On Fri, 8 Jun 2018 14:14:23 +1000 Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 8/6/18 1:44 pm, Alex Williamson wrote: > > On Fri, 8 Jun 2018 13:08:54 +1000 > > Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > >> On 8/6/18 8:15 am, Alex Williamson wrote: > >>> On Fri, 08 Jun 2018 07:54:02 +1000 > >>> Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>> > >>>> On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 11:04 -0600, Alex Williamson wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Can we back up and discuss whether the IOMMU grouping of NVLink > >>>>> connected devices makes sense? AIUI we have a PCI view of these > >>>>> devices and from that perspective they're isolated. That's the view of > >>>>> the device used to generate the grouping. However, not visible to us, > >>>>> these devices are interconnected via NVLink. What isolation properties > >>>>> does NVLink provide given that its entire purpose for existing seems to > >>>>> be to provide a high performance link for p2p between devices? > >>>> > >>>> Not entire. On POWER chips, we also have an nvlink between the device > >>>> and the CPU which is running significantly faster than PCIe. > >>>> > >>>> But yes, there are cross-links and those should probably be accounted > >>>> for in the grouping. > >>> > >>> Then after we fix the grouping, can we just let the host driver manage > >>> this coherent memory range and expose vGPUs to guests? The use case of > >>> assigning all 6 GPUs to one VM seems pretty limited. (Might need to > >>> convince NVIDIA to support more than a single vGPU per VM though) > >> > >> These are physical GPUs, not virtual sriov-alike things they are > >> implementing as well elsewhere. > > > > vGPUs as implemented on M- and P-series Teslas aren't SR-IOV like > > either. That's why we have mdev devices now to implement software > > defined devices. I don't have first hand experience with V-series, but > > I would absolutely expect a PCIe-based Tesla V100 to support vGPU. > > So assuming V100 can do vGPU, you are suggesting ditching this patchset and > using mediated vGPUs instead, correct? If it turns out that our PCIe-only-based IOMMU grouping doesn't account for lack of isolation on the NVLink side and we correct that, limiting assignment to sets of 3 interconnected GPUs, is that still a useful feature? OTOH, it's entirely an NVIDIA proprietary decision whether they choose to support vGPU on these GPUs or whether they can be convinced to support multiple vGPUs per VM. > >> My current understanding is that every P9 chip in that box has some NVLink2 > >> logic on it so each P9 is directly connected to 3 GPUs via PCIe and > >> 2xNVLink2, and GPUs in that big group are interconnected by NVLink2 links > >> as well. > >> > >> From small bits of information I have it seems that a GPU can perfectly > >> work alone and if the NVIDIA driver does not see these interconnects > >> (because we do not pass the rest of the big 3xGPU group to this guest), it > >> continues with a single GPU. There is an "nvidia-smi -r" big reset hammer > >> which simply refuses to work until all 3 GPUs are passed so there is some > >> distinction between passing 1 or 3 GPUs, and I am trying (as we speak) to > >> get a confirmation from NVIDIA that it is ok to pass just a single GPU. > >> > >> So we will either have 6 groups (one per GPU) or 2 groups (one per > >> interconnected group). > > > > I'm not gaining much confidence that we can rely on isolation between > > NVLink connected GPUs, it sounds like you're simply expecting that > > proprietary code from NVIDIA on a proprietary interconnect from NVIDIA > > is going to play nice and nobody will figure out how to do bad things > > because... obfuscation? Thanks, > > Well, we already believe that a proprietary firmware of a sriov-capable > adapter like Mellanox ConnextX is not doing bad things, how is this > different in principle? It seems like the scope and hierarchy are different. Here we're talking about exposing big discrete devices, which are peers of one another (and have history of being reverse engineered), to userspace drivers. Once handed to userspace, each of those devices needs to be considered untrusted. In the case of SR-IOV, we typically have a trusted host driver for the PF managing untrusted VFs. We do rely on some sanity in the hardware/firmware in isolating the VFs from each other and from the PF, but we also often have source code for Linux drivers for these devices and sometimes even datasheets. Here we have neither of those and perhaps we won't know the extent of the lack of isolation between these devices until nouveau (best case) or some exploit (worst case) exposes it. IOMMU grouping always assumes a lack of isolation between devices unless the hardware provides some indication that isolation exists, for example ACS on PCIe. If NVIDIA wants to expose isolation on NVLink, perhaps they need to document enough of it that the host kernel can manipulate and test for isolation, perhaps even enabling virtualization of the NVLink interconnect interface such that the host can prevent GPUs from interfering with each other. Thanks, Alex
