Hi Christoffer, On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 12:04:28PM +0200, Christoffer Dall wrote: > On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 10:49:00AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote: > > The guest wouldn't have to do any invalidation at all on real HW, > > because the TLBs are strictly private to a physical CPU (only the > > invalidation can be broadcast to the Inner Shareable domain). But when > > we multiplex two vcpus on the same physical CPU, we break the private > > semantics, and a vcpu could hit in the TLB entries populated by the > > another one. > > Such a guest would be using a mapping of the same VA with the same ASID > on two separate CPUs, each pointing to a separate PA. If it ever were > to, say, migrate a task, it would have to do invalidations then. Right? An OS (not Linux) could use a different ASID space per-cpu. e.g. with two single-threaded tasks A and B, you could have ASIDS: cpu0 cpu1 A 0 1 B 1 0 ... and this would not be a problem, so long as when mappings changed maintenance were performed appropriately (e.g. perhaps it uses IPIs to trigger the relevant local TLB invlidation, rather than using broadcast ops). > Does Linux or other guests actually do this? Linux currently doesn't use ASIDs that way, but does use global mappings in a potentially-confliciting way in the cold-return paths (hotplug-on and return from idle). With two vCPUs, you could have a sequence like: cpu0 cpu1 Task with ASID x started hotplug on install global TTBR0 mapping global entry allocated into TLB Task hits cpu1's global entry ... which cannot happen bare-metal, and there's no point at which the guest can perform suitable maintenance. > Another fix would be to allocate a VMID per VCPU I suppose, just to > introduce a terrible TLB hit ratio :) That would break broadcast invalidation within the guest, no? ... unless you also trapped all TLB maintenance, and did the IPI-based broadcast in SW. Thanks, Mark. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html