On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 11:18:26AM +0800, Youquan Song wrote: > From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx> > > (cherry picked from commit 15d45071523d89b3fb7372e2135fbd72f6af9506) > > The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch > control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing > later ones. > > Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. > It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after > the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID > enumeration, IBPB is very different. > > IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: > > * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. > - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. > > * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. > These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after > VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate > - Either it can be compiled with retpoline > - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then > there is a IBPB in that path. > (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) > - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make > Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. > There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted > in some tsc calibration woes in guest. > > * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. > When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. > If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on > every VMEXIT. > > Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' > can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations > available like RSB stuffing/clearing. > > * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). > VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 > > Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration > and control. > > Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. > > https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support > > [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] > [karahmed: - rebase > - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID > - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID > - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] > - vmx: support nested] > [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) > PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] > > Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-3-git-send-email-karahmed@xxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> [v4.4 backport] > > Conflicts: > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c And again...
