+ return pages;
+
+err:
+ if (npinned > 0)
+ release_pages(pages, npinned);
+
+ kvfree(pages);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+ unsigned long npages)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+ release_pages(pages, npages);
+ kvfree(pages);
+ sev->pages_locked -= npages;
+}
+
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
+{
+ uint8_t *page_virtual;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
+ clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
+ kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
+ }
+}
+
+static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct enc_region *region)
+{
+ /*
+ * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
+ * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
+ * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
+ * correct C-bit.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
+
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
+ list_del(®ion->list);
+ kfree(region);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+ struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
+ * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty(head)) {
+ list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
+ __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
+ list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+ sev_asid_free(kvm);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..45a383443ffe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H
+#define ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+
+bool svm_sev_enabled(void);
+unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void);
+__init int sev_hardware_setup(void);
+__exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+#else
+
+static inline unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void) { return 0; }
+static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void) { return false; }
+static inline __init int sev_hardware_setup(void) { return -ENOTTY; }
+static inline __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) { }
+static inline void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) { }
+
+static inline int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ return -ENOTTY;
+}
+static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+ return -ENOTTY;
+}
+static inline int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+ return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
+#endif /* ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index eb75077cb982..1d1228b7b57d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/frame.h>
-#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
@@ -54,6 +53,8 @@
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
#define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
@@ -294,13 +295,6 @@ enum {
#define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
-static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
-static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
-
-static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
-{
- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
-}
static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
@@ -1057,47 +1051,6 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
return 0;
}
-static __init int sev_hardware_setup(void)
-{
- struct sev_user_data_status *status;
- int rc;
-
- /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
- max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
-
- if (!max_sev_asid)
- return 1;
-
- /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
- min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F);
-
- /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
- sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
- return 1;
-
- status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!status)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * Check SEV platform status.
- *
- * PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query
- * the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV
- * feature or SEV firmware is dead.
- */
- rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto err;
-
- pr_info("SEV supported\n");
-
-err:
- kfree(status);
- return rc;
-}
-
static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -1183,6 +1136,8 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
r = sev_hardware_setup();
if (r)
sev = false;
+ else
+ max_sev_asid = sev_get_max_asid();
} else {
sev = false;
}
@@ -1249,8 +1204,7 @@ static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
int cpu;
- if (svm_sev_enabled())
- bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+ sev_hardware_unsetup();
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
@@ -1560,154 +1514,6 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}
-static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
-{
- struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
- int cpu, pos;
-
- pos = asid - 1;
- clear_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
- sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
- __sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
-}
-
-static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
-{
- struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
- struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
-
- if (!handle)
- return;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return;
-
- /* deactivate handle */
- data->handle = handle;
- sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
-
- wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
- sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
- kfree(data);
-
- decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!decommission)
- return;
-
- /* decommission handle */
- decommission->handle = handle;
- sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
-
- kfree(decommission);
-}
-
-static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
- unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
- int write)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
- unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
- struct page **pages;
- unsigned long first, last;
-
- if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
- return NULL;
-
- /* Calculate number of pages. */
- first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- npages = (last - first + 1);
-
- locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
- lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
- pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
- size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
- if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
- pages = vmalloc(size);
- else
- pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!pages)
- return NULL;
-
- /* Pin the user virtual address. */
- npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
- if (npinned != npages) {
- pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
- goto err;
- }
-
- *n = npages;
- sev->pages_locked = locked;
-
- return pages;
-
-err:
- if (npinned > 0)
- release_pages(pages, npinned);
-
- kvfree(pages);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
- unsigned long npages)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
- release_pages(pages, npages);
- kvfree(pages);
- sev->pages_locked -= npages;
-}
-
-static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
-{
- uint8_t *page_virtual;
- unsigned long i;
-
- if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
- return;
-
- for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
- page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
- clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
- kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
- }
-}
-
-static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct enc_region *region)
-{
- /*
- * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
- * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
- * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
- * correct C-bit.
- */
- sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
-
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
- list_del(®ion->list);
- kfree(region);
-}
-
static struct kvm *svm_vm_alloc(void)
{
struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = vzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_svm));
@@ -1719,34 +1525,6 @@ static void svm_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
vfree(to_kvm_svm(kvm));
}
-static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
- struct list_head *pos, *q;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
- /*
- * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
- * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
- */
- if (!list_empty(head)) {
- list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
- __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
- list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
- }
- }
-
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
- sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
- sev_asid_free(kvm);
-}
-
static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1765,9 +1543,27 @@ static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
}
+static void sev_vmcb_clear(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+ int cpu, pos;
+
+ pos = sev_get_asid(kvm) - 1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return;
+
+ sev_vmcb_clear(kvm);
sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
}
@@ -6102,835 +5898,6 @@ static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}
-static int sev_asid_new(void)
-{
- int pos;
-
- /*
- * SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
- */
- pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
- if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
- return -EBUSY;
-
- set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
- return pos + 1;
-}
-
-static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- int asid, ret;
-
- ret = -EBUSY;
- if (unlikely(sev->active))
- return ret;
-
- asid = sev_asid_new();
- if (asid < 0)
- return ret;
-
- ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free;
-
- sev->active = true;
- sev->asid = asid;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
-
- return 0;
-
-e_free:
- __sev_asid_free(asid);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
-{
- struct sev_data_activate *data;
- int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
- int ret;
-
- wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
-
- ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* activate ASID on the given handle */
- data->handle = handle;
- data->asid = asid;
- ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
- kfree(data);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
-{
- struct fd f;
- int ret;
-
- f = fdget(fd);
- if (!f.file)
- return -EBADF;
-
- ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
-
- fdput(f);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
- return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
- struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
- void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
- int *error = &argp->error;
- int ret;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!start)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- dh_blob = NULL;
- if (params.dh_uaddr) {
- dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
- if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
- start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
- }
-
- session_blob = NULL;
- if (params.session_uaddr) {
- session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
- if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
- goto e_free_dh;
- }
-
- start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
- start->session_len = params.session_len;
- }
-
- start->handle = params.handle;
- start->policy = params.policy;
-
- /* create memory encryption context */
- ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free_session;
-
- /* Bind ASID to this guest */
- ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free_session;
-
- /* return handle to userspace */
- params.handle = start->handle;
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
- sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto e_free_session;
- }
-
- sev->handle = start->handle;
- sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
-
-e_free_session:
- kfree(session_blob);
-e_free_dh:
- kfree(dh_blob);
-e_free:
- kfree(start);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
- unsigned long npages)
-{
- unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
- int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
-
- /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
- paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
- while (i < npages) {
- next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
- if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
- pages++;
- paddr = next_paddr;
- continue;
- }
- break;
- }
-
- return pages;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
- struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
- struct page **inpages;
- int i, ret, pages;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- vaddr = params.uaddr;
- size = params.len;
- vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
-
- /* Lock the user memory. */
- inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
- if (!inpages) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- /*
- * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
- * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
- * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
- * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
- */
- sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
-
- for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
- int offset, len;
-
- /*
- * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
- * within the page.
- */
- offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-
- /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
- pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
-
- len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
-
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- data->len = len;
- data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_unpin;
-
- size -= len;
- next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
- }
-
-e_unpin:
- /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
- for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
- set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
- mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
- }
- /* unlock the user pages */
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
-e_free:
- kfree(data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
- struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
- void __user *p = NULL;
- void *blob = NULL;
- int ret;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* User wants to query the blob length */
- if (!params.len)
- goto cmd;
-
- p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
- if (p) {
- if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!blob)
- goto e_free;
-
- data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
- data->len = params.len;
- }
-
-cmd:
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
-
- /*
- * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
- */
- if (!params.len)
- goto done;
-
- if (ret)
- goto e_free_blob;
-
- if (blob) {
- if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
- ret = -EFAULT;
- }
-
-done:
- params.len = data->len;
- if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
- ret = -EFAULT;
-e_free_blob:
- kfree(blob);
-e_free:
- kfree(data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct sev_data_launch_finish *data;
- int ret;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
-
- kfree(data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
- struct sev_data_guest_status *data;
- int ret;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free;
-
- params.policy = data->policy;
- params.state = data->state;
- params.handle = data->handle;
-
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
- ret = -EFAULT;
-e_free:
- kfree(data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
- unsigned long dst, int size,
- int *error, bool enc)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct sev_data_dbg *data;
- int ret;
-
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- data->dst_addr = dst;
- data->src_addr = src;
- data->len = size;
-
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
- enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
- data, error);
- kfree(data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
- unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
-{
- int offset;
-
- /*
- * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
- * destination has enough space.
- */
- src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
- offset = src_paddr & 15;
- sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
-
- return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
- unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
- unsigned long dst_paddr,
- int size, int *err)
-{
- struct page *tpage = NULL;
- int ret, offset;
-
- /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
- tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tpage)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
- }
-
- ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free;
-
- if (tpage) {
- offset = paddr & 15;
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
- page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
- ret = -EFAULT;
- }
-
-e_free:
- if (tpage)
- __free_page(tpage);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
- unsigned long __user vaddr,
- unsigned long dst_paddr,
- unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
- int size, int *error)
-{
- struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
- struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
- int ret, len = size;
-
- /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
- src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!src_tpage)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
- (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
- __free_page(src_tpage);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
- }
-
- /*
- * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
- * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
- * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
- * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
- */
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
- int dst_offset;
-
- dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dst_tpage) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
- __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
- if (ret)
- goto e_free;
-
- /*
- * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
- * copy_from_user().
- */
- dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
-
- if (src_tpage)
- memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
- page_address(src_tpage), size);
- else {
- if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
- (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto e_free;
- }
- }
-
- paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
- dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
- len = round_up(size, 16);
- }
-
- ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
-
-e_free:
- if (src_tpage)
- __free_page(src_tpage);
- if (dst_tpage)
- __free_page(dst_tpage);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
-{
- unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
- unsigned long dst_vaddr;
- struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
- struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
- unsigned long n;
- int ret, size;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
- size = debug.len;
- vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
- dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
-
- for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
- int len, s_off, d_off;
-
- /* lock userspace source and destination page */
- src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
- if (!src_p)
- return -EFAULT;
-
- dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
- if (!dst_p) {
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- /*
- * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
- * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
- * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
- * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
- */
- sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
- sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
-
- /*
- * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
- * offset within the page.
- */
- s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
- d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
- len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
-
- if (dec)
- ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
- __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
- dst_vaddr,
- __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
- len, &argp->error);
- else
- ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
- __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
- vaddr,
- __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
- dst_vaddr,
- len, &argp->error);
-
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
-
- if (ret)
- goto err;
-
- next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
- dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
- size -= len;
- }
-err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
- struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
- struct page **pages;
- void *blob, *hdr;
- unsigned long n;
- int ret, offset;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
- if (!pages)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /*
- * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
- * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
- */
- if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto e_unpin_memory;
- }
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- goto e_unpin_memory;
-
- offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
- data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
-
- blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
- if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
- data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
-
- hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
- if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
- goto e_free_blob;
- }
- data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
- data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
-
- data->handle = sev->handle;
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
-
- kfree(hdr);
-
-e_free_blob:
- kfree(blob);
-e_free:
- kfree(data);
-e_unpin_memory:
- sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
- int r;
-
- if (!svm_sev_enabled())
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
- switch (sev_cmd.id) {
- case KVM_SEV_INIT:
- r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
- r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
- r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
- r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
- r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
- r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
- r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
- r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
- break;
- case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
- r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
- break;
- default:
- r = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
- r = -EFAULT;
-
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
- return r;
-}
-
-static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct enc_region *region;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
- return -ENOTTY;
-
- if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!region)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
- if (!region->pages) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto e_free;
- }
-
- /*
- * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
- * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
- * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
- * correct C-bit.
- */
- sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
-
- region->uaddr = range->addr;
- region->size = range->size;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
- list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
- return ret;
-
-e_free:
- kfree(region);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static struct enc_region *
-find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
- struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
- struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
- struct enc_region *i;
-
- list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
- if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
- i->size == range->size)
- return i;
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-
-static int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
- struct enc_region *region;
- int ret;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
- if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
- ret = -ENOTTY;
- goto failed;
- }
-
- region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
- if (!region) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto failed;
- }
-
- __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
-
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
- return 0;
-
-failed:
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
- return ret;
-}
-
static uint16_t nested_get_evmcs_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Not supported */
--
2.17.1
