On Tue, 2018-02-06 at 19:01 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 06/02/2018 18:29, David Woodhouse wrote: > > I've put together a linux-4.9.y branch at > > http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.9.y > > > > Most of it is fairly straightforward, apart from the IBPB on context > > switch for which Tim has already posted a candidate. I wanted some more > > review on my backports of the KVM bits though, including some extra > > historical patches I pulled in. > > Looks good! Thanks for the work, > > Paolo Thanks. In that case, Greg, the full set is lined up in http://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable.git/shortlog/refs/heads/linux-4.9.y or git://git.infradead.org/retpoline-stable linux-4.9.y This matches what Linus just pulled in from tip/x86-pti-for-linus, except that it's missing the IBPB on context switch (qv). ---------------------------------------------------------------- Andi Kleen (1): module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Andy Lutomirski (3): x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info Arnd Bergmann (1): x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Ashok Raj (1): KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Borislav Petkov (4): x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers x86/nospec: Fix header guards names x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Colin Ian King (1): x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Dan Williams (12): array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec x86: Introduce barrier_nospec x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Darren Kenny (1): x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL David Hildenbrand (1): KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail David Matlack (1): KVM: nVMX: mark vmcs12 pages dirty on L2 exit David Woodhouse (10): x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Dou Liyang (1): x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Jim Mattson (1): KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Josh Poimboeuf (1): x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option KarimAllah Ahmed (4): x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Mark Rutland (1): Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Paolo Bonzini (2): KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Peter Zijlstra (2): KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Thomas Gleixner (1): x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Waiman Long (1): x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 - Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/common.c | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 134 ++---------------- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 28 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 22 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 91 ++++--------- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 - arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 12 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 128 +++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 70 +++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 21 ++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 31 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 754 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------------------ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 57 +++++++- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 +- include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +- include/linux/init.h | 9 +- include/linux/module.h | 9 ++ include/linux/nospec.h | 72 ++++++++++ kernel/module.c | 11 ++ net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 ++ 47 files changed, 1230 insertions(+), 680 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt create mode 100644 include/linux/nospec.h
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