Re: Nested VMX security review

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On 08/16/2016 02:23 AM, Lars Bull wrote:
[...]

> We've done the following work on this front:
[...]

Thanks for doing this. Are the tests closed or public? Would it make
sense to also use these for others archslike s390/ppc (lets say with less
effort than a rewrite) or is this really  x86-specific code?

> Our testing was focused primarily on security of the host from both
> guest levels rather than the security of L1 and did not check for
> correctness. We are fairly confident after this work that nested VMX
> doesn't present a significant increase in risk for the host. We're
> curious what the next steps should be in getting this considered
> production-ready.

Are there any plans to do L2->L1 testing? If we cannot be sure that L2
does not violate the integrity of L1, we certainly cannot enable
that by default. (to make it more obvious, would you buy a hypervisor
that provides a "give-me-root" interface for its guests.



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