On Tue, 31 Oct 2017 12:55:20 +0000 "Wang, Liang-min" <liang-min.wang@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > -----Original Message----- > > From: David Woodhouse [mailto:dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 8:39 AM > > To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Duyck, Alexander H > > <alexander.h.duyck@xxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Wang, Liang-min <liang-min.wang@xxxxxxxxx>; > > alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx; linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Kirsher, Jeffrey T > > <jeffrey.t.kirsher@xxxxxxxxx>; kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; bhelgaas@xxxxxxxxxx; > > linux-pci@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Subject: Re: [PATCH] Enable SR-IOV instantiation through /sys file > > > > On Sat, 2017-10-28 at 23:16 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > > > On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 11:20:41PM +0000, Duyck, Alexander H wrote: > > > > > > > > I don't see this so much as a security problem per-se. It all depends > > > > on the hardware setup. If I recall correctly, there are devices where > > > > the PF function doesn't really do much other than act as a bit more > > > > heavy-weight VF, and the actual logic is handled by a firmware engine > > > > on the device. > > > > > > Can you cite an example? While those surely could exist in theory, > > > I can't think of a practical example. > > > > I have them, which is why I'm patching the UIO driver to allow num_vfs > > to be set. I don't even want to *use* the UIO driver for any purpose > > except to make that appear in sysfs. It's all handled in the device. > > > > (I think we might be able to just give the PF out to a guest as if it > > were just another VF, but I don't think we actually *do* that right > > now). > > Under UEFI secure boot environment, kernel puts restrictions on UIO and its derivatives. > So, user-space function/driver based upon UIO is no longer working under UEFI secure > boot environment. The next viable option is vfio-pci, hence this patch in parallel with > UIO work. If you want a PF driver that does nothing other than allow SR-IOV to be enabled, doesn't that scream pci-stub? Trying to overlay it onto a driver that also allows userspace driver access to that device seems like the worst idea. Thanks, Alex