On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:15:15AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> If kernel_maps_pages_in_pgd is called early in boot process to change the
kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()
> memory attributes then it fails to allocate memory when spliting large
> pages. The patch extends the cpa_data to provide the support to use
> memblock_alloc when slab allocator is not available.
>
> The feature will be used in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode,
> where we may need to change the memory region attributes in early boot
> process.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> index 46cc89d..9e4ab3b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
> #include <linux/gfp.h>
> #include <linux/pci.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> +#include <linux/memblock.h>
>
> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ struct cpa_data {
> int flags;
> unsigned long pfn;
> unsigned force_split : 1;
> + unsigned force_memblock :1;
> int curpage;
> struct page **pages;
> };
> @@ -627,9 +629,8 @@ try_preserve_large_page(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address,
>
> static int
> __split_large_page(struct cpa_data *cpa, pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address,
> - struct page *base)
> + pte_t *pbase, unsigned long new_pfn)
> {
> - pte_t *pbase = (pte_t *)page_address(base);
> unsigned long ref_pfn, pfn, pfninc = 1;
> unsigned int i, level;
> pte_t *tmp;
> @@ -646,7 +647,7 @@ __split_large_page(struct cpa_data *cpa, pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address,
> return 1;
> }
>
> - paravirt_alloc_pte(&init_mm, page_to_pfn(base));
> + paravirt_alloc_pte(&init_mm, new_pfn);
>
> switch (level) {
> case PG_LEVEL_2M:
> @@ -707,7 +708,8 @@ __split_large_page(struct cpa_data *cpa, pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address,
> * pagetable protections, the actual ptes set above control the
> * primary protection behavior:
> */
> - __set_pmd_pte(kpte, address, mk_pte(base, __pgprot(_KERNPG_TABLE)));
> + __set_pmd_pte(kpte, address,
> + native_make_pte((new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + _KERNPG_TABLE));
>
> /*
> * Intel Atom errata AAH41 workaround.
> @@ -723,21 +725,50 @@ __split_large_page(struct cpa_data *cpa, pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static pte_t *try_alloc_pte(struct cpa_data *cpa, unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> + unsigned long phys;
> + struct page *base;
> +
> + if (cpa->force_memblock) {
> + phys = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
Maybe there's a reason this fires:
WARNING: modpost: Found 2 section mismatch(es).
To see full details build your kernel with:
'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x48edc): Section mismatch in reference from the function __change_page_attr() to the function .init.text:memblock_alloc()
The function __change_page_attr() references
the function __init memblock_alloc().
This is often because __change_page_attr lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of memblock_alloc is wrong.
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x491d1): Section mismatch in reference from the function __change_page_attr() to the function .meminit.text:memblock_free()
The function __change_page_attr() references
the function __meminit memblock_free().
This is often because __change_page_attr lacks a __meminit
annotation or the annotation of memblock_free is wrong.
Why do we need this whole early mapping? For the guest? I don't like
that memblock thing at all.
So I think the approach with the .data..percpu..hv_shared section is
fine and we should consider SEV-ES
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/Protecting%20VM%20Register%20State%20with%20SEV-ES.pdf
and do this right from the get-go so that when SEV-ES comes along, we
should simply be ready and extend that mechanism to put the whole Guest
Hypervisor Communication Block in there.
But then the fact that you're mapping those decrypted in init_mm.pgd
makes me think you don't need that early mapping thing at all. Those are
the decrypted mappings of the hypervisor. And that you can do late.
Now, what would be better, IMHO (and I have no idea about virtualization
design so take with a grain of salt) is if the guest would allocate
enough memory for the GHCB and mark it decrypted from the very
beginning. It will be the communication vehicle with the hypervisor
anyway.
And we already do similar things in sme_map_bootdata() for the baremetal
kernel to map boot_data, initrd, EFI, ... and so on things decrypted.
And we should extend that mechanism to map the GHCB in the guest too and
then we can get rid of all that need for ->force_memblock which makes
the crazy mess in pageattr.c even crazier. And it would be lovely if we
can do it without it.
But maybe Paolo might have an even better idea...
Thanks.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
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