Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/kvm: expose the CPUID of SPEC_CTRL and STIBP to guests

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On 09/01/2018 10:16, Wei Wang wrote:
> On 01/09/2018 04:43 PM, Liran Alon wrote:
>> ----- wei.w.wang@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>
>>> This patch shows an alternative approach to the one posted here:
>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.mail-2Darchive.com_linux-2Dkernel-40vger.kernel.org_msg1580364.html&d=DwIBAg&c=RoP1YumCXCgaWHvlZYR8PZh8Bv7qIrMUB65eapI_JnE&r=Jk6Q8nNzkQ6LJ6g42qARkg6ryIDGQr-yKXPNGZbpTx0&m=o_uh0-IfLdLMwf2MaOOQVKtZbPlJ-fDVmglRj277cwk&s=j1oGOoYysZhUuGuuvuwdTU_OO7bv1ysIyvDtAlc6C-c&e=
>>>
>>>
>>> The advantages are
>>> 1) Simpler;
>>> 2) More reasonable because this is used to fill the hardware security
>>> hole, for all the x86 cpus that physically support the two CPUIDs,
>>> which means the hole already exists physically. All the VMs should
>>> use this feature no matter what CPU model they are using. So,
>> I'm not sure I 100% agree with this.
>> There should be a way for the userspace agent to disable these CPUIDs
>> if wanted.
>> You don't want to lose the ability to expose a mimic of a real
>> physical CPU-model of core2duo that
>> doesn't have these CPUIDs. A good solution can be that these features
>> will be exposed by default to guests
>> if available on hardware but can still be explicitly not-exposed if
>> userspace agent wishes so.
> 
> I think the case we are handling here is different:
> It shouldn't be treated as a regular feature (e.g. xsaves) that a user
> can choose to use or not. It is a security hole (or say a bug). When we
> fixed a bug, we don't give users an option to select to trigger the bug,
> right?

The user is free to do whatever it wants.  For example, you could use
KVM with an old CPU model to test the performance effect of IBRS on a
guest, or to reverse engineer whether the guest is using IBRS or
retpolines or whatever, and so on.

Policy isn't implemented in KVM, QEMU or even libvirt.

>> The only weird side-effect of this is that live-migration between
>> different physical hosts running with
>> exact same QEMU cmdline will result in different CPUID values exposed
>> to guest.
> 
> I think live migration itself doesn't do the CPUID check, so adding the
> QEMU side hardcode part doesn't help. That is, even using that patch
> 7/7, I think it wouldn't make a difference.
> This is the same case when we migrate a VM from a skylake physical
> machine to an older machine, the difference of supported CPUID won't
> even generate a warning when the destination side QEMU gets booted, right?

But we support it by using "-cpu Haswell" when we start the machine on a
Skylake.

Patch 7 is ugly right now, but it will be just a usual "add CPUID bits"
patch as soon as Linux gets the cpufeature.  A security-related feature
is a good reason to fast track adding the CPUID bits, it's not a good
reason to bypass all the lessons that we've learnt through the years
about guest ABI and live migration.

Paolo



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