On Fri, 5 Feb 2016 18:32:07 +0100 Eric Auger <eric.auger@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Alex, > > I tried to sketch a proposal for guaranteeing the IRQ integrity when > doing ARM PCI/MSI passthrough with ARM GICv2M msi-controller. This is > based on extended VFIO group viability control, as detailed below. > > As opposed to ARM GICv3 ITS, this MSI controller does *not* support IRQ > remapping. It can expose 1 or more 4kB MSI frame. Each frame contains a > single register where the msi data is written. > > I would be grateful to you if you could tell me whether it makes any sense. > > Thanks in advance > > Best Regards > > Eric > > > 1) GICv2m with a single 4kB single frame > all devices having this msi-controller as msi-parent share this > single MSI frame. Those devices can work on behalf of the host > or work on behalf of 1 or more guests (KVM assigned devices). We > must make sure either the host only or 1 single VM can access to the > single frame to guarantee interrupt integrity: a device assigned > to 1 VM should not be able to trigger MSI targeted to the host > or another VM. > > I would propose to extend the VFIO notion of group viability. > Currently a VFIO group is viable if: > all devices belonging to the same group are bound to a VFIO driver > or unbound. > > Let's imagine we extend the viability check as follows: > > 0) keep the current viable check: all the devices belonging to > the group must be vfio bound or unbound. > 1) retrieve the MSI parent of the device and list all the > other devices using that MSI controller as MSI-parent (does not > look straightforward): > 2) they must be VFIO driver bound or unbound as well (meaning > they are not used by the host). If not, reject device attachment > - in case they are VFIO bound (a VFIO group is set): > x if all VFIO containers are the same as the one of the device's > we try to attach, that's OK. This means the other devices > use different IOMMU mappings, eventually will target the > MSI frame but they all work for the same user space client/VM. > x 1 or more devices has a different container than the device > under attachment: > It works on behalf of a different user space client/VM, > we can't attach the new device. I think there is a case however > where severals containers can be opened by a single QEMU. > > Of course the dynamic aspects, ie a new device showing up or an unbind > event bring significant complexity. > > 2) GICv2M with multiple 4kB frames > Each msi-frame is enumerated as msi-controller. The device tree > statically defines which device is attached to each msi frame. > In case devices are assigned we cannot change this attachment > anyway since there might be physical contraints behind. > So devices likely to be assigned to guests should be linked to a > different MSI frame than devices that are not. > > I think extended viability concept can be used as well. > > This model still is not ideal: in case we have a SR-IOV device > plugged onto an host bridge attached to a single MSI parent you won't > be able anyway to have 1 Virtual Function working for host and 1 VF > working for a guest. Only Interrupt translation (ITS) will bring that > feature. > > 3) GICv3 ITS > This one supports interrupt translation service ~ Intel > IRQ remapping. > This means a single frame can be used by all devices. A deviceID is > used exclusively by the host or a guest. I assume the ITS driver > allocates/populates deviceid interrupt translation table featuring > separate LPI spaces ie by construction different ITT cannot feature > same LPIs. So no need to do the extended viability test. > > The MSI controller should have a property telling whether > it supports interrupt translation. This kind of property currently > exists on IOMMU side for INTEL remapping. > Hi Eric, Would anyone be terribly upset if we simply assume the worst case scenario on GICv2m/M, have the IOMMU not claim IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP, and require the user to opt-in via the allow_unsafe_interrupts on the vfio_iommu_type1 module? That would make it very compatible with what we already do on x86, where it really is all or nothing. My assumption is that GICv2 would be phased out in favor of GICv3, so there's always a hardware upgrade path to having more complete isolation, but the return on investment for figuring out whether a given device really has this sort of isolation seems pretty low. Often users already have some degree of trust in the VMs they use for device assignment anyway. An especially prudent user can still look at the hardware specs for their specific system to understand whether any devices are fully isolated and only make use of those for device assignment. Does that seem like a reasonable alternative? Thanks, Alex -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
