2016-09-05 2:22 GMT+08:00 Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@xxxxxxxxx>: > If EPT support is exposed to L1 hypervisor, guest linear-address field > of VMCS should contain GVA of L2, the access to which caused EPT violation. > > Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 3 +++ > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > index 5cede40..a4bb2bd 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > @@ -10500,6 +10500,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, > vmcs12->guest_pdptr3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3); > } > > + if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) > + vmcs12->guest_linear_address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS); > + No, nested_ept_inject_page_fault() will set vmcs12->guest_linear_address after L0 walks L1's EPT page table and finds that the mapping is invalid if nested EPT is enabled. prepare_vmcs12() just copies the vmcs field that could have changed by the L2 guest or the exit-information etc instead of all fields since other fields are modified by L1 with VMWRITE, which already writes to vmcs12 directly. Regards, Wanpeng Li -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
