Do not expose the address of vmx->nested.current_vmptr to
kvm_write_guest_virt_system() as the resulting __copy_to_user()
call will trigger a WARN when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is
enabled.
Opportunistically clean up variable names in handle_vmptrst()
to improve readability, e.g. vmcs_gva is misleading as the
memory operand of VMPSTR is plain memory, not a VMCS.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++--------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index e30da9a2430c..6688dcf314d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8480,21 +8480,20 @@ static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Emulate the VMPTRST instruction */
static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
- gva_t vmcs_gva;
+ unsigned long exit_qual = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+ u32 instr_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+ gpa_t cvp = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr;
struct x86_exception e;
+ gva_t gva;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
- if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
- vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
+ if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qual, instr_info, true, &gva))
return 1;
/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
- if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, vmcs_gva,
- (void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
- sizeof(u64), &e)) {
+ if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, (void *)&cvp,
+ sizeof(gpa_t), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
--
2.18.0
