This does seem to allow a DoS from userspace if userspace prefers it.
That doesn't seem wise.
On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 8:44 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
<konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 10:46:02PM -0700, Wanpeng Li wrote:
>> From: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Tim Shearer reported that "There is a guest which is running a packet
>> forwarding app based on the DPDK (dpdk.org). The packet receive routine
>> writes to 0xc070 using glibc's "outw_p" function which does an additional
>> write to I/O port 80. It does this write for every packet that's received,
>> causing a flood of KVM userspace context switches". He uses mpstat to
>> observe a CPU performing L2 packet forwarding on a pinned guest vCPU,
>> the guest time is 95 percent when allowing I/O port 0x80 bypass, however,
>> it is 65.78 percent when I/O port 0x80 bypss is disabled.
>>
>> This patch allows I/O port 0x80 bypass when userspace prefer.
>
> s/prefer/requests it/
>>
>
> Perhaps:
>
> Reported-by: Tim Shearer as well?
>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Tim Shearer <tshearer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 7 +++++++
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> index ebf1140..d3e5fef 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> @@ -10118,6 +10118,13 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>> goto out;
>> memset(kvm_vmx->vmx_io_bitmap[i], 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
>> }
>> + if (kvm->arch.ioport_disable_intercept) {
>> + /*
>> + * Allow direct access to the PC debug port (it is often used for I/O
>> + * delays, but the vmexits simply slow things down).
>> + */
>> + clear_bit(0x80, kvm_vmx->vmx_io_bitmap[VMX_IO_BITMAP_A]);
>> + }
>> return 0;
>>
>> out:
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
